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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
Within the assertive movements of inquiry and creation there dwells a quiet void of 
unknowing. Out of this abyss of infinite expansion the creative gesture is exhaled. Tracing a 
chaotic profusion of instances, images and inferences, this thesis is an exploratory delve into 
the active state of unknowing resident within the creative gesture. It is suggested that the 
non-discriminating and ubiquitous presence of unknowing conditions a method of doing and 
a mode of being that together become a state of method of unknowing. This is suggested not 
through description but by arousal, through the form of the thesis. For commensurate with 
the subject, the thesis is presented not so much as a document, but as an activity: a formal 
emulation of the postulate that invites an encounter with this state of method of unknowing. 
A way is opened into the nebulous territories of the unknown but arrival at any 
understanding is paradoxically dependent on the absence of a destination. The trajectory is 
therefore not, and must not be, conclusive.  
Divided into three parts, the thesis begins with a general appraisal of concepts and ideas 
which all manifest a tendency towards unknowing. Frequently this is by housing at their core 
some inscrutable and mysterious unknown element. This element is more often than not the 
very essence of the idea itself. These ideas or occurrences span nearly two and a half 
millennia of recorded thought in quite diverse and not necessarily related fields. The second 
part focusses on how the active principle of unknowing may reveal itself through methods of 
meaning making. The main vehicles of explication are those of poetics and hermeneutics. 
This is chiefly for reasons of attempting to demonstrate through the actual means employed, 
and in the case of a thesis, this is language. The third part introduces the archetypal image of 
a ruin as an aesthetic articulation of the state of method. The ruin is conceived of as an entity 
in a state of perpetual becoming and which, by means of this metaphysical topography, 
unveils the performing dynamics of unknowing as a state of method.  
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Prologue

 
 
[Interlocuters] 
 
RECEPTIONIST 
A PIECE OF ROCK IN ALLEGORY 
 
[Scene] 
A very large and ornate empty mirror frame is propped against a crumbling column 
just left of centre stage. The back drop is a fantastic affair of distant peaks, including 
the ominous glow of a volcanic caldera, atmospheric cumulus formations and 
mysteriously lit water surfaces with the occasional tumbling cascade. Receptionist is 
bent down and forward slightly and peers through the frame towards the audience. A 
piece of rock in allegory is reclining on the floor of a dinghy in front of the frame, 
the dinghy being loosely moored to it. The stage appears to be a slightly swampy 
plain of grasses and stone mounds. No obvious water bodies in sight, only in the 
distant shimmer from the backdrop. 
 
RECEPTIONIST: They had set out, we thought to sail but no flag was flown, no sail in 
the rigging. Nothing rigged. They were lost.    
A PIECE OF ROCK IN ALLEGORY: The fine salt of the high seas corrosive but tasty. 
R: Through the misty yawning doubts of chaotic profusion from which we begin. 
A.P.O.R.I.A: Beginning with A, as I do.  
R. A tempting trail you lead, but I shall blaze my own I shall, I do. You of course are 
welcome, as long as you follow. Follow in the right way…or else you’ll be lost. 
A.P.O.R.I.A: On course. 
R: So, after setting sail, that being where we began, departure essential, destination 
also but without fixing it exact, they set off, as we said. The first veil aside revealed 
the real, the mask of what they appeared to be doing and that appearance was all they 
had so hoisting the veil they caught the wind, violent winds of philosophising and 
along that infinite shore towards the evanescent horizon they chartered the unknown 
and called it a map. Unsure of the vessel and where it would take them, if it could 
take them, if they wanted to be taken, they alighted. The way had been read but none 
could agree what it said, at least what it meant. In any case they had all determined, 
harmoniously in disagreement with each other and that was the real beginning, 
knowing somewhat that there was now less to be determined, at least it needn’t be 
agreed upon which made progress a far more liberating event. Vertiginous stasis.   
 
                                                 

 The rhythm of the traditional iambic hexameter is unfortunately lost in this translation. The original 
is also lost. The prologue is preserved nearly in its entirety, though only as a translation. Only 
fragments of the three main episodes have survived. The stasima are believed to be close to complete 
in their preservation. The exodos is thought by some to belong to either a lost satyr play, suggesting A 
State of Method is part of a trilogy, or that it is an abandoned version of the first episode. The 
positioning of the dramaticule as the exodos, as is done so here, is also popular.  
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(At this point A piece of rock in allegory slowly rolls out of the dinghy and is sucked 
out of sight into the sandy alluvium of the swamp plain.) 
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Parodos 
 
 
The danger is in the neatness of identifications. 
         Beckett 
       
 Dante…Bruno.Vico..Joyce 
 
Scene 
 
Tempting kinship with the pre-Socratic’s conceptions of an originative 
substance or first principle, the activity of unknowing is here introduced as a primal 
mover. An ineluctable act of engagement that determines, either through a resistance 
to, or a willingness for, every aspect of material and immaterial being and doing. The 
creative gesture, the very act of life, of coming to be and of engagement with living, 
is not only a ‘wager on transcendence’1 but a continuous encounter with the 
unknown. This encounter, I (and the chorus) call the activity of unknowing, it is 
active and unavoidable. All knowledge stems from an initial engagement with the 
unknown, all life is driven from a seed whose infinite possibilities of growth cannot 
ever be known, pre-programmed, controlled or contained. Life is unknowing, death 
is known. Unknowing is a vital act, progenitive, creative. At the base of all inquiry, 
of all knowledge, lies this unknowing. It is the hidden, obscured originative force 
that precedes all movements. This thesis is a peripatetic adventure into that nebulous 
and indiscriminate dominion of unknowing. Through the associative affinity of ideas 
between disparate epochs, belief systems, cultures and continents, I would like to 
present unknowing as a kind of ‘human universal.’2  
                                                 
1
 George Steiner, Real Presences (London: Faber and Faber Ltd, 1989), 4. 
2
 Charles H. Kahn, The Art and Thought of Heraclitus: An edition of the fragments with translation 
and commentary (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 300. In coming to terms with the 
peculiar resonances between culturally and historically distant thinkers, Kahn surmises that such 
occurrences may be reflective of something akin to a human “universal.” 
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This is not so much an epistemology, or non-epistemology, but if anything, 
an existential aesthetics. It may pertain to metaphysics in the sense that Theodore 
Adorno (1903-1969) claims all philosophy does, or at least did and should do. 
Adorno’s personal experience of a perpetual postponement of defining the subject, 
the “about” of metaphysics, occasioned the realisation that that was in fact the very 
matter of metaphysics itself.
3
 In his eternal adjournment, a procrastination borne first 
from naïveté and then from a slow seeping awareness of another order of rhythm that 
could not be traced (and nor would doing so be of any benefit) Adorno comes as 
close as possible to the true evanescence of metaphysics. This fleeting will-o’-the-
wisp state is also perhaps as close as possible to describing the state of method that 
this thesis tenders as the unknowing that shepherds the creative gesture. The state of 
method tendered is immanent in the writing. It shapes the form, and directs the 
content of this thesis. The thesis is therefore not driving towards a knowing of 
unknowing but is driven by unknowing as the only method possible to arrive at the 
destined no place. 
The creative act is sparked by a deep abiding unknowing. Out of this dark 
cave of flickering shadows we are compelled inexorably towards the light. A light of 
true form, a light of individual truth. But this flight is not motivated by an idea or 
thought, it is motivated by an existential and metaphysical conundrum. It is the 
conundrum that underwrites Samuel Beckett’s (1906-1989) ‘obligation to express’4 
which is essentially an act of survival. It is the truth seekers propulsion for 
conversion urged by Søren Kierkegaard (1813-1855) to be taken up independently 
by the individual ‘because I can discover my own untruth only by myself, because 
only when I discover it is it discovered.’5 Therefore I am proposing that the 
conditions behind the creative gesture and which bring it into presence and which 
drive every compulsion of being and doing are that of an existential state of 
unknowing. I am calling this state a state of method for it is a method of making 
which is governed by a state of being. 
The unknown is not considered an entity or locus or logos but rather more as 
a relational activity. Therefore it is not static. It is ever changing, constantly engaged 
                                                 
3
 Theodore W. Adorno, Metaphysics, Concept and Problems, trans. Rolf Tiedmann and ed. by 
Edmund Jephcott (UK: Polity Press, 2000), 1-9. 
4
 Samuel Beckett, Disjecta, Miscellaneous Writings and a Dramatic Fragment, ed. Ruby Cohn (New 
York: Grove Press, 1984, 139. 
5
 Søren Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments: Johannes Climacus, ed. and trans. Howard V. Hong 
and Edna H. Hong (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1985), 14. 
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and forever elusive, thus it is that I call the unknown the activity of unknowing. 
Enclosed within every moment and every atom is an infinite void of unknowing. Our 
passage through the causal nexus of time and space is a continuous co-originating 
and co-expressive encounter with the unknown, such that existence in its entirety is 
tempered by the luminous refractions of unexpected engagement. We may well ask 
along with Johannus Climacus, ‘But what is this unknown against which the 
understanding in its paradoxical passion collides and which even disturbs man and 
his self-knowledge?’ and then be consoled by the efficiency of his absolute answer, 
‘It is the unknown,’ for what other answer can there be? Climacus determines that 
this ‘unknown’ cannot be any being, or thing, human or otherwise. Then more or less 
for convenience sake he calls it ‘the god,’ prudently qualifying such a dramatic and 
hefty title with ‘it is only a name we give to it.’ 6   
Without proposing a specific query or problem it is hoped that a mode of 
entry will reveal itself and without prescribing answers, certain questions will be 
provoked. These questions might be: How is the unknown present to us and how are 
we present to it? What kind of an It is it? Is it an It, or more of an Is? An Eckhartian 
“Isness” per chance. How do the subtle persuasions of unknowing affect their 
presence upon us? Is the aesthetic experience or artistic endeavour a bridging 
between knowing and unknowing and is that bridge, as the ‘arc of metaphor,’7 a 
means of encounter? 
This method of enquiry leads definitively away from the pointless pursuit of 
what Adorno calls ‘the sphere of false, deceptive and, [he] would say, mythical 
certainty.’8 While Adorno brings disgrace to myth with this statement by its alliance 
to falsity and deception and teams it with our nemesis “certainty,” he unwittingly 
proves its beguiling and paradoxical prowess. According to this thesis in its thorough 
approval of myth, to have “mythical certainty” would be to have the most desirable 
and trustworthy form of knowing. This form of certainty would be one whose North 
Star and Archimedean point are on the move. 
There is a certain presumption that, like time passing from here to there, 
moving from the past and into the future, ideas and knowledge begin from an 
undeveloped form and move assuredly towards enlightened awareness.. Yet much of 
                                                 
6
 Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments, 39. 
7
 Steiner, Real Presences, 176. 
8
 Adorno, Metaphysics, Concept and Problems, 144. 
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what we might securely presume to be a genuine movement towards something 
solid, clarified, understood, or in other words, known, is in fact the principle effort 
made in the approach towards what can only ever be a knowing of non-knowing or 
learned ignorance. This movement is expressed by Pseudo-Dionysius (late fifth to 
sixth century) as an “approach towards nothing” and is made for example in the 
processes of understanding God.
9
 At the triumphant moment of arrival the departure 
doors swings open and reveals the real destination. The success is in having another 
clarified point to depart from, with no return ticket and none required. Straight lines 
are rather satisfying, stabilising, comforting even, but they don’t actually exist. 
When it can be demonstrated that the infinite line is a circle, as Nicholas Cusanus
10
 
(1401-1464) does, there is very little hope for the direct route; S bends and blind 
corners only engineered out for the sake of delusion. If there is any hope of 
encountering then ‘It must be something that can be thought to be a straight line and 
a circle at the same time – that is, an absolute nothingness.’11  
With the weightiest of weights pulling upon us, Friedrich Nietzsche’s (1844-
1900) archenemy the ‘Spirit of Gravity,’ there surfaces a challenge: to resist the 
natural temptation of ‘turning nothing into something.’12  This is a problem Gary 
Barnham identifies with the work of Samuel Beckett (1906-1989) and the same can 
be said to arise with anything pertaining to metaphysics. The attentive and lurking 
threat,  when the vertigo of unanswered questions overwhelms is that of turning 
nothing into something and the unknown into the known. But following the dusty 
wheel ruts of our forebears, the known, the proved, the secure, will eventually lead to 
a very small gene pool. We must unfasten the cangues and risk disorientation. We 
must leap off the ladder with Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951) who encourages us 
to leave all knowing and understanding behind to ‘see the world aright.’13  
                                                 
9
 Pseudo-Dionysius; An understanding of God is not so much an approach towards something as 
towards nothing. 
10
 Also known as Nikolaus Krebs Chrypffs, Nycolaus Cancer de Coesse and Nicholas of Cusa. See 
Jasper Hopkins, A Concise Introduction to the Philosophy of Nicholas of Cusa (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1980). 
11
 Nishida Kitarō quoted by James W. Heisig in The Philosophers of Nothingness (Honolulu: 
University of Hawai’i Press, 2001), 78.  
12
 Gary Barnham, ‘Cinders: Derrida with Beckett,’ in Beckett and Philosophy, ed. Richard Lane, 
(New York: Palgrave Publishers Ltd, 2002), 55. 
13
 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, trans. D.F. Pears and B.F. McGuiness 
(London and New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1974), proposition 6.54.  
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The intractable and obstinate assertions of Reason, insisting on working in 
isolation: this is another problem. How does one break into the solitary confinement 
of such a well-fortified inmate? Must it be a “fugitive penetration”? Like that of the 
Gall’s in Beckett’s Watt, who seemingly without anything occurring, efficiently 
exacted their expertise upon the supplicant notes of a dormant instrument? The 
Gall’s though are more of a stand-in for Reason. Exercising their prodigious talents, 
they entered the residence of Mr Knott with great aplomb and departed with tidy 
conclusion, yet left Watt with an evasive but indubitable absence of real 
understanding. What is real understanding anyway? Felt? A matted compression of 
fibres. That possibly describes the state of Watt, he not being prone to feeling much. 
Or must it be ‘a collision at the limit of reason whose downfall is a necessary 
condition of approaching the idea of transcendence’?14  
 
Setting 
 
The pursuit of knowledge, clarity, substantiated or ‘justified true belief,’15 
‘exact conclusions,’16 fixed determined points of any orienting axis what-so-ever, 
statements of demonstrated fact, in short, all that a supported and validated thesis 
should be, is driven by a form of unknowing. It entirely depends on the risks taken as 
to what aspect of unknowing is engaged. It is has been made reasonably clear 
through the mechanisms of linguistic analysis, phenomenology and apophatic 
theology, for example, that we can never actually comprehend anything outside of 
certain personal limits of understanding. We are in other words constantly exploring 
that which we already intrinsically know some-how. This has two implications, one 
expansive and one decidedly restrictive, not to mention extremely dull. Accepting 
Socrates’s argument that ‘it is impossible for something known to be unknown, or 
for something unknown to be known,’17 unknowing is a movement towards 
knowing, but a knowing that we are already in possession of, yet without 
understanding or ‘having it.’18 The stultifying and restrictive implication of such an 
                                                 
14
 Koral Ward, Augenblick: The Concept of the ‘Decisive Moment’ in 19th- and 20th-Century Western 
Philosophy (Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2008), xiv. 
15
 See Plato, Theaetetus, trans. Robin A. H. Waterfield (London: Penguin Books Ltd, 2004). 
16
 See Søren Kierkegaard, Parables of Kierkegaard, ed. with Introduction by Thomas C. Oden (New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1978), from the parable “A Possibility,” 104-117. 
17
 Plato, Theaetetus, 93. 
18
 Ibid., 109. 
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assertion is that we are trapped in our own learning and cannot ever really come to 
know anything outside of it. Where-as, the expansive aspect, “the boundless,” 
implies that even though we may be constantly grasping but without ever getting a 
grip, there is yet something, things, many things, which lie outside our 
understanding. This has a most profound and relieving effect, unlike the reality of 
being a man that Beckett’s Watt grapples with. Somewhat ironically, unknowing is 
about as solidly, concretely, empirically, logically certain as anything can get. Like 
death, an unknown certainty. 
In the time of the epilogue, as George Steiner so poignantly claims we are, 
the density of the paper forest is becoming suffocating. Research now inevitably 
feeds off itself in a ‘parasitic discourse’ that has smothered the host to a point of non-
recognition. Assailed by such a farrago of ‘criticism, meta-criticism, dia-criticism, 
the criticism of criticism,’19 the original object or source of such reflection is 
annihilated. The following thesis is exemplar par excellence of this ‘grotesque’ 
imbalance. For the ensuing discourse is of a parasitic type so rarefied the host never 
actually existed. It needs no host, not through strength, but weakness. Its life-force is 
so frail that the weight of an anchor would drown it.  So, with the ominous hazard of 
hypocrisy, saddled with the charge of contradiction pawing at the stalls, the 
proceeding exposition attempts to demonstrate not through explanation but 
description, without explanation. The tenebrous risk at play is that the only 
demonstration given will be that of the parasitic secondary. My use of demonstrate 
here is meant as a kind of invitation to experience, an encounter with the material 
presented that is in some way direct and palpable. An experience which could 
provoke a rather more private intimacy than what the distant tone of a demonstrate 
which has at its stronghold a quantified and verifiable observation implies.  
I take Beckett as a guide, or rather Beckett takes me, as my Virgil, most adept 
shepherd into spheres of the unreachable unknown, this time with words on Joyce, 
whose writing he says, ‘is not about something; it is that something itself.’20 Whilst 
not endowed with the integrity (or genius) allowed by the creation of a unique lexical 
                                                 
19
 George Steiner, Real Presences, 48. 
20
 Beckett, Disjecta, 27. 
Parados  
7 
 
universe to express “that something itself” I attempt, in obeisance to ‘my master and 
my author,’21 at very least to not only be about but to also be.   
This approach also takes inspiration from Thomas Kasulis’s experience of 
translating Dōgen Kigen (1200-1253) which he describes as an intimate act of 
meeting halfway, a collaborative relationship of reception, engagement and 
transmission with Dōgen. Comparatively, as the aphorisms of Heraclitus (535-475 
B.C.) are awash with ambiguity the complexity of meanings prompts a dynamic and 
interpretative exchange between Heraclitus and the reader. If the ambiguity is taken 
as an intentional device as Kahn indicates then interpretation of the fragments 
necessarily solicits ‘a principle of hermeneutical generosity on the part of the reader 
and commentator.’22 From the perspective of Steiner this generosity would be the 
solicitation of freedoms and the meeting of these freedoms would be a ‘cortesia.’23 
According to Steiner this cortesia is a necessary act of trust and discretion. It is this 
generosity or cortesia which allows the delicate unfolding of the creative gesture for 
it is between the sensitive spaces of impartment and reception that the emollient 
openness of a state of unknowing eases transmission.  
I absolutely do not mean to imply that the following displays any of the 
poetic or literary authenticity that we find in the work of say Heraclitus, Dōgen and 
Beckett, but I absolutely do wish to appoint them as sovereign authorities as to what 
methodological means might be used to express something of the state of method 
that I here propose. Adorno cites Beckett’s works as the ‘only truly relevant 
metaphysical productions since the war.’24 They do not shy away from the 
uncomfortable and unanswerable truths of human existence, like rubbish bins and all 
the muck in them. The aversion to such unsightliness is exactly the reason why in 
Adorno’s evaluation, ‘metaphysics…has slipped into material existence.’25 If the 
matter at hand demands abandoning the straight lines of reasonability and fronting 
the curves with reckless abandon to effect a necessary and inevitable “collision at the 
limit of reason” then understandably partakers may be few. The tellurian order is 
strong and the spirit of gravity perhaps stronger. When even metaphysics is plunged 
into materialism we experience what Kierkegaard describes as ‘a muddiness of the 
                                                 
21
 Dante Alighieri, The Divine Comedy, trans. Allen Mandelbaum (New York: Everyman’s Library, 
1995), 61. 
22
 Kahn, The Art and Thought of Heraclitus, 92. 
23
 Steiner, Real Presences, 155, 171, 176. He says, ‘tact of heart, is of the essence,’ 155. 
24
 Adorno, Metaphysics, Concept and Problems, 117. 
25
 Ibid. 
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mind in which earthly distinction ferments almost grossly.’26 We are wont to know, 
yet not too much and the giddying crash course of unknowing certainly appears 
foolhardy in many lights and simply ignorant in others. In failing to achieve ‘the 
profound, immediate, experiential validity of Beckett’s writings’27 at least an 
example may be given as to what was aimed for.   
Constantly attended by the admonishment of Beckett ‘the danger is in the 
neatness of identifications’28 and like Ruby Cohn in her treatment of the 
miscellaneous fragments which compose Beckett’s Disjecta, I also wish ‘to avoid 
embalming the whole,’29 through a comprehensive submersion in tidy statements of 
category. Attendant to Beckett and his lurking reproofs is the equally vituperate 
Heraclitus (I have even insinuated an inspired pairing of these two, envisaging 
Heraclitus as the archetypal Beckettian protagonist). Heraclitus views the learning of 
the polymath with disapprobation. He doubts the real effects of such aptitude for 
garnering nous, otherwise it would have taught his impressive predecessors. That is 
not to say polymathy does not have its place, but alone it will never reach the depths 
of fundamental insight procured through experience.  
The ensuing battlefield of names, dates, ideas, declarations and declamations 
may very well support the scepticisms of Heraclitus by proving their wisdom (that 
polymathy does not promote learning), but I hope too that in taking a “step 
embarrassing beyond words”30 beyond all the declamations and declarations the 
wisdom of Heraclitus will be discernible in a more positive incarnation.   
Unknowing denounces the authority of explanation and demands that the 
integrity of its inherent state be left unsullied by the niggling probes of determined 
inquisition. Yet at the incalculable risk of flying in the face of such a withering edict 
                                                 
26
 Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments: Johannes Climacus, 12. 
27
 Martin Esslin, Mediations, Essays on Brecht, Beckett, and the Media, 80. Esslin upholds the 
philosophical immediacy of Beckett’s prose over work advocating its own logic in representational 
hypothesis, writing about rather than being, proving rather than demonstrating. He identifies Sartre in 
particular and compares his narrative prose and theatre, which may illustrate a point but not 
demonstrate it, with that of Beckett, asserting the “superiority” of Beckett’s work, ‘not only because 
Beckett’s work is on a higher level of artistic intensity and creativeness, but also because Sartre’s 
narrative prose and theatre clearly bear the marks of having been preconceived as an illustration of 
general concepts and are therefore denied the profound, immediate, experiential validity of Beckett’s 
writings.’ Esslin argues that Beckett’s ‘categorical refusal to allow any philosophical meaning or 
thesis to be attributed to his work’ is paradoxically the very thing that imbues his work with a 
significance and profundity that transcends mere supposition and elevates the work to ‘human 
documents of great importance’ that ‘constitute the culmination of existential thought itself.’ 
28
 Beckett, Disjecta, 19. 
29
 Ruby Cohn in the introduction to Disjecta, 7. 
30
 See second episode, p 167 in this volume for quotation reference from Steiner.  
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this thesis confronts the necessities of defining to some degree through some manner 
of explanation what it decrees inexplicable. Such a flagrant contradiction does have 
hidden potential. The possibility, for example, of arriving at the happy hiatus of a 
coincidentia oppositorum: the possibility of paradox, the seed of all life. A truly 
fruitless endeavour it would be to define the parameters of the subject, whose only 
substantiality is that of having none. But I would take up the paradoxical whimsy of 
the ‘truly false’ which as it is presented in Plato’s Theaetetus (as a passing jest), 
means something ‘having abandoned its own nature for the nature of its opposite’ 
can actually occur in a manner entirely opposite to itself.
31
  
The vastness of the dimensions of thought represented in the following is 
expressly to make evident the thoroughly permeating, foundational, fundamental and 
meta-historical nature of the substanceless subject. The value of such a desiccated 
medley of species is justifiably questionable. The objective is that with the collective 
force of the ideas re-presented here and with as little speculative distortion as 
possible but as much imaginary flourish as the thought inspired, something of a 
picture will begin to transpire in which the edges may be traced, yet with the centre 
remaining infinitely variable in response to each act of intimacy. 
I would like to refer to an image Kasulis gives us of a narrative tapestry as 
the way to approach the reading of Dōgen’s oeuvre, ‘In the case of Dōgen’s 
thought,’ he says, ‘we have something more like a tapestry depicting a single scene, 
rather than a fabric with a repeating pattern, so it is difficult to take any single, 
isolated idea as truly representative.’32 In the case of this thesis, and this introduction 
alone, neither can be clearly read without the full setting being present in the mind at 
the same time. What I am explaining here can make very little sense as a 
disembodied snapshot of the full picture. Each stitch adds to the whole, it does not 
represent it.  At a glance, the chaotic profusion of ideas re-presented may defy any 
semblance of cohesion, especially because of the economic, positively parsimonious, 
provision of reasoning to weld together the ideas into an ordered whole. Like a giant 
wall tapestry, only when seen from a distance is the detail of singular colours and 
threads integrated into a meaningful picture or idea.  
                                                 
31
 Plato, Theaetetus, 95.  
32
 Thomas Kasulis, ‘The Incomparable Philosopher: Dōgen on How to Read the Shōbōgenzō,’ in 
Dōgen Studies, ed. William R. LaFleur (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1985), 85.  
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Thinking requires a directive. The rubrics under which we develop ideas are 
like anchors and compasses. But it is a very fine balance between exploratory 
discovery and organised expeditions to pre-ordained destinations. I have a grapnel 
cast, catching the current but not entirely adrift, at the behest of the captains orders. 
 
Set 
 
In the ‘farraginous chronicle’33 that follows, the line of thought is far from 
straight. It does not attempt to trace a chronological nor comprehensive history. The 
trail navigates over two millennia of recorded thought, in a haphazard manner, from 
the “Bitter River” of ancient surrounds to the ever flowing waters of Heraclitus, into 
the depths of the many staring abysses of doubt, redemption and eternal return 
through to the yonder shores of nirvāna. The odyssey sets sail from the Ionian city of 
Miletus some 2500 years ago with the birth of natural philosophy and with it 
Anaximander’s (611-546 B.C.) elusive conception of τό ἄπειρον (First Episode) and 
navigates the globe and her infinite nether regions through vertiginous projections of 
time and space into a non-existent future contained in the augenblick of being-time, 
to disembark on the alluvial harbour plain of Ephesus, a mere meander from the 
departure port (Third Episode).   
  Whilst not particularly about them, a few characters do emerge as 
protagonists whose disparate voices form the warp and weft of a very loosely woven 
whole. The resulting image made up as much by the gaps left between the threads, of 
which there are profusely more than not, for as infinite as the possibilities of form 
are, the formless is ever more unbounded. The leading voices are those of Heraclitus, 
Dōgen, Nishida Kitarō (1870-1945) and Beckett. Forming the descant are Cusanus, 
Nietzsche and Nishitani Keiji (1900-1990), with supporting roles, cameo 
appearances and sonorous effects by a truly eclectic choir of songsters striking their 
notes with a startling harmony amidst the discord of times and temperaments. In 
consonance with the idea of bi-directionality derived from Nishida and which by 
extension dissolves a unilateral sense of time, and with a little ‘green mountains’ 
                                                 
33
 James Joyce, Ulysses (London: Penguin Books, 2000), 554. This quote taken from Joyce meant to 
describe life in general, but I would like to appropriate it here to explain the style of discourse, which 
notwithstanding, is certainly to some degree (I hope, for that is certainly my intention) a reflection of 
how life might be interpreted. 
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walking,’34 these estranged participants can be ushered into a relatively meaningful 
grouping. They are not necessarily related by fields of interest and expertise though 
they may share some, and nor by historical association or the customary lineal 
understanding of time but possibly more by the one resounding question that 
Nishitani identifies as the basis of any existential enquiry (and by default the 
religious quest) ‘For what do I myself exist?’35  
By introducing this question here I am suggesting that the same question can 
be found airing its bemusing innuendo close to the central motivations of the 
heterogeneous ideas and thoughts presented in the following by the partaking team. 
Commenting on the possibility of influences and connections between Ancient 
Greece and the Orient, Kahn surmises that it is just as probable for a spontaneous 
simultaneity of ideas to occur in like-minded people irrespective of geographical or 
historical proximity. This perspective brings a whole new dimension to comparative 
methods of research and is much more favourably aligned with the approach taken in 
this thesis than a strictly historical methodology.  
In accord with the content each episode is arranged slightly differently. The 
first as a general appraisal with many thematic variations takes on a numbering 
system. The second, which is more literary and descriptive, simply uses titles to 
divide the chapter. The third being formulated around ruins breaks the chapter up 
into fragments. These fragments are incomplete as one would find the fragments of a 
ruin. The term “fragment” is also a genuflection to all of the ancient thinkers, 
makers, designers, inventors and writers of the world whose work is left to us in 
fragments that we endeavour to reconstruct - the process of which must entail a very 
dynamic and creative exchange with unknowing.  
Some categories re-occur in different settings. This is because they are to be 
thought of as both nouns and verbs, so to speak. As nouns ideas would occur in the 
                                                 
34
 Eihei Dōgen, Moon in a Dewdrop: Writings of Zen Master Dōgen, trans. Robert Aitken, Reb 
Anderson, Ed Brown, Norman Fischer, Arnold Kotler, Daniel Leighton, Lew Richmond, David 
Schneider, Kazuaki Tanahashi, Katherine Thanas, Brian Unger, Mel Weitsman, Dan Welch and 
Philip Whalen and ed. Kazuaki Tanahashi (New York: North Point Press, 1995), 98. The phrase 
‘green mountains’ walking’ is taken from the ‘Mountains and Waters Sūtra’ of Dōgen. The sense of 
the phrase I would like to appropriate for my purposes here is that when we relinquish the usual 
perception of things understanding expands. For example the idea that mountains do not walk just 
because their walking doesn’t appear to be like human walking.  
35
 Keiji Nishitani, Religion and Nothingness, trans. Jan Van Bragt (Berkeley and Los Angeles: 
University of California Press, 1982), 21. 
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first chapter under the auspices of ‘the unknown’ and as verbs in the second chapter 
under ‘methods of meeting.’  
 The first episode is an exploration of different occurrences and encounters 
with the unknown, under the epithet of “the countenance of unknowing,” in other 
words, how the activity of unknowing might appear to us. The appearance or 
experience of this activity is more readily recognised in some thing or idea that is 
unknown or unknowable by its nature and that is why I am calling “the unknown” 
the “countenance of unknowing.”   It may appear for example as an idea within 
philosophy that depends in some way on an unknowable principle or element. The 
Buddhist conception of śūnyatā (emptiness) would fall into this category as would 
the absolute nothingness as espoused by the Kyoto school of philosophy. The 
spacings and lacunae of linguistic theory would be another incidence of how the 
unknown might occur. These thetic gaps also have particular resonance with the void 
of śūnyatā, the infinite, the indefinite and boundless τό ἄπειρον (the apeiron), the 
oblivion of memory’s edge that Marc Augé writes of and the unreadable silent 
centres of books of which Maurice Blanchot (1907-2003) writes.  
 The episode takes the form of a general, non-comprehensive, discursive 
appraisal of these so-called occurrences of the unknown. Loosely woven around the 
apeiron, this recurring leitmotif snakes its way through the labyrinth of notions and 
images as a grounding yet intangible theme. The meaning of the apeiron is crudely 
understood as ‘the indefinite’ or ‘boundless.’ Both of these terms and concepts have 
immediate relevance for even the most basic idea of what unknowing might be. 
Furthermore, quite apart from its philosophical and scientific connotations, the 
apeiron is a concept shrouded in mystery and is essentially an unknowable and 
unverifiable idea. For both of these reasons I have chosen it as an appropriate and 
somewhat symbolic thematic footing.  
It is suggested the apeiron is a very early rendering of the coincidentia 
oppositorum and as the architect of this floating structure Anaximander is by default 
positioned betwixt two opposing worlds. Even though held by most to be at the 
inception of a scientific movement away from archaic world conceptions he himself 
still stands as an antecedent to the bridging of worlds that Heraclitus is generally 
more recognised for. At the nexus of a rift between scientism and mythology 
Anaximander does not entirely abandon the shifting and thaumaturgic perspectives 
of the mythological world. We need look no further than the concept of the apeiron 
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for exemplification of this ambiguous role. It is precisely the unresolved and 
contradictory positioning that makes him inadvertently perfectly poised as a gateway 
to both views. Apart from merely his words being poetic as Simplicius reports, there 
is something undeniably lyrical about the graceful might of the apeiron.  
Broken up into some twenty-six thematic divisions, these parts, some small 
vignettes, others fully dressed scenes, are the pulpy protuberances issuing from the 
void, like impudent blemishes on the perfect complexion of nothingness, a ripple on 
the stillest surface of serene emptiness. Like border points or docking stations, 
beached peninsulas exposed to the north-east-south-west winds of speculation, each 
idea even most briefly sighted, traces an outline of the formless form and draws a 
discernible face upon which to fix the minds-eye. But like the mask of persona 
which Nishitani defines as ‘through and through real’36 there is however, nothing at 
all behind it. The mask, the outcrop, the peripheral blip is the through and through 
real form of absolute nothingness. The appearance of unknowing in forms, concepts 
and ideas that grapple with inexactitudes and unknowable moving indeterminable 
elements of flux, paradox, contradiction, imaginary realities and illusion to name a 
few is the through and through real mask of the unknown. It is this mask to which 
the first episode attends.  
The divisions of the episode follow two orderings. One is that of a standard 
numeric system in which related subsets are grouped under the same number. For 
example “The Apeiron” as the first section, is number 1. All other parts that relate to 
the apeiron are accordingly grouped under 1. For example, “Oblivion and Memory” 
which as its own section and theme still relates back to apeiron and is therefore 1.2. 
However, unlike most numbering systems, the ordering of this standardised 
numerical system is not consecutive. This is because there is another more intuitive 
ordering of themes. There are subtle links between most of the divisions and it is 
these links that direct the actual ordering of the episode. Not surprisingly there is an 
ordered sense of chaos about the structure. The intended effect is that the reader will 
somehow experience something of what is being written about in the very processes 
involved in navigating the ideas presented. The unexplained and more subtle links 
will likewise hopefully invite the reader to take up their own path of meaning by 
meeting halfway with the text.  
                                                 
36
 Nishitani, Religion and Nothingness, 71. 
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To assist the reader, a little nudge towards the general current, to ease the 
nose into the flow, sniff out the general direction and follow the whiff upon the wind 
in sail, each subset is précised with a brief indication of why it presumes to be part of 
the whole; like ambiguous arrows on a track to nowhere. As Carter Wheelock writes 
in the context of Jorge Luis Borges’s (1899-1986) ‘tantalizingly cryptic’ prose, there 
is the possibility that much like the brief comments Borges may on occasion provide 
for his reader ‘these little aids’ may not serve ‘the imperious hunger for the 
explanation of it all.’ I would hope though that they do impart some form of 
information, even if it be ‘only the value of another oblique metaphor.’37 All of the 
ideas presented are seen to be in some way engaged with, formed by, or are in the 
process of creating or exposing an unknown principle. Or they may simply incite the 
void, the great abyss of unknowing as we contemplate their significance, their 
meaning or presence in our world.  
The second episode is concerned more with the methods in which we might 
come to deal with or engage with this activity of unknowing. Methods that might 
provoke an encounter with unknowing, and if not, then are certainly open and 
inviting to the possibility. The invitation implies at very least a recognition of 
unknowing and this second episode endeavours to present some of those methods in 
possession of invitations.   
As the dominant mode of the following is necessarily that of language and 
because of the stated intention to demonstrate rather than explicate, it follows that 
the demonstration necessarily be imparted through aspects of language. Accordingly 
this episode is dominated by the presence of language, although not entirely. And 
importantly, the prominence of language here is not meant to imply the equivalent 
imbalance in the actual presence of unknowing in the world at large. The points 
made should be thought of as metaphoric as much as being specific to the subject in 
question.  
For example, one of the final sections of the episode, titled “Elusive 
understanding; whose language?” considers the inventiveness of personal languages 
to transmit meanings, the results of which are often thought so obtuse that no 
meaning can be gleaned whatsoever. This is not exclusive to language alone but is a 
                                                 
37
 Carter Wheelock, The Mythmaker: A Study of Motif and Symbol in the Short Stories of Jorge Luis 
Borges (Austin and London: University of Texas Press, 1969), 55.  
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feature of all creative exertions reaching for some hitherto unknown and probably 
ungraspable newness and perhaps most overtly in the visual and plastic arts. What 
can be taken from the offering of this part through its example of language, is a 
mode of engaging with the unfathomable, the recondite and the unknown - through 
unknowing. In this instance it is called transmission, but to open to the transmission 
one must be willing to let go of understanding and allow the knowing of non-
knowing to seep in through the cracks of our constructed realities.  
As another example, the following section of the episode, titled “The 
concrete and everyday reality; lived experience,” introduces the idea of true lived 
experience as a standpoint outside of objective knowledge. It is one of the exceptions 
to the dominant treatment of language matters per se, though by proxy language will 
obviously be a part of lived and everyday experience. Somewhat paradoxically, the 
minutiae and supposed trivia of diurnal routine are presented as the secret passage – 
disguised by their commonplace invisibility – past objectified knowledge. To use 
this example as a paradigm for how the activity of unknowing might occur and how 
we can apply it outside of the given context I would suggest one possibility as an 
idea. In everything we do and everything that is right before us, often anonymous in 
its prominence and obviousness, there is the potential for radical conversion. Right 
on the other side of knowing is the infinite and obscured face of unknowing, but 
everything looks the same – on the outside. Everyday reality is not just washing the 
bowls and polishing the spoons, it is seeing the refracting and magical reflections of 
the dustless mind beaming back off the surface of the spoon. Unknowing is not a 
cloudy and turgid soup of mashed nothingness, it is every little possible taste and 
flavour and scent that we have yet to discover.  
The third episode is an adventure indirectly into, out of, through and behind 
the formless form of the state of method that the previous two episodes have set up. 
In this final episode ruins are cast as an uncanny and quintessential representative of 
what I put forward as the features distinctive to the state of method of unknowing. 
These features, or, better said: flags, beacons, portents, hints, glimmers, indicators, 
auguries or evocative signals, are the unity or identity of opposites, somewhat 
cryptically yet potently described by the Heraclitean phrase palintropos harmoniē (a 
tuning or fitting together which comes about through a turning back on itself) or the 
coincidentia oppositorum of Cusanus, all of which have their affiliations with 
paradox, another principal indicator. These are joined by the poetic voice, metaphor 
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and symbolic imagery, any notion in dalliance with the infinite, void, eternity and 
śūnyatā (emptiness). What all of these have in common is a pronounced leaning 
towards ambiguity. Either/or is definitely not part of this picture. This and that 
become this is that and that is this and this is this and that is that and this.  
As the first episode is guided by the leitmotif of the apeiron, the “boundless,” 
this episode is conducted through the eternal passages of boundless time. In 
Nietzsche’s The Gay Science the image of the hour glass is considered a synecdoche 
for the greater cosmological dimensions of his theory of eternal return and here time 
is suggestively used as a type of synecdoche for unknowing. Three particular 
treatments of time are absorbed and reconfigured in relationship to the ruin and each 
other as an exposition of this synecdoche. These are: the concept of ruin time taken 
from Florence Hetzler, being-time (uji) from Dōgen and various configurations of 
the nunc stans, most prominently, Nietzsche’s conception of augenblick (moment or 
in the blink of an eye). With the troubling aid of time the coincidentia oppositorum 
is fittingly enacted as our idea of time both helps and hinders understanding. With 
the things most familiar to us we have to throw the mind off its habitual course to see 
the world aright. As Dōgen warns in the fascicle Uji just because the appearance of 
time as coming and going is common to all this by no means indicates that all have a 
right understanding of time. Precisely because it is so close to us we do not doubt or 
question it thoroughly enough to really comprehend it. This thinking echoes that 
expressed by Heraclitus when he writes that whilst the logos is common to all they 
(the all) fail to comprehend it. It is only the obvious that is comprehended and the 
obscure or enigmatic are left for those willing to doubt, question or discover. In both 
Heraclitus and Dōgen this discovery is an entirely independent and individual 
venture therefore it is unable to be stated in absolutes or fixed terms. These are but 
some of the byways taken on the path of unknowing.  
Ruins are generalised into an archetype, avoiding any historical or 
archaeological investigation that would be pertinent to a specific site but for the 
present purposes is not of significance or assistance. Through their metaphysical 
topography ruins are staged as an outward and palpable manifestation of unknowing, 
an appropriately contradictory possibility. They give formal substance to a 
substanceless form and do so without the usual weightiness of gravity which always 
threatens to overwhelm the haze with smoke.  
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The flâneur of the imaginary is invoked and invited to experience this 
creative bi-directional expressive state conditioned by unknowing in a meta-
existential meander through ruins being time. The physical site (imagined) exists 
through a paradoxical dialectic of presence and absence. It exhibits all of the 
unifying contradictions that colour the strokes of unknowing as they paint their 
image of life into our being.  
 
In short 
 
Certain qualities are indicated as auguries of where might dwell the activity 
of unknowing, and at the same time what qualities this activity might come to arise 
from. These are paradox, poetry, metaphoric and symbolic language, transitions of 
opposites in unity or coincidence, conceptions of the infinite, faith and the religious 
quest, the verity of illusion, time as a momentary and continuous meeting with 
being, the pursuit of the existential subject in any manner, openings and awakenings 
to presence, mutual bi-directional exchanges that could be of absence and presence, 
universals and particulars or negations and affirmations.    
   
Ruins are introduced as a navigable material means of encountering the 
nebulous dominion of unknowing. The fragmentary form of incessant becoming that 
sketches their ever changing vista finds its parallels in the philosophical concepts of 
Dōgen’s uji, Nishida’s basho, Nietzsche’s Eternal Recurrence and Heraclitus’s 
theories of flux and the identity of opposites.   
 
Atop his 100 foot pole Dōgen casts off.  
 
Zeus reigns thunderous yet. 
 
 
…and then perhaps this is more about Beckett (the work of) than anything 
else. Beckett is the “fugitive penetration.” A metaphysical quest enacted through the 
mask of illusion. However, as is established, the “through and through” realness of 
this mask is the face of reality that we encounter through the mask. 
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N.B. 
 
On the matter of God; there is no doubt that the God inference is active in 
much of what is presented here and it should be understood at the outset that whilst I 
am not taking any measures to avoid this inference – the inference of the presence of 
God, not only here but everywhere – neither am I purposefully implying it. It seems 
to me that God - apart from the distinct disadvantage of being nothing short of a 
swear-word, the inverted modern blaspheme, nearly as bad as “post-modern” - in 
certain rather dominant spheres of the rationalised and realistic, is a very convenient 
mode or concept through which the mode or concept of unknowing finds particularly 
steady footing.  
In Walter Benjamin’s (1892-1940) perennially influential treatise on 
translation,
38
 he defines the act of translation as a mode. The task of the translator is 
to return to the mode of the original text. The translation is not about the 
broadcasting of information but the communication of an encounter with the text as 
it was once conceived and then now as it is received. Consequently to be true to the 
original the translation will never be the same as it. If the God concept, or more 
importantly the individual’s relationship to the God concept, can be thought of as a 
translatable mode then it would be this mode which, in a ‘cloud of unknowing,’39 
moves us towards absolute nothingness and can be appropriated as an example of 
what I am not defining as unknowing.  
 
 
So be satisfied with abridged allusion and brief hints, since the verification of 
this discussion would call for laying down principles and explaining details 
which my present moment does not allow, nor do my concern and thought 
turn toward such things. The keys of hearts are in God’s hand; He opens 
hearts when He wills, as He wills, and how He wills. The only thing opening 
up at this moment is three chapters.
40
 
                                                 
38
 Walter Benjamin, Illuminations, trans. Harry Zohn, ed. and intr. Hannah Arendt, (New York: 
Schocken Books, 2007), 69-82. ‘The Task of the Translator,’ was originally written as an introduction 
to the translation of Baudelaire’s Tableaux Parisiens. 
39
 See Annonymous, The Cloud of Unknowing and the Book of Privy Counseling, ed. William 
Johnston (New York: Image Books Doubleday, 2005).   
40
 Abu Hamid Al-Ghazālī, The Niche of Lights, trans. David Buchman (Utah: Brigham Young 
University Press, 1998), 2. 
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I 
The Unknown 
The Countenance of Unknowing 
 
 
1.  The Apeiron 
 
Boundless, infinite and indefinite, Anaximander’s τὸ ἄπειρον (the apeiron) is a most 
befitting beginning to the ensuing adopted family of ideas that through conceptual 
kinship I am housing together under the aithereal rubric of the unknown. If this 
exploration was at all faithful to the entropy of times arrow then το ἄπειρον would 
be the appropriate historical starting point for the investigation. It may also be 
misleading to commence this far from historical record, at the inception of what 
could be deemed the (documented) seed from which sprout the following wandering 
tendrils of thought. Yet by doing so invites certain presumptions of direction and 
thus more pointedly initiates the primal movement of unknowing which treads a very 
fine line between the unexpected and the mistaken. By being misled we may have the 
fortune to happen upon ‘the trackless and unexplored,’1 and there, if at all 
anywhere, we might encounter the elusive trail of the unknown. The unfathomable 
nature of Anaximander’s τὸ ἄπειρον, not only as a concept but also because of the 
tremendous complications with doxographical evidence, makes of it an archetypal 
unknown. I do not think it insignificant that such an enigmatic and unrestrained idea 
as τὸ ἄπειρον features so early in the annals of speculative thought, and whilst 
reneging on an anti-lineal standpoint on time, I suggestively position this seed of all 
doubt at the beginning of this appraisal and will repeatedly return to it throughout 
this episode as a token and perhaps ironic anchor.   
 
                                                 
1
 Heraclitus, Fr. D. 18 He who does not expect will not find out the unexpected, for it is trackless and 
unexplored. Charles H. Kahn, The Art and Thought of Heraclitus: An edition of the fragments with 
translation and commentary (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 31. 
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Anaximander is part of a trilogy of Milesians, along with Thales (624-546 
B.C.) before him and his younger contemporary Anaximenes (585-525 B.C.), who 
forged a way through the thunderbolts and foam of the land of mythos to the well 
paved road of logos. Thales heads the procession and marks the beginning of a 
rationalist approach to the recondite mysteries of the natural world through new 
empirical methods based on primarily observable phenomena that abandon the 
mytho-poeic formulations of the archaic world conception. Whilst Thales claims the 
honorific title of the first philosopher, it is Anaximander’s development of a new 
cosmology that, in the words of Charles Kahn, ‘asserted itself with the total force of 
a volcanic eruption’2 and which can be described as ‘the springhead of Greek natural 
philosophy.’3  
A cosmogony that was largely genealogical and most notable in the 
Theogony of Hesiod (between 750-650 B.C.) persisted up until Thales. Indeed 
inclusive of Thales the effects of the mythological precedents are still evident even 
whilst speculations and measurements of the heavenly bodies were urging belief 
systems in an entirely new direction.
4
 The new Ionian cosmogonical speculation was 
still signatory to the burning questions left unanswered from Hesiod’s Theogony 
‘What gods were born in the beginning? Who first of all, who next?’5 Creation 
myths, primordial origins, teleologies, ‘waxings and wanings and destructions,’6 still 
dominated early Greek natural philosophy. Enduring and inconclusive, speculation 
on an originative substance, cause or first principle remains unclarified, the only 
definitive supposition, its indefinability. Whether or not meant as an originative 
substance, if a substance at all, the apeiron (τὸ ἄπειρον) of Anaximander is regarded 
as a form of arche (ἀρχή) or first principle (in company with nearly every other basic 
element that presented with any obvious credentials in immediate and observable 
phenomena). 
The apeiron of Anaximander perhaps heralds the first fathoming and 
explication within a Western context, outside of a mythological or theological 
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framework, of an unknowable yet omnipresent generative force, and as Aryeh 
Finkelberg states, ‘Anaximander’s Apeiron is perhaps the most obscure notion in 
Greek philosophy.’7 Scholarly polemic surrounding the apeiron inadvertently 
illustrates the very sine qua non of the concept, its essentially ungraspable, 
uncontainable and abstruse nature. The task of understanding Anaximander’s 
concept of the apeiron is fraught with a magnitude of perhaps insurmountable 
hurdles, not least of which is the fact that, as Kahn explicitly demonstrates, in the 
one extant fragment available through the doxographical evidence, there is, even if 
just on grammatical grounds, ‘no term in the fragment which could refer to the 
ἄπειρον.’8  
The actual fragment in question is preserved as a mixture of quotation and 
comment by Theophrastus (c.371-287 B.C.) who, as a pupil of Aristotle (384-322 
B.C.), compiled a vast history of philosophical thought as part of a grandiose 
encyclopaedic project of Aristotle’s. Unfortunately most of the general history and 
all of the more detailed accounts of specific philosophers have perished. There are 
three principle versions of Theophrastus’s account.9 They come to us through 
Simplicius writing a millennium later, who is considered the most accurate and 
reliable source, and also from Pseudo-Plutarch of the second century A. D. and 
Hippolytus from the third century A. D. Whilst Simplicius, due to his apparent 
diligence and faithful renditions of original extracts is regarded as a trustworthy 
source of verbatim quotations from Theophrastus, there is still some contention as to 
whether he actually had recourse to the original Phys. Opin. (Φυσικῶν Δόξαι) or was 
reliant on another commentary on Aristotle’s Physics by Alexander of Aphrodisias - 
which is now also lost.
10
  
This rather rudimentary excursion into the “excerpts and epitomes” of 
Anaximander should at least give some indication of the hazardous distillation 
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process of the doxographical sources, that doesn’t necessarily result in the extraction 
of a rarefied essence. As Kahn so flatly submits ‘all we can attempt to do is refine 
the surviving ore out of the dross that has accumulated through centuries of excerpts 
and epitomes.’11 The flecks and glints of promise are all embedded within the 
following fragment: 
 
Anaximander [son of Praxiades, of Miletus, the successor and pupil of 
Thales] declared the Boundless [τὸ ἄπειρον] to be the principle and element 
of existing things, having been the first to introduce this very term of 
“principle”; he says that it is neither water nor any other of the so-called 
elements, but some different, boundless nature, from which all the heavens 
arise and the κόσμοι within them; out of those things whence is the generation 
for existing things, into these again does their destruction take place, 
according to what must needs be; for they make amends and give reparation 
to one another for their offense, according to the ordinance of time, speaking 
of them thus in rather poetical terms. It is clear that, having observed the 
change of the four elements into one another, he did not think fit to make any 
one of these the material substratum, but something else besides these. (Phys. 
Opin. Simplicius)
12
 
 
It would be reasonable to surmise that the ensuing polemic around 
Anaximander’s apeiron was due chiefly, if not entirely, to the muddling and 
meddling of minds, often whose main prerogative was to confirm or support their 
own conceptual frameworks. Both Aristotle and Theophrastus are liable on that 
count. H.B.  Gottschalk believes that most attempts to describe the apeiron fall into 
the same error as Aristotle, which comes from ‘trying to describe the Apeiron in 
terms which make sense to themselves and their audience.’13 These terms are 
generally in accordance with theories of prime matter or principle substances from 
which all other things derive, be it in a modified sense or contained as potentiality 
within the ἀρχή itself. Or, in the outlook of Aristotle, a complete abandoning of 
systems predicated on origins, for these still implicitly corroborate the creation 
myths, and so the ἀρχή as a point or site of inception is rejected outright. Complicit 
                                                 
11
 Kahn, Anaximander, 12. This is not to suggest that an incredible amount of ore has not been mined, 
and I hope that this most cursory evaluation serves not to diminish or demean those efforts in any way 
but rather to marvel at the quantity of value that has been extrapolated considering the involved and 
complex process of extraction.  
12
 Ibid., 166. 
13
 H. B. Gottschalk, ‘Anaximander's “Apeiron.”’ Phronesis 10, no. 1 (1965): 50. 
First Episode  
25 
 
with this rejection is his idea of an ‘eternal and ungenerated’ world. This shift in the 
fundamental constructs of early Greek thought did not however take-off. The initial 
revolutionary spark of scientific scandal dwindled to a dim light, and the two 
foremost schools of Hellenistic thought continued to fuel the Vulcan forge and 
‘generate the cosmos.’14  Beginnings of course cannot exist without endings – albeit 
if the beginning and end are common
15
 - so consequently, generation naturally 
requests company of its partner destruction. On this count though ‘there does not 
seem to have been the same unanimity.’16 Reflective perhaps of the great mystery 
that death continues to be, though curiously it is the only unavoidable and known 
certainty in life.  
The inference of a material substance dominates the interpretations of 
Aristotle and in following him, that of Theophrastus. In brief summation of the 
evidence, Gottschalk concludes that, as they understood it, ‘Anaximander's ἀρχή was 
a principle “of the material kind”’ and ‘It is corporeal but not identical with any of 
the elements or any other known substance.’17 However, as Gottschalk also tells us, 
‘It is now generally agreed that Anaximander’s Infinite is not material in any real 
sense.’18  
 
1.1  Lost Ancestors  
 
The (pointless) pursuit of certainty and the insatiable desire for understanding are 
the chief ingredients of constructed (delusional) reality. There is no Archimedean 
point to plumb our pirouette, no X marking the spot, nor an archival blue print by 
which we can understand the score of living. But that does not negate the value of 
searching for the possibility of one. In the process of searching, the potential for 
numinous connection may be revealed and a continuity of malleable form may be 
perceived. 
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The bookkeeper (he remained nameless) of Kierkegaard’s parable A 
Possibility, is a perfect model for the fruitless lunacy of looking for precise answers 
under the fallacious auspices of ‘exact conclusions.’ In pursuit of a possibility the 
bookkeeper applied his own theory of potentiality to prime matter, and like Aristotle 
it was confirmation he required, ‘there is an x which has to be sought for…an eternal 
presumption seeking to corroborate its certainty,’19 and thus he pursued the x, the 
unknown, the possibility, desirous of its knowledge ‘to transform that x into a known 
quantity.’20  
In pursuit of another X, pointedly capitalised, Rudolf Otto (1869-1937) coins 
the word ‘numinous’ to better classify the peculiar sui generis mental state which 
obtains to an experience ‘of the spirit.’  Otto’s X can never be concretely known or 
found, or taught. It can be inferred by negation, ‘this X of ours is not precisely this 
experience, but akin to this one and the opposite of that other,’ but ultimately it will 
evade classification and will only be met with in the most remote regions of personal 
experience, ‘In other words our X cannot, strictly speaking, be taught, it can only be 
evoked, awakened in the mind; as everything that comes ‘of the spirit’ must be 
awakened.’21  
Perhaps it was the determinism for ‘exact conclusions’ that led Giordano 
Bruno (1548-1600) to lament that ‘poor Aristotle…missed the entire way.’22 Whilst 
the bookkeeper had gracefully retired from the standard forms of social coherency, I 
do not wish to imply Aristotle was treading the same thin line, yet if it is ‘a crazy 
observer [who] sees perhaps most, his observation is more intense and more 
persistent’23 as Kierkegaard supposes, then it may well have served Aristotle to lose 
sight a little in order to gain some more.  
Comparing his task to that of a palaeontologist, Kahn, with the bookkeeper, 
traces a propinquity of filial resemblance to ‘reconstruct the lost ancestor.’24 He 
defends and attests to an essential unity and intrinsic continuity that forms the whole 
picture of early Greek speculation on the natural world. A continuity he suggests, 
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that the ancient doxography has neglected. However, with recourse to the well spring 
of early Greek literature, namely Homer (c. eighth century B.C.) and Hesiod, he 
assures us that it ‘should be possible to put some semblance of flesh and blood on 
the dry skeleton of Milesian philosophy.’25 The genealogical structure of Hesiod’s 
cosmogony exerts its influence in the use of biological metaphors in Anaximander. 
 This is precisely the kind of continuity that Kahn is pointing out. As it is 
‘natural and historically appropriate’ for Anaximander to use biological analogies, so 
too then is it appropriate for the interpretation of his ideas. Yet, the extension of the 
analogy has not served to resolve or clarify the purpose. For logically, if the very 
process of analogy – that of inception, gestation, birth, generation and death – 
‘remains mysterious at a certain level’26 then how can it reveal the hidden meanings 
to which it itself is not privy. However, it is once again the presence of continuity 
which makes the analogies so apposite. A metaphor could hardly be considered 
metaphoric if it did not contain the same basic elements as that of which it is the 
similitude, and in this case, those basic elements are imperspicuous mystery and 
inscrutable indeterminacy. 
 
1.10  Off-Spring: Universals and Particulars 
 
Only through the great mystery of death and the alchemical magic of dissolution 
does new life emerge. The transformation from was to is is made through a startling 
and utter abandonment of form and disappearance of the was. There can be no is if 
the was persists. Of course the is immediately becomes a was and thus the cycle 
proceeds, perpetuated by an infinitesimal passage from one life to the next. Here 
indeterminacy and chaos are allied as principle generative powers which there-by 
stand in relation to the apeiron, and by insinuated association, equating the driving 
force of life with a cosmology of unknowing. 
 
Whilst the nature or composition of the apeiron is held to be indeterminate, it 
is imbued by most with a ‘fertility and fecundity’ which makes it either generative or 
denotes a kind of boundless reservoir from which all life emerges. Conceived of 
(without conception) as a first principle (ἀρχή-arche), the apeiron is charged with 
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the usual parental duties and expectations. It “surrounds” the world, like the 
protective (smothering?) embrace of an “everlasting” presence from which issues 
forth eternal unconditioned life. So complete and thorough is it in its role that there 
is no need of ‘other causes, such as mind or love’ to ‘steer all’ as Aristotle tells us.27 
Upon first principles inherited from the mythological cosmogonies, and of which he 
includes Anaximander’s apeiron, Gottschalk informs us, ‘these entities only acted as 
the first parents of the universe. Once it had developed, they had no more part in 
it.’28 Similarly it is described by Daniel Graham as ‘the parent or matrix…out of 
which the world and its component stuffs come to be, but it is not itself the matter of 
the world.’29   
Providence, not of madness, but of the microscope uncannily reveals the 
same universal relationships but on a cellular level. From Georges Bataille’s (1897-
1962) L’Érotisme, Italo Calvino (1923-1985) translates this description of biological 
generation: 
 
In asexual reproduction, the simplest entity which is the cell divides at a point 
in its growth. The nucleus divides into two equal parts, and from a single 
entity two result. But we cannot say that a first entity has given birth to a 
second. The two new entities are, to the same degree, the products of the first. 
The first has disappeared. Essentially, it is dead, since only the two entities it 
has produced survive…The first dies, but in its death appears a fundamental 
instant of continuity.
30
  
 
Aristotle would perhaps verify such an event as the necessary outcome of a 
finite material world, as he states, ‘it is possible for the destruction of one thing to be 
the generation of the other, the sum of things being limited.’31 The apeiron remains 
elusive, outside the world as ‘a source but not its ground or substratum.’ Only 
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through the whole system and through ‘its offspring’ can we glean something of its 
munificent activity.
 32
  
The moment of death, of closure and finitude in the cell is the simultaneous 
opening to a new life form. The last gasp of the living, a yawn perhaps, agape at the 
wonderment of life spawning chaos confronted in the augenblick
33
 of passing. The 
basic meaning of chaos (χάος) is a derivative of ‘gape, gap, yawn’ and in the 
Hesiodic cosmogony is not altogether dissimilar to the apeiron in its progenitive 
capacities and (im)material indeterminacy.  
The filial bond is perhaps the most accessible performance of the 
confounding interplay of universals and particulars open to all members of the 
public, upper tiers and standing room available.      
 
2.  Chaos 
 
How can anything be secured in the maelstrom of chaos? How can knowing settle 
amidst such a blizzard of teeming possibilities? It is not a daring leap from Chaos to 
the Unknown. The unknown is everything else that we cannot hear, read or see. It is 
a raucous silence which presides at the beginning, or perhaps the centre? The end? 
Ancient Greek mythology charges Chaos with a grand responsibility, the receptacle 
of all Ideas, the ultimate void, the breath of all life. A God before Gods. Time slips 
in, otherwise unannounced from the wings, unavoidably demanding.   
  
At the centre of every great book - writes  Blanchot - there is poised a silent 
speech, a speaking of non-speaking, an ‘unreadability.’ With the death of the last 
writer ‘this gentle breath of endless recapitulation’ cannot be quelled. It is the writer 
alone who muffles the din of this ‘secret speech’ by imposing their own will upon it, 
giving it voice, a voice that can be heard, understood. Blanchot conjures ‘another 
kind of underworld,’ an underworld within an underworld, the centre of 
unreadability in the forbidden books of libraries which await a fate of flames.
 34 
Chaos too has its dubious affiliations with the underworld. An excerpt from the 
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Theogony details another fate of flames in a thunderbolt hurling episode of Zeus’s 
(an activity worthy of infamy) directed at the earth-born Titans: 
 
And the darting gleam of thunderbolt and lightning blinded the eyes even of 
strong men. A marvellous burning took hold of Chaos; and it was the same to 
behold with the eyes or to hear the noise with the ears as if the earth and 
broad heaven above drew together; for just such a great din would have risen 
up.
35
  
 
Exactly what quarters Chaos keeps in/under the world is a disputed area. 
How the heat and flames could penetrate to the underworld, albeit steered by the 
almighty wrath of Olympian measure, suggests that Chaos does after all reside in the 
hallowed void where Aither and Earth wave and waft at each other. In the in-
between: a gap, an awning of continuity, a continuous yawn, a gaping passage 
between, from which the silent utterances, the “great din” of another secret speech 
issue forth.  
Meanwhile, in a far off sovereign state, under the commanding nib of 
Beckett, an ‘incoherent continuum’ punctuated by a dehiscent ‘statement of silences’ 
collapses back into chaos as ‘notes fly about, a blizzard of electrons’: the trailing 
fulgour of Zeus’s pyrotechnic lash-out? 36  
One scholar, Gregory Vlastos, has suggested that it was from Hesiod’s 
cosmogonical Χάος (Chaos) that Anaximander derived his το ἄπειρον. It is not an 
altogether appealing or fortunate heritage if that be the case. Hesiod’s ‘murky Chaos’ 
may share in the subfusc gloam of mystery that veils the apeiron but Chaos is alone 
in the ‘dank’ and ‘grievous storm’ that marks its limits and which ‘even the gods 
detest.’37 From the intermediary interstice of the apeiron comes the chaotic yawn of 
life, an unreadable and unspeakable continuum of incoherency. Together there-in 
resides comings and goings, birth and death, generation and destruction, chaos and 
kosmos (κόσμος), ‘the source of coming-to-be for existing things is that into which 
destruction, too, happens “according to necessity…according to the assessment of 
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Time.”’38So commands mighty Chronos (Χρόνος) who thus dispensing judgment 
initiates the cycles of Natures passage.  
 
3.  Χρόνος and Uji 
 
Time is fickle, sly and flexible beyond measure. It is not the unquestionable and 
steadfast gauge by which we bind together our would-be hovering and disorientated 
experiences that it is oft  presumed to be. Time is an incalculable calculator because 
it is individually activated. I might even go so far as to say Time is the presiding 
grand conductor of the silent tintinnabulum orchestra, the Unknown. But that would 
be decidedly rash.  
 
In an alternate assessment of time, Zen master Dōgen39 condenses the 
seriatim passage of the world into the blink of an eye. Time is experienced 
inseparable from being, that is, time literally is being time. The passage of being-
time (uji), as Dōgen terms it, is exerted in the blink of an eye ‘for the time being, I let 
him raise his eyebrows and blink his eyes.’40 With the softening persuasions of 
being, times arrow is directed off course, though only to return. The moment of 
passing through (exit, off-course) is the very moment of re-entry, yet with all that has 
passed between contained in the augenblick of being-time, ‘Just reflect: right now, is 
there an entire being or an entire world missing from your present time, or not?’41  
In Dōgen’s intriguing conception of being-time, an idea Thomas Cleary 
introduces as, ‘one of the most, if not the most, striking and original presentations in 
Dōgen’s thought,’42 time alone is not ordained gate keeper of our comings and 
goings, but shares the porters door with being, an equally omnipotent yet aloof 
abstraction. The dynamic interdependence of ‘this exhaustive reciprocal 
interpenetration’43 means every point, every moment of past, future and present, 
exists as a continuous activity of an immediate now. There is no separation of matter 
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from passage, nothing comes into being separate from time nor passes through time 
without being. Nothing can pass away outside of time for even death is being-time 
and in that moment of passing there resides all times as a resolute indestructible 
being.  
Dōgen’s formulation of uji is fundamental to Nishitani’s configuration of the 
non-objective mode of being of the self as it appears on the field of śūnyatā. The true 
‘selfness of the self’ that emerges on this field is a ‘being bottomlessly in time’ and 
in unison with emptiness. Just as this selfness opens up on the homeground of 
absolute nothingness that lies at the bottom of all being, this same homeground 
opens up within the self. By this same ‘circuminsessional interpenetration’ Nishitani 
explains the interaction between time and the selfness of the self as it opens up on 
the field of śūnyatā within time. Once again, as with Dōgen, time is not something 
that is seen to pass through being but that is in being as much as being is in time. 
 The birth-and-death cycle is nothing other than the active emanation of 
being-time. Neither in life nor death are we separate from time. We are both born 
and die in time, but we are not merely within time but are time itself: ‘we do not 
simply live in time: we live time. From one moment in time to the next we are 
making time to be time, we are bringing time to the “fullness of time.”’44 
 
4.  Prosōpon and Real Appearances 
 
A subterfuge duplicity, that is, a real appearance, or, a mask. Borderland territories 
marked out by the impressions of either side. An acquaintance or family of old duck-
rabbit, the sneaky fairground illusionist that taints our most sincere beliefs with a 
backstage double pass. The authenticity of an appearance lies in its not trying to be 
what it is, it could be anything, and so without force reveals itself paradoxically by 
being what it isn’t. A mask. The Unknown is not so much the real appearance behind 
the mask of the known but the mask as the real appearance of the Unknown.  
 
A sustained and unyielding effect of René Descartes (1596-1650) ego cogito 
is what Nishitani describes as a ‘person-centred prehension of person.’45 He 
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appropriates the ‘ancient concept of persona’ to articulate the paradoxical 
actualisation of a ‘Form of non-Form’46 in a radical re-configuration of “person.”  
The Latin persona is derived from the Greek prosōpon (πρόσωπον) which was used 
without distinction for both face and mask. The dual capacity intimates a conception 
of self that is not restricted to a “person-centered prehension of person” and an 
understanding of reality that acknowledges the reciprocity between the seen and 
unseen. It portrays a society that had an entirely different perspective of reality, one 
poised on the cusp of two worlds: between.  
The mask gives form to an authentic façade of reality that is ‘a visible sign 
rather than a concealing veil.’47 Nishitani’s percept of persona as the mask of person 
constitutes the ‘through and through real’ face or mask of absolute nothingness, 
rendering the thing called personality ‘in unison with absolute nothingness.’48 Even 
though personality is called a mask it is not some ‘temporary exterior that can be 
donned and doffed at will’ and moreover ‘It is the most real of realities. It comes into 
being only as a real form of human being that contains not the slightest bit of 
deception or artificiality.’49 If mask is thought of as something that conceals or even 
a thing or phenomenon at all, then it would mean something more real lies behind it. 
Nishitani goes to some lengths to clarify this point to the contrary, positing person as 
a phenomenon but not, in the terminology of Kant, as something distinct from the 
thing-in itself. Instead both phenomenon and the thing-in-itself are subsumed by the 
infinite void, the field of śūnyatā (emptiness) a middle point, a mode of being, in 
which everything is encountered in its “true suchness.”50  
There is nothing more real than the outward manifestation, the similitude, the 
metaphor, and even though these are all appearances of reality, or even illusions, 
there is nothing else behind them or beyond them to make an appearance, as 
Nishitani emphatically advances; ‘Person is an appearance with nothing at all behind 
it to make an appearance. That is to say, “nothing at all” is what is behind person; 
complete nothingness, not one single thing, occupies the position behind person.’51 
                                                 
46
 Keiji Nishitani, Religion and Nothingness, 71. 
47
 Simon Goldhill, ‘ΠΡΟΣΩΠΟΝ F. Frontisi-Ducroux: Du Masque au Visage. Aspects de l'identite en 
Grece ancienne’, in The Classical Review, New Series, Vol. 46, No. 1 (1996): 111-113. 
48
 Nishitani, Religion and Nothingness, 71. 
49
 Ibid., 69-72. 
50
 This term is used and explained throughout Religion and Nothingness. See for example pp. 21, 24, 
34, 71, 71, 93-95, 106, 181-2, 192-96, 259-60. It is also explained a little more, further on this thesis.  
51
 Ibid., 70. 
First Episode  
34 
 
Thus person is understood in terms of persona or prosōpon as the manifest form, the 
face or mask if you will, of absolute nothingness.  
In just such a manner does the unseen world of Dominion of Ṣūfī mysticism 
have its similitudes in the world of visible form, but as with the mask of persona, nor 
are these to be disregarded as mere representation or as something which conceals 
something else, lest we fall into the myopic erring ways of the Bāṭanites, ‘God 
forbid! Nullifying the outward meanings is the view of the Bāṭanites, who have one 
blind eye and look only at one of the two worlds, not recognizing the parallel 
between the two or understanding its significance.’52  
The outward similitude becomes the ‘primal fact,’ the only possible evidence, 
the only perceivable evidence of life:  ‘Goethe says that things that will pass are 
metaphors of the Eternal…yet so long as there is nothing like an eternal thing to 
serve as its archetype, the metaphor as such is the primal reality or fact. It is 
metaphor even as primal fact, and primal fact even as metaphor.’ 53 The mask of 
persona marks out a form upon which the gaze can arrest, a horizon to orient the 
vision. However, it is not the destined arrival point, but more a landing from which 
to alight.       
In the dramatic mask of fifth-century Attic theatre, most likely inherited from 
the cultural sphere of Dionysian ritual, we are given passage to another realm that is 
made visible through the very act of concealment ‘there was no secret reality behind 
the mask. Truth was made visible by the mask.’54 Again, there is no other hidden 
reality or world or thing behind the mask, the mask unveiled truth through its 
positioning between worlds, by ‘a means of commingling human and spiritual 
worlds.’55 The use of the mask in classical Greek tragedy gives form to this 
exchange between worlds, the reciprocal gaze of the inward and outward. The basic 
translation of prosōpon is “before the gaze.” The gaze in question though, is not 
clarified: it could equally be of the seer or the seen. Considering the meanings 
embedded within the term ‘mask’ that have been appropriated over time, and which 
are increasingly removed from the subtleties of ambiguous reciprocity that are 
inherent in the original, Wiles ponders the eventual title of Mask and Performance in 
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Greek Tragedy and speculates that Fore-gaze and mimesis in Goat-Song at the 
Dionysia would perhaps have been less misleading. Certainly it would have at the 
very least hinted at the transformational powers invested in the mask of old and I 
suppose Fore and back gaze and mimesis etc. is a little clumsy.  
The transformative powers of the mask help transcend the immediate earthly 
reality and open both wearer and spectator to other dimensions of reality. In this 
capacity the mask acts in the same way as a symbol which, according to Eliade, in 
‘its multivalence, which is to say the multiplicity of meanings which it expresses 
simultaneously’56 is able to convey far more than any conceptual renderings of the 
structures of reality. The message of the symbol is to show us the ‘unity between the 
different levels of the real,’ a unity which, as Eliade petitions, we may find difficult 
to access rationally.
57
 The symbolic, like the mask worn in Dionysian ritual, can 
rekindle the frayed and torn connections that we have with our mythological past but 
more importantly with a sense of reality that embraces the paradoxical and 
coincidentia oppositorum.   
 
1.2  Oblivion and Memory 
 
The fire that fuels our memory is not the blazing saturation of a hexachromic pana-
vision colour, washing out the blandness of neutrality and burning neural pathways 
of captivating melodrama. Memory is picturesque forgetting it is in the gaps and 
pauses between scene changes that the plot is developed. And the lost plot is the true 
keeper of memories makings. Forged in the foundry of Augé’s Oblivion, knowledge 
becomes forgetting, cast through the spaces left by the lack of remembrance, cire 
perdue of the mind. Like the mask of persona as the real appearance of absolute 
nothingness, the unknown, perhaps as the once known but now forgotten, is the only 
form through which we can identify our actual knowing.        
 
In ‘his sublime essay Oblivion,’58 Marc Augé inscribes another border that at 
once silences and gives voice to the unremitting din of memory (even in its vacancy 
it is garrulous) in the poignant image of land and seas meeting ‘Memories are crafted 
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by oblivion as the outlines of the shore are created by the sea.’59 Augé tenders 
oblivion, or loss of remembrance, as a contingency of memory rather than its 
opposition. He attests to a proximity of ‘two pairs – life and death, memory and 
oblivion’ which bring the content and meaning of each into reconsideration, in the 
same way that memory is conceived not opposed to oblivion, but formed by it.  
Without the space of forgetting the mind is left no navigable means to retrieve its 
memories.  
The cartographic tracing of memoirs island floating in a vast sea of oblivion 
bears a resemblance to the first charted descriptions of our buoyant sphere, 
surrounded by the great “Bitter River” Okeanos. ‘In short,’ Augé declares, ‘oblivion 
is the life force of memory and remembrance is its product.’60 Oblivion - as 
proffered by Augé - not so distant cousin of Apeiron, seed of all remembrance and 
into which all memory ultimately falls is the “nothing at all” behind the mask of 
memory.  
Beckett concedes a similar (‘if by some miracle of analogy’61) contortion of 
participation and identification between immediate and past experiences in his 
erudite and “irascible” examination of the Proustian monster, Time. The ideal 
recollection cannot be willed, it comes upon one all of a sudden out of an unexpected 
sensation ‘whose integral purity has been retained because it has been forgotten.’62     
In Genjōkōan, one of the pivotal fascicles from his Shōbōgenzō, Dōgen writes ‘To 
learn one’s self is to forget one’s self.’ When you ‘cast off one’s body and mind,’63 
and ‘forget them both’64 you move into the reflection of forms and sounds, and 
hearing and seeing them for what they truly are, without any distance or distorting 
rarefactions you can fully perceive life and death and ‘this traceless enlightenment 
continues without end.’65 Joan Stambaugh references the same passage in her book 
Impermanence is Buddha-nature, and emphasizes the crucial distance between 
Dōgen and a general tradition of mysticism by the active formulation of forgetting. 
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Instead of union with the self through an internal search that encounters the 
divine within,
66
 Dōgen casts off the way of the Buddha, all others and his own sense 
of self in order to realize true Buddha-nature (his own suchness). This is a radical 
inversion of how we presume learning to be the accumulation of knowledge, here 
rather we have learning through forgetting, as Stambaugh writes in sympathy with 
this passage, ‘To learn is to forget.’67 
 
5.  The Imaginal Spirit, Mystery and Mythos 
 
Melting memories, melting worlds, slipping between the seen, between the seams, 
between the scenes and melting into unseen worlds.   
 
As with the speculation on Anaximander’s τὸ ἄπειρον which relies on one 
extant fragment, historical evidence of classical Greek drama relies on fragments of 
another type, ceramic. Fortunately, according to Wiles, ‘fifth-century vase painting 
offers a rich source of data’ which means historians needn’t be contained to the 
‘paltry antiquarian references’ of Horace and Aristotle.68 This doxography of the 
vases reveals a striking lack in representations of actual performance, the absence of 
which only heightens the intrigue surrounding early Greek tragedy. Wiles suggests 
the graphic privation can be read as a ‘tribute to the power of the theatrical 
imagination’ or perhaps ‘a religious taboo.’ More provoking though is his further 
conjecture that it is significant of different ‘ways of seeing.’ 69 As the word prosōpon 
already infers, the ways of seeing in fifth-century Greece were not bound by the 
same divisions between an imaginary world and a perceived one that we are 
corralled within today. The point of crossing was not the well-guarded fence of 
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science and rationalism under whose steely-eyed tunnel of vision we now (attempt 
to) frolic: an inheritance, ironically, of sixth and fifth-century Greece.  
The most important pictorial evidence we have of the Athenian theatre is 
depicted on the Pronomos vase, named for the figure of Pronomos, a famous Theban 
composer, who is the central figure of one side of the vase, seated beneath Dionysos 
and Ariadne, playing his aulos. The vase appears to represent the entire chorus and 
cast of a satyr play along with the celebrated musician and Dionysos - theatres patron 
god - with his beloved Ariadne.  What is most pronounced, according to Wiles, are 
the ‘multiple layers of reality’70 that make up the scenes on the vase. Furthermore, 
any assessment of the performance must necessarily have its foundations in an 
understanding of these layers. 
The term archaeologists use to describe the slippages between worlds, 
between the seer and the seen, evidenced in the use of the mask is ‘melting.’71 The 
imagery conjured by this term alludes not only to the merging of face and mask, 
subject and object, but to the powers of Dionysian ritual and to the malleable form of 
the classical Greek world which itself is poised on the cusp of two worlds, the 
imaginary of mythos and the rationalized of logos. As we pass to the other side of the 
Pronomos vase, the side Wiles accuses theatre historians of omitting from their 
reviews, we encounter ‘no dividing line at the point where the mimetic world yields 
to the divine world.’72 On another krater, now residing in the Vatican, the painter 
plays with the boundaries and connections between the human and supernatural and 
through the link of a maenadic figure creates a realm where ‘a Dionysiac world of 
the imagination merges with the observed world of mimesis and Athenian cult.’73 
In al-Ghazālī’s unfolding of the “mysteries of the divine lights,” imagination 
is given the similitude of glass which is taken from clay. The faculty of imagination, 
like its earthen counterpart, is considered dense and opaque, thus it ‘veils the 
mysteries and comes between you and the lights.’ It is not until it is refined and 
purified, presumably through the transformative principle of fire, that it becomes the 
glass through which the divine lights can penetrate. ‘Imagination, which provides the 
clay from which the similitude is taken, is solid and dense. It veils the mysteries and 
comes between you and the lights. But when the imagination is purified so that it 
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becomes like clear glass, then it does not obstruct the lights…it preserves the light 
from being extinguished by violent winds.’74  Thus the melting of the densities of the 
imaginal spirit unveils, unmasks, the lights and opens the way to understanding 
divine mystery.  
The closing of this way incited a vituperate critique from al-Ghazālī, aimed 
particularly at Aristotle and Peripatetic philosophy, in The Incoherence of the 
Philosophers. His attack was so successful that it entirely changed the course of 
development of Hellenistic philosophies within the lands of Islam. His major 
dissension with Peripatetic thought was its logical treatment of metaphysics. For al-
Ghazālī the language of philosophy alone was simply not equipped or appropriate to 
deal with the ‘unseen reality of God and His relation to the universe.’75 The “violent 
winds” and ‘rough movements’76 that threaten to extinguish the light are the forceful 
exhalations of just such a philosophizing. The translucency of mystical reverie is 
painted out by the heavy hand of scientific rationalism, saturating the palette with 
colours of “exact conclusions.” Beckett would have undoubtedly agreed with al-
Ghazālī, but instead of protecting the light from “violent winds” exerted his own 
‘fundamental sounds (no joke intended) made as fully as possible’ and converts with 
great aplomb ‘afflatus into flatulence,’  as Richard Begam writes in his essay 
“Beckett and Postfoundationalism, or, How Fundamental are those Fundamental 
Sounds?”77 
Melting also suggests a loss or emptying of self, a kenōsis or anātman. 
Through a process of becoming, the actor is transformed by the mask and melts into 
it, surrendering any individuality. The mask, like the glass of al-Ghazālī’s similitude, 
does not obstruct the lights of the unseen world but allows them to penetrate, not 
through the translucency of the material, but through the transcendent act of the 
player. Françoise Frontisi-Ducroux describes the submission of the actor to the mask 
as a complete erasure of identity. The mask does not merely cover the face (identity) 
but ‘it abolishes and replaces it…beneath the dramatic mask, the face of the actor 
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does not exist, and his individuality, as revealed by his own face, disappears and is 
replaced by that of the incarnated personage.’78  
As a method of answering his own enquiry into the use of masks in ancient 
Greek theatre, Wiles poses a counter question as the best means of answering ‘why 
is it necessary for us not to wear masks in our theatre?’ The response to that question 
is loitering at the closure of the Way, in the “sempiternal penumbra” (thank you 
Beckett) of this shadowy half world whose light has been clouded by the solidity of 
certitude and knowing. The naked face of unique individuality that inhabits the stage 
of a pre-dominantly text-based contemporary theatre (Wiles particularly cites 
Shakespeare, Ibsen and Beckett) in a kind of neo-Cartesian order, is entirely 
antithetical to the function of the Greek mask.  
According to Jean-Pierre Vernant the classical Greek was afforded the 
benefits of access to a world which was not yet ‘cut off from man by the 
unbridgeable divide which separates matter from spirit, the physical from the 
psychic,’79or in the words of Wiles, a ‘non-Cartesian seeing.’80 Ultimately, in 
Wiles’s reckoning, the mask ‘transforms mental states’ and is a permeable boundary 
between ‘the world and the otherworld’81 acting as an ‘intermediary of inner and 
outer.’ In a final rebuke to the reading of Greek theatre, Wiles states, ‘Theatre 
historians must read against the grain of the philosophers if they are to reach that 
majority for whom reason was not the primary means of attaining truth. There was 
theory, and there was theōria.’82 Theōria (θεωρία), unlike the modern English word 
theory - which is however, derived from theōria - expresses “contemplation,” 
“looking at.” It houses ideas of the gaze, awareness, observation, being a spectator, 
and the experience that those observations and contemplations provoke. 
Understanding and awareness can either come through the eye of observation or the 
mind’s eye of contemplation. It has associations with the contemplative state of 
prayer in which we might come to know God.  
As described by Al- Ghazālī, the “imaginal spirit” is what transforms 
objective knowledge into embodied meaning. What Ibn al-‘Arabī designates as the 
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‘Presence of Imagination,’ operates as an intermediary translator, an express conduit 
between the incomprehensible and our rational mind. It makes real what the mind 
cannot conceive of. Metaphorically, the imagination is presented ‘as a horn of 
light’83 and transforms. William Chittick honours Henry Corbin for his pivotal 
development of the imagination through his mundus imaginalis and his 
bequeathment of the word “imaginal” to the Western intellectual tradition.  
This goes someway to correcting the misadventure of Western philosophy 
dominated by the rational mind, which in Chittick’s reckoning, ‘Somewhere along 
the line…took a wrong turn.84 But ultimately, as far as Chittick is concerned, ‘it is as 
if Corbin was so entranced by the recovery of the imaginal that he had difficulty 
seeing beyond it,’ and so the critical point of tawḥīd – the ‘declaration of God’s 
Unity’85 - central to the Islamic view is displaced by the primacy of the imaginal. In 
effect the fundamental purpose of the imaginal light is to point beyond itself, to 
illuminate the path away, to see through to the unity that is God. The merging point 
of the sensory and rational world’s where-in the magic of the imaginal spirit distils 
its essence is ‘called the Meeting Place of the Two Seas’ and in this basin of titanic 
proportions the imagination ‘embodies meanings and subtilizes the sensory thing.’86 
 
1.3  The Poetic 
 
What is poetry but the siren’s song of the unknown. What voice but the poetic can 
lure the firm and verified into disequilibrium and hysteria. Poetry is the proud and 
humble home of the metaphor. Metaphor is the sweet ambrosia sustaining the 
incomprehensible feats of the mythic gods and the mythic gods are nothing if not 
pure poetry. The poetic is a non-exchangeable private currency without fixed rates. 
It is indeterminable and subject to infinite fluctuations of value. The apeiron is 
divinely poetic, it eludes everything, even itself, for it is uncontainable and as an 
Infinite, inherently unknowable. Perhaps as with certain untranslatable modes of 
transmission, understanding the apeiron would be to meet with it half way, to 
participate somehow in an engaged exchange. This meeting could never be known by 
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or communicated to anything outside of it, not without calamitous distortion, 
deflation, disbelief, dangerous bewilderment or exaggeration. Such is the 
incommensurable omnipotence of an unknowable and indefinable force such as the 
apeiron.  
 
The arcane and alluring apeiron has been taken to mean “boundless,” 
“infinite,” “indefinite,” “without limit,” “unlimited” or “limitless,” also, 
‘ungenerated as well as imperishable,’87  ‘that which is internally unbounded, 
without internal distinctions’88 and ‘non-traversable, or inexhaustible.’89 This does 
not conclude the eulogy (or indictment, depending on one’s preferences; something 
or nothing?). But once the word took on a philosophical appellation within the newly 
developing cosmology ‘the original meaning disappears from sight.’90 As  ‘the only 
two witnesses whose voice deserves a hearing’ yet whose views are ‘so dependent 
on their own conceptual scheme’91 Kahn for one ventures outside the doxographic 
tradition to see what proffers can be gleaned from early Greek literature on the scope 
and source of this great term (the search of the source of the source for all…tilting at 
windmills?)  
It is presumed that ἄπειρος (apeiros) is derived from the noun πέρας (peras) 
typically understood as “limit” and therefore with α- privative it logically becomes 
“limitless” or ‘devoid of limits, boundless.’92 Yet in the Homeric corpus the ἄπειρος 
(apeiros) expresses a vastness and unsurpassable immensity whilst characteristically 
equated with earth and sea, neither of which can be thought of as without limits. 
Though, with a given propensity for inconsistencies the poetic voice was at liberty to 
contradict (or reveal the paradox) and so the earth of shores and edges could well 
become “boundless” and “limitless.” As opposed to the “muddling and meddling of 
minds” that I earlier suggested might reasonably be held responsible for scholarly 
agonistics surrounding the apeiron,
93
 I rather believe it is the unqualifiable poetry of 
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the concept that is the cause of such unyielding dissention – though it must be 
conceded, with a declaration like that of Krauss’s, certain covenants have been 
sealed. If the concept is expressed “in rather poetical terms” as Simplicius seems to 
think then it follows that through the same terms, the poetical, meaning might be 
revealed.  
The acumen of the new scientific speculation emerging in Miletus - and from 
which arose the rationalist methods of logic that were to become the foundations of 
the Western philosophical canon - is precisely what led the Ionian enterprise astray 
from the spiritual principles that characterise what has come to be known as the 
‘Axial Age’ of which the ancient Greeks were of significant import. The so named 
‘Axial Age’, coined by Karl Jaspers, identifies a period in history from 800 to 200 
BC in which a striking synchronicity occurs in the developments of three otherwise 
isolated regions: China, India and in the west, Hellas and the Near East. Jasper 
describes ‘the enigma of the occurrence’ as being nothing short of ‘the nature of a 
miracle.’ 94 It is a period in which suddenly ‘Being becomes sensible to man, but not 
with finality: the question remains.’95 This question can perhaps only be answered by 
maintaining a balance and connection between the origins and destinations of the 
inquiry.  
With such a perspective in mind, the historical diversion back into the 
mythopoeic that Kahn initiates is at once befitting to the concept of apeiron and 
possibly more revealing than the brilliant trajectory of the new natural philosophy 
that shone forth from the ‘jewel of Ionia.’96 Not only is it more befitting, but as ‘the 
idea of Greek rationalism suddenly bursting forth from sixth-century Ionia, like 
Athena from the brain of Zeus, is one of those historical naïvetés which are no longer 
very much in fashion’97 it seems a prudent measure to cross the great Styx and 
search the shadowy dominion of the departed for lost evidence. The apeiron is as 
much a matter of poetic and symbolic representation as a scientific solution or 
premise. The poetic antecedents of the burgeoning Ionian cosmology were still 
sensitive to an unseen world, a world which has its parallels with the later Ṣūfī 
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equivalent of Dominion, as expounded by al-Ghazālī. This world necessitates the use 
of parable, analogy, myth and symbolism to adumbrate its flighty spectre for it is in 
fact inconceivable through direct concrete means; it simply ceases to exist under the 
unsustainable pressures of such conditions.  
The mythopoeic conception of the world is an express acknowledgment and 
mode of response that concedes the unknowable and ineffable. Wittgenstein’s well-
known exhortation to leave aside explanation for description alone, ‘all explanation 
must disappear, and description alone must take its place’98 is in its own context of 
language pictures, a continuing acknowledgment of what lies outside language 
‘whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent.’99 The construction of 
meaning through language pictures functions in a manner akin to the epic and 
mythological narrative. A space is tendered; there prevails a gap of malleable 
indeterminacy, an overlap, a seam allowance for co-existent realities that do not 
attempt to contrive “exact conclusions.”  
 
6.  Gaps and Openings: Ruptures and Reconnections 
 
No leap can be taken without trust. Yet trust is a leap itself. In the delicate interstices 
between meanings, invisible bridges are hatched that bear the faithful leaper across 
the “narrow passages of nothingness.”  
 
In Real Presences George Steiner heralds the opening of another gap with the 
erosion of the ‘Hebraic-Hellenic-Cartesian’ tradition that housed itself in Logos. He 
inaugurates the entering ‘upon a second major phase’ which submits to a ‘real 
absence’ in the articulations of logic and communicable knowing. This second 
phase, what he calls the time of the epilogue, necessarily comes ‘after the Word’ and 
exercises a new, or, if I may suggest, a rekindled, authority over the sovereignty of 
semantic order. The preceding phase - that of declamatory Logos - had its inception 
with the propositional utterances of the pre-Socratics and continued with its 
enunciatory trajectory until now. Or, quite specifically, until the years of the 1870s to 
the 1930s in Russia and Western and Central Europe, in which period, Steiner 
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believes we witness the fissure of trust hither-to-fore invested in nomination and 
predication, ‘this break of the covenant between word and world.’100  
It is not often such seismic movement erupts in the core of man, if it did we 
would have been left floating, disconnected and adrift from our historical moorings 
without recourse to anchor. According to Steiner it is writing that traces the 
providential line of continuity between the remote past and our present latitudes, 
giving intelligible sustenance to the connective tissues of our remembrance and 
being in the world. Through these delicate webs of scriptive capture we are able to 
‘cite archaic myths as somehow elemental to our own constellations of 
consciousness.’101 However, the bond of trust between word and world is but a 
trailing thread on the vestigial goat track (byway of the archaic ‘language-animal’) 
frayed and worn by the impossible burden of bringing ‘home to sensory verification 
and to intelligibility the elusive quarry of existence.’102  
One flag bearer of the ensuing opus magnum, the first phase of Logos, was 
Anaximander with his ‘riddling dictum,’103 to use the epithet of Steiner. The 
“dictum” he refers to is the extant fragment of Anaximander, and the book from 
which it would have been derived is claimed to be some of the first Greek prose. 
Though to be consistent, this assertion has not been immune to the usual attestations 
and challenges that accompany the ancient Greek texts. Theopompus amongst other 
authorities of old regards Pherecydes as the author of such a due.
104
 Karl Jaspers 
however, is one who begs to differ and in blandiloquent approbation confirms 
Anaximander as quite a revolutionary figure:  
 
he was also the first thinker to develop, in concepts, a metaphysical vision 
transcending all sense perception; the first to give the name of the Divine to 
what is achieved in the fundamental thinking that transcends all that exists, or 
in other words, to find the divine with the help of thought, instead of 
accepting it as a given in traditional religious conceptions. He was the first 
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Greek to find in prose the appropriate form in which to communicate such 
insights.
105
  
 
Patent in Jasper’s résumé is the founding pledge of trust that Steiner 
instaurates between world and word, before language ‘withered to inert routine and 
cliché,’106 in a time when ‘Logos and cosmos met.’107 Anaximander’s prose may 
have been harbinger to the ultimate rupture of confidence but that was a far cry from 
the force of its revelation in its nascent setting. The “real presence” at the centre of 
Steiner’s now broken contract between world and word is, in short, a ‘wager on 
transcendence.’108  
Watt’s sidewalk swagger, earlier exposed, is a more prosaic but no less 
significant expression of this “wager on transcendence,” a true leap of faith, with 
every single step.   
Undoubtedly the first tectonic rumblings portentous of the eruption to come 
surfaced with the Milesians. And perhaps the volcanic force of Anaximander’s 
philosophy did generate the ‘tidal wave’ of ‘acta and dissertations’109 consequent to 
the initial murmurs, but behind that great (and destructive?) wave, Olympus towers, 
majestic and undisturbed for all to see, if we would but look up a little.  
Distance, in time and space, is sometimes the best form of perspective, and perhaps 
being in possession of both of those, perspective and distance, in time and space 
what’s more, is what bestows Nishitani Keiji with his particular vista that is able to 
shepherd the competing elements of mythos, logos, philosophy, the intellect and 
“scientism” into a harmonious and interconnected dimension of Existenz. This 
comprehensive distillation is worth quoting at length: 
 
Even when philosophy first came to being as a logos or “science” (though 
opinion is divided on this question), it did so as a demythification – or, if you 
will, a logification – of the mythical world view in which it, nonetheless, 
remained firmly rooted. We may even go so far as to say that the underlying 
root of the mythos hidden deep beneath Greek philosophy has remained intact 
throughout the whole of its development, and that this accounts in part for the 
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depth and richness of its logos. While it may be called a demythification of 
the mythical through the logical, it was not a pure and simple negation of the 
mythical. That sort of negation begins with the standpoint of science proper, 
or rather, “scientism.” Science grasps the mythical on the dimension of its 
outer shell of representations, which it banishes as unscientific. Philosophy, 
for its part, recognizes in the same representations symbols of logos which it 
then restores to the dimension of logos.  
But neither the negation of myth by scientific intellect nor its transmutation 
into logos by philosophic intellect can exhaust the essence within myth. The 
mythical has to be restored to the existential whence it originates in an 
elemental sense and within which the core of the content of its meaning can 
be accorded anew an existential interpretation on the dimension of 
Existenz.
110
 
 
The timeless protagonist and narrator of Calvino’s Cosmicomics, Qfwfq, has 
his own eureka moment in the bathtub of ‘torrid soup of infinite heat’ at the 
inceptive moments of our exploding universe when it was nought more than ‘an 
infinitesimal pimple in the smoothness of nothing.’111 Like a gigantic kinetic 
pendulum he ricochets from one extreme to the other in an arabesque of dazzling 
flexibility, quite unprecedented and full of potentiality, but through the sheer 
unbridled enthusiasm of the venture exposes the very weaknesses of character he 
wished to conceal, his ‘ingenuous, mindless’ and thoroughly ‘greenhorn’ 
behaviour.
112
 He was something between a baryon and a quark at the time, so 
“greenhorn” behaviour is begrudgingly permissible. In the excited flurry of 
development that ensued after the creation of time and being, of which our blazing 
star was part, Qfwfq was afforded a momentary “opening” through which his great 
revelation poured:   
 
so began a time when it was only in the chinks of emptiness, the absences, the 
silences, the gaps, the missing connections, the flaws in time’s fabric, that I 
could find meaning and value. Through those chinks I would sneak glances at 
the great realm of non-being, recognising it now as my only true home…I 
would slither into these narrow passages of nothingness that crossed the 
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compactness of the universe; together we would achieve the obliteration of 
every dimension, of all time, all substance, all form.
113
 
 
Qfwfq’s recognition of his true homeground as nothingness is a strikingly 
Buddhist perspective. The restoration of meaning to his new found being, but only 
through the chinks and absences that reveal this “true home,” sets up the dynamic of 
his relationship as a particular particle with the universal universe. These interstices 
of inordinate significance are also indicated in Nishida’s self-determining cosmic 
structure. It is precisely by virtue of these gaps that meaning is instituted. As Nishida 
writes in his treatise Basho; ‘But insofar as there is a gap between the universal that 
subsumes and the particular that is subsumed, a relationship between thing and 
quality is established.’114 
Out of this gap meaning is formed as much by what is absent as what is 
present. In the wake of Jacques Derrida’s (1930-2004) différance Terry Eagleton 
takes up the sparks and flickers of the temporal processes of language and awaits the 
meaning that might someday, somehow, emerge from the absences between them; 
‘When I read a sentence, the meaning of it is always somehow suspended, something 
deferred or still to come…and although the sentence may come to an end the process 
of language itself does not.’115 This flickering of absence and presence renders the 
fullness of the sign untraceable, sublimely elusive; ‘meaning is not immediately 
present in a sign. Since the meaning of a sign is a matter of what the sign is not, its 
meaning is always in some sense absent from it too.’116   
 
6.1  Charting Absences in the Land of Logos 
 
 A proliferation of marks, dashes, outlines, spots and smudges on the chartered page 
mirrors the same collection of streaks and blotches accruing in the atlas of an 
inquiring mind. The result is a massive island of debris, littered with darkening sure 
lines, layer upon layer, washed up by the rising tide of factum and datum. But no 
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matter the depth or height of this shoreline rubble the horizon ever beckons and its 
bewitching call, which is not recorded anywhere, makes light of all, even the darkest 
of the surest of lines.  
 
Anaximander is also recorded by the geographer Agathemerus (c. third 
century) to be ‘the first to depict the inhabited earth on a chart.’117 Here again the 
assertion of knowledge, the literal demarcation of that knowledge upon the page, 
would seem to fill in and in effect, wipe-out the translucency of the tentative, the 
mythological. Hyperborea, land of eternal light in the beyond, takes its more 
legitimate snowy and sandy form.
118
 Certainly, one assumes, if nothing else, then the 
solidity and clarity of a line, whether the borderline of a territorial demarcation or the 
cursive mark of alphabeta characters, would dissuade the imagination from its more 
distant wanderings and quell the pyrotechnics of our Olympian antecedents. Yet 
paradoxically, the security of such docking gives the assurance of possible return and 
whole new fathoms are covered. Albeit of a more tellurian order which has seen the 
diminished flame of otherworldly attributes.  
An exquisite rendering of this anomaly would be the superbly crafted book, 
Atlas of Remote Islands; Fifty Islands I have not visited and never will, whose own 
cartographic explorations stem from a poetic imagination par excellence. ‘Give me 
an atlas over a guidebook any day,’ declares the author Judith Schalansky, ‘There is 
no more poetic book in the world.’119 The sublime images of Schalansky’s fifty 
small islands surrounded and separated by immense oceanic expanses give visible 
form to Augé’s sea of oblivion crafting the shoreline of memory. Maps offer us the 
world through their every failure to do so. It is an offering of absences. Their 
potency and meaning comes from the gaps which we are obliged, offered, to fill.   
As with the prodigious and exhaustive memory of Funes ‘el memorioso’ of 
Jorge Luis Borges, whose incomprehensible comprehensiveness left him without any 
understanding what-so-ever for there was no space left for the discovery of 
realisation. Just like the vital potency of Augé’s oblivion which authorizes the 
retrieval of memories, it is in the spaces of forgetting, the absences and lacunae that 
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meaning is made. As Terry Eagleton points out, ‘meaning is not immediately present 
in a sign. Since the meaning of a sign is a matter of what the sigh is not, its meaning 
is always in some sense absent from it too.’120 Absences within the sign and within 
the mind maintain in permanent reserve a place of invitation for contemplation. 
Nietzsche may have been the inspiration for Borges and his legendary Funes with 
this pointed maxim; ‘Many a man fails to become a thinker for the sole reason that 
his memory is too good.’121 
The recognition of a “real absence” striking camp in the otherwise busy 
portico that ushers through interpreters, scholars, astronomers, camels and gift 
bearing mendicants (the most valued and rarest of visitors), between word and world 
is one of the momentous turns and compelling reasons identified by Steiner, as to 
why ‘Western consciousness…moves house.’122  Steiner cites the work of Mallarmé 
and Rimbaud as early warning signs of the general egress in motion, ‘This move is 
first declared in Mallarmé’s disjunction of language from external reference and in 
Rimbaud’s deconstruction of the first person singular.’ 123 The central résistance of 
this tour de force is against the ‘mendacious and utilitarian contract’124 that invests 
the word with such ultimate and supreme authority that it is taken for truth, reality 
and the very thing-in-itself. This contract must be broken to reinstate the numinous 
freedom of language through ‘the arc of metaphor,’125 where the lion can again roar 
and defecate in the ‘reticulative unboundedness of its lexical-grammatical 
universe.’126 Reason is founded on the structural edifice of logos and has been so 
effective and convincing in its construction of meaning that the real purpose of its 
venture has been eclipsed by the obfuscating shadow cast from its colossal façade.  
In the Critique of Pure Reason Kant’s systematic explication of the 
possibilities and talents of reasons perspicacious capacities does not avoid the 
measure of its limits either. ‘Reason,’ Kant reasons, ‘has an immediate relation to the 
use of understanding…but solely for the purpose of directing it to a certain unity, of 
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which the understanding has no conception.’127 The nebulous realm of “no 
conception” conducts its affairs through the intermediary messengers of metaphor, 
similitude, poetry, parable and myth, and the odd map.  
The first modern atlas, appearing in 1570, was curiously titled Theatrum 
Orbis Terrarum (Theatre of the World) or otherwise referred to as the Ortelius Atlas, 
after its Antwerpian compiler: scholar and geographer Abraham Ortelius. The world 
as the stage upon which the dénouement of the Gods’ wills and wraths are played out 
was not a theme uncommon of the times. In nearby Spain (whose King Felipe II 
Ortelius had been appointed to as geographer, and whom was acknowledged with a 
dedication in the Theatrum Orbis Terrarum) a generation later, Pedro Calderón de la 
Barca y Barreda González de Henao Ruiz de Blasco y Riaño, more often referred to 
as Pedro Calderón de la Barca, reasons unknown, wrote El Gran Teatro del Mundo 
(The Great Theatre of the World), one of the many Sacramental plays that he 
dedicated the latter part of his life to writing. The mythological cannot be ignored in 
either of these titular suppositions. Certainly a heritage of mythology is more evident 
in theatre than cartography, but if we look to the edges of Ortelius’s original 1570 
edition of Typus Orbis Terrarum (Map of the World) there swirl the vaporous forms 
of current or cumuli, Olympus or Oceanus.  
These early engravings surely inspired the aesthetic elegance of Schalansky’s 
pared back topographies and share with her the paradoxical spirit of an unsung 
poetic longing and an empirical structural control that manifests itself in scientific 
endeavour and an appeal to perfectionism. There are no surviving records of 
Anaximander’s first charts of the earth and sea, so we are at liberty to unleash the 
imaginary – apart from the sobering fact or ‘lucky coincidence’ of a Mesopotamian 
counterpart in the collection of the British Museum which curtails any extravagant 
chimeras.
 
What we can assume is that the quiffs and spume that cornice the edges of 
the Typus Orbis Terrarum would be augmented to a statement of some significance 
as the hallowed “Bitter River” that flows around our small blue green planet, that 
would then provoke the mirth of Herodotus ‘I laugh at the sight of the earth charts 
which many have drawn up in the past, and which no one has explained in a way that 
makes any sense. They picture Ocean flowing round about the earth, which is 
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circular as if drawn with a compass.’128 The “Bitter River” circumnavigating the 
intrepid expeditions of the first explorers thus delineates the boundaries of their 
imaginations. 
Herodotus was a founding member of the house of Logos and his mirth might 
well have been subdued to witness the rupture invocated by Mallarmé (through the 
hermeneutics and philology of Steiner) between any external referent and its lexical 
representation. Walter Benjamin (1892-1940) honours Herodotus as ‘the first 
storyteller of the Greeks.’ The only known work of Herodotus The Histories or The 
History or The Inquiry, as it is variably translated, is, as the title suggests, meant as 
an inquiry and account of events leading to and creating the Greco-Persian wars. All 
stories are histories of a kind, and the less invested in ‘the dissemination of 
information’ or ‘psychological connection’ of a tale, the more likely it is able to 
continuously release its meaning over time.
129
 For Benjamin, it is the dryness and 
impartiality of Herodotus that assures his narratives the longevity of impact that a 
real storyteller has. Like Wittgenstein, Benjamin seeks an unrestricted meaning not 
coloured or crafted through the defensive network of explicatory negotiations, but 
rather meaning that arises through receptive encounter: 
 
Herodotus offers no explanations. His report is the driest. That is why this 
story from ancient Egypt is still capable after thousands of years of arousing 
astonishment and thoughtfulness. It resembles the seeds of grain which have 
lain for centuries in the chambers of the pyramids shut up air-tight and gave 
retained their germinative power to this day.
130
  
 
As the ‘best canon of the Ionic speech,’ his prose is distinctively marked by 
the poetic language of the epic and tragic writers before him.
131
 Graham describes it 
as ‘peripatetic story telling’ and ascribes Herodotus’s conceptual world in which he 
applied his own theories to events and often in contradiction to the prevailing view, 
as very much an effect of the Ionian cosmologists.
132
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Of the Ionians, Heraclitus presents Logos not so much as a rational Word 
order from which all reason flows, but as a cosmic world order, that is unifying and 
transformative. Configured in relation to the subject as it experiences and changes in 
confrontation with the world Graham conceives Logos as a dynamic relationship 
rather than a fixed principle, ‘To put it otherwise, our soul has its own Logos that 
governs its interaction with the world. It is a Logos that increases itself.’133 Had this 
‘unseen but ever-present’ discourse of world and soul penetrated to the furthest 
depths of the “lexical-grammatical universe” the rupture in the covenant between 
word and world would ostensibly be rendered void. This interruption was made 
necessary for the precise reason that a discontinuity, a hiatus of communion had 
already occurred. In a silent appeal to the disjunctive factionalism at play in the 
house of Logos we are ushered into the ‘spacings, lacunae, fissures and breaks’ of 
writing, that not only signify the estrangement of word from meaning but 
simultaneously hold and nurture the dormant seeds awaiting precipitous conditions 
to release their germinative power and create whole new networks of roots and stems 
upon which to build a “lexical-grammatical universe.” The indeterminate passage to 
yonder shore is marked out by these ‘white abysses of silent nothingness.’134  
Rimbaud and Mallarmé also appear in Blanchot’s The Death of the Last 
Writer like ephemeral book ends to an ‘imaginary Tibet’ rent of its holy signs. 
Blanchot conjures the illusory death of the last writer, a mythical ‘Rimbaud-like 
character,’ invoking the ceaseless murmur of a non-speaking speech which only 
writing can silence.
135
 The writing though, must arise out of the very same 
vertiginous abyss that broke the line of thought and separated off its parts into 
unintelligible idiom. Embarking upon an epic odyssey for ‘the unlimited creativity of 
metaphor which is inherent in the origins of all speech’ and which can bring back to 
awareness the unsayable utterances sounding their sonorous musings from the gap s, 
now, finally, ‘we are at sea, uncompassed.’136  
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7.  The Sea 
 
Endless unfathomable depths. More than metaphor or symbol, the sea is a living 
similitude of the unknown. The rudimentary offering made here is but a blip in the 
ocean of inferences that make the sea (or ocean) the most appropriately and 
infinitely symbolic vessel for so many of the ideas I am associating with the 
Unknown. The apeiron, the poetic, the infinite, abysses, voids, unchartered ways, 
chartered ways, evanescent horizons, light refracting Fata Morganas, plunges, 
floating, uncertain wreckage and ruin, hierophanous epiphany, epic exploratory 
risks, unimaginable worlds on distant shores, nirvāna of yonder shore, numinous 
invocation,  lost, and found uncompassed.     
 
The sea harbours a rich bounty of analogies and has the depth, 
mysteriousness, expansiveness and activity – both inherent and acquired – to absorb 
and spew forth all manner of revelation. Kahn found in the epic literature of Homer 
and in the metaphoric language of the mythopoeic, imagery befitting and significant 
of the boundless and indefinite apeiron, ‘The άπειρον of Anaximander…has the 
epithet (and the majesty) which Earth and Sea possess for Homer.’137 Drawing on the 
archaic poets, predecessors to the Ionian cosmologists, not only provides important 
and subtle insights into the transferences and metamorphosis of meanings that 
accompany the apeiron, but also keeps alive the tenuous tracings of languages 
potential “to invoke the numinous.” The immensity and elusiveness of the apeiron 
cannot be understood without the buoyant effects of lyrical suggestion, it is not an 
explainable idea, it falls into the domain of Wittgenstein’s gnomic order “all 
explanation must disappear, and description alone must take its place.” The apeiron 
“steers all” like a universal rudder guiding its prodigious fleet through Sea, Earth, 
Tartarus, Heaven, Air, Aither and even Fire.  
Nearly two millennia after Anaximander’s reason baffling apeiron 
surrounded our known world Cusanus
 
set sail from Greece and was touched by the 
effulgent rays of divine inspiration which were to illuminate his path of theological 
and philosophical inquiry for the remainder of his life’s speculative voyage: 
‘Attainment, however, was denied me until I was returning by sea from Greece, 
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when, by what I believe was a supreme gift of the Father of Lights from Whom is 
every perfect gift, I was led in the learning that is ignorance to grasp the 
incomprehensible.’138  
Marjorie O’Rourke Boyle rides the crests and surges of the allegorical ‘wave 
of the Intellect,’139 in rhetorical demonstration of the maritime themes and oceanic 
metaphors often evoked to express the internal tides of the metaphysical quest. Boyle 
traces the sea as a hierophanous site in western culture back to Greek mythology 
with the coupling of the Titan Ōkeanós and his sister Tethys who ‘were the parents 
of coming-to-be’140 according to Aristotle’s account and in Homer ‘Okeanos begetter 
of gods and mother Tethys’ or simply ‘begetter of all.’ In Plato’s Cratylus and 
Timaeus there are suggestions that the cosmogonical importance of Ōkeanós dates 
back to Orphic poetry ‘Orpheus, too, says somewhere that “Fair-streamed Okeanos 
first began the marriages, who wed Tethys, his sister by the same mother”,’ and also 
‘we must believe those who formerly gave utterance, those who were, as they said, 
offspring of the gods, and must, I suppose, have truly known their own 
ancestors:…Okeanos and Tethys were born as children of Ge [earth] and Ouranos 
[sky].’141  
From this hydrous and poetic fons et origo the sea has continued to expand 
horizons through symbolic and allegorical metaphor. Indeed Boyle contends that it is 
primarily the symbolic ‘potency of the sea to invoke the numinous’142 that is the real 
motive behind Cusanus’s testimony of his seaborne epiphany, although, she does 
concede that the seventy-four day journey from Constantinople to Venice could have 
allowed ‘Cusanus the leisure for profound speculation’143 inductive of the revelations 
such as his. The sea, as with the infinite, each being a representative epithet of the 
other, is not immune to negative charges typically (in the West) associated with the 
void, the indefinite and the unknown. As Boyle points out, even in the modern idiom 
to be “at sea” indicates ignorance, confusion, lostness and uncertainty. She cites 
Plato (427-347 B.C.), Plotinus (204-270) and Augustine (354-430) amongst those 
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who have used the maritime metaphor to help describe difficulties, perplexities and 
even evil: ‘Plato had imagined evil matter as the sea, the abyss of dissimilitude 
through which God steers as limbs abraded and mutilated by the waves.’144 
  In The sea as a place of no return in ancient Greece, Astrid Lindenlauf 
focuses on a scene from a Boeotian black-figure skyphos (bowl like drinking vessel 
from Thebes fourth-fifth century B.C.) which draws attention to ‘a whole range of 
characteristics that the ancient Greeks attributed to the sea,’ not least of which being 
‘its dangerous, savage and corrupting nature when whipped into a roiling turbulence 
by storms like Boreas’ (Boreas being the God of the cold north wind, hence 
“Hyperborea”).145 Lindenlauf also recalls the image of frogs around a pond given by 
Plato in Phaedo to describe the pattern of Greek colonisation on the shores of the 
Mediterranean. This infamous circle of squatting amphibians (perhaps inspired by 
the apparently awkward figure of Socrates or maybe it was an early insight into our 
evolutionary history as a biological species) ‘highlights that the sea was an integral 
part of ancient Greek life and a mediating and unifying agent.’146 The archaic 
concept of the great river Ōkeanós at the world’s edge is converted to the sea at the 
centre, upon whose edge is perched the founding settlements of Western 
(un)civilisation.   
Undoubtedly these great aqueous abysses were honoured, feared even, for 
their potency to “invoke the numinous,” and in a dynamic reminiscent of the 
relationship perceived between the Gods and mortal man, were ‘thought to be 
benevolent yet also terrible.’147 Appropriating terms used in modern waste 
management Lindenlauf’s argument ultimately testifies to the ancient Greek 
perception of the sea as what she calls ‘a place of no return’ and an ‘away-place.’ 
The sea from this perspective takes on a marginal and dubious character that has 
direct associations ‘with darkness, death and the abyss of Hades,’148 so many 
abysses. 
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And let us not neglect Nietzsche’s infamous abyss which returns our gaze 
and engulfs us with its monstrousness.
149
 In a paradoxical trans-descendence to a 
‘sorrowful, black sea,’ that from his mountain summit Zarathustra must go down to, 
the sea is represented as yet another great abyss, as a place of darkness but yet also 
as the ultimate summit of enlightenment; ‘Ah, this sorrowful, black sea beneath me! 
Ah, this brooding reluctance! Ah, destiny and sea! Now I have to go down to 
you!’150 For it is only in penetrating to the depths of his pain and unknowing that 
Zarathustra will be freed of himself and look beyond and above to encounter his real 
Self. ‘Summit and abyss – they are now united in one!’151 The greatest heights can 
only come from the greatest depths. 
 
7.1  The Infinite Yonder Shore 
 
When the infinite, which carries within it such immense distance, can be conceived 
right here in the smallest ripple upon an endless sea, when it is brought home by the 
tiniest of gestures then have we met the truly infinite and can revel in its sublimity. In 
this meeting infinity is no longer a negation of the finite but an awakening to the 
infinite within the finite, to an “absolute near side” and a conversion from nihility 
which is true finitude to śūnyatā as true infinity. 
 
Yet not all experiences of the seemingly limitless infinitude of the sea that 
leaves us oscillating “uncompassed” in a void of unknowing are met with despair or 
hesitation. Vertiginous liberation is also a sentiment corollary to an experience or 
conception of vastness. Giacomo Leopardi’s poem L’Infinito marries the otherwise 
mismatched motifs of sweet ease and certain ruin in the final image of his hillside 
reverie ‘E il naufragar m'è dolce in questo mare’ (And sweet to me is shipwreck on 
this sea). Drowning in the boundless immensity that only the imaginal spirit can 
elicit Leopardi blissfully acquiesces to the incomprehensible. Not afloat, but asunder 
– the infinite sea of eternity overwhelming and quelling the quotidian rustlings of 
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times present. Leopardi’s conceded shipwreck, inspired by the contemplation of an 
obscured horizon, bespeaks a marked rapport with the nirvāna of Zen Buddhism, 
expressed by Nishitani as the ‘attainment of “yonder shore” beyond the fathomless 
sea of suffering.’152 Nirvāna is understood as the true transcendence into emptiness 
and it is only arrived at through an existential confrontation with nihility. Nihility is 
experienced as what Nishitani dubs ‘bad existential infinity’ which recalls the “bad 
faith” of Sartre.153 The trick to liberation here is in understanding the 
interconnectedness of suffering and bliss. Suffering is the delusional ignorance of 
samsāra (birth-and-death) bliss is emancipation from this cycle. As a standpoint in 
Mahāyāna teachings it is called ‘samsāra-sive-nirvāna’ or ‘non-abiding in 
nirvāna.’154 What this standpoint expresses is very much like what Nietzsche 
expresses through Zarathustra’s “trans-descendence” to his abyssal summit, if I may 
call it that. It is a breaking through to yonder shore by breaking out of the infinite 
cycle of birth-and-death, by ‘dying to this “life” of birth-and death.’155  In his final 
analysis Nishitani insists that infinity must truly become part of the very living of 
life itself ‘To take possession of infinity is for infinity to become reality as life; for it 
to be really lived.’156  
Amidst hedgerow and leafy ululations Leopardi succumbs to a sublime rural 
felicity that confronts the terrified voice of mortality and in so doing is liberated 
from it and released into the quietude of eternity. This is samsāra-sive-nirvāna 
rendered lyrical upon a hill, a conversion of the monstrous abyss into the agape of 
infinity. The sea through all its mercurial (in every sense of the word – capricious, 
fluid, changeable, volatile, unpredictable, lively etc. - and not least being the 
association of trade and travel that comes with the messenger god Mercury) 
incarnations, maintains a constant affinity with infinity. To enumerate the poetic and 
symbolic resonances of the sea and how this fathomless archetypal “abyss” (why not 
another) has protected, procured, betrayed and destroyed life: disoriented, 
enlightened, born afloat and inspired ideas: bewitched, bemused, befuddled and so 
on and so forth is itself, in short, an infinite and fathomless enterprise, or, to use the 
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words of al-Ghazālī, most apropos here, ‘this discussion is an ocean without 
shore.’157   
 
8.  The Evil Good Infinite  
 
A picture, unexpectedly encountered, not framed by the usual squaring off at the 
edges, but which continues past its limited configurations to suddenly become quite 
another, its other. The infinite does not exist, it has no reality, and yet reality cannot 
be contained to the finite either. These two oppositions are entangled in a self-
determining and self-effacing embrace whispering promises of freedom and security 
one to the other.  
 
Paolo Zellini begins A Brief History of Infinity with the words of Borges 
‘One concept corrupts and confuses others. I am not speaking of the Evil whose 
limited sphere is ethics; I am speaking of the infinite.’158 This quote is taken from 
Borges’s condensed form of his own ‘illusory Biography of the Infinite,’ which for 
reasons alluded to but never clarified, resulted instead in the short essay Avatars of 
the Tortoise. In this brief “biography” he enumerates various uses of the formulaic 
regressus in infinitum to verify with equal success both ways, the existence and non-
existence of a thing. To this end he confirms ‘the vertiginous regressus in infinitum 
can perhaps be applied to all subjects.’159 The idea of the reduction of all subjects 
through the infinite application of an infinitely repeating factor to an infinite could 
also be a very vertiginous and therefore apt configuration of the Unknown. The 
Unknown is infinite, it is an absolute, and like the Infinite it can also be a bit scary. 
That is probably why movement is more often than not away from it rather than 
towards it, just as most would step back from the edge of an abyssal cliff and not 
throw themselves off it. But that, hypothetically, is the very plunge required to break 
into the Unknown. This is the dive taken by Nietzsche’s Zarathustra off the mountain 
summit towards his ‘Great Death’ and it is the same Quixotic lunge that opens us up 
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the ‘transcendent nothingness’ beyond being160 and initiates the essential existential 
conversion to gain passage ‘to the far side of the “yonder shore,” or nirvāna, where 
all seasoned travellers aim for.  
There is the divine and the feared in the infinite. One cannot exist without the 
other. They are parts of the same that have nothing to do with each other what-so-
ever and in fact neither can truly exist in the presence of the other. In his infamous 
Les Paradis Artificiels Charles Baudelaire blames not hashish, nor opium, nor wine, 
but man’s thirst for the infinite for his criminal persuasions, though it is a corrupted 
conception of the infinite which diverts the pure. He confesses, ‘It is this corruption 
of the sense of the infinite, I believe, that is the cause of all man’s guilty excesses.’161 
Another form of corruption is pointed out by Zellini in Aristotle’s conception of the 
apeiron, which he says is ‘indissolubly linked to a negative notion.’ He quotes from 
Aristotle’s Physics where the apeiron is conceived as fundamentally incomplete as 
its infiniteness means there is necessarily always something outside of it, which 
therefore means it can unendingly go on in its limitlessness.  
It is precisely this negativity which lead Zellini to adduce that “infinite” is a 
less appropriate term for the apeiron than “unlimited” or “indefinite” as they do not 
carry the ‘perfection’ inferred by the term “infinite.”162 The perfection of the void 
enfolds the pain, fear and “evil” misadventures of being within it. Its perfection is 
founded in the confrontation with this despairing nihilism. The brief but illuminated 
life of Simon Weil (1909-1943) is testament to the conversion instaurated by the 
transformative act of confrontation. As a figure she cannot be readily, or helpfully 
separated from her ideas, that is, the connection between her experiences of physical 
existence and the philosophies and perspectives that arose from them are more than 
usually intertwined, for she was overtly living her beliefs at the same time as 
espousing them.  
We cannot understand the infinite without the finite but we cannot either 
understand the infinite from the finite, it must be understood as infinite-sive-finite 
and finite-sive-infinite. This is what Nishitani means by saying infinity must “be 
really lived” if we are to encounter it at all, or to “take possession” of it. Without 
entering into the void we can never hope to know its perfection and according to 
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Weil this is not the right of the finite anyway. She writes in her notebooks, ‘the void 
is the supreme plenitude, but man has not the right to know this.’163 We may not 
have the right and nor, according to Nishitani, the reason, ‘Infinity, as a reality, is cut 
off from the prehension of reason.’164  
Like Aristotle’s understanding of limitless which entails there always being 
something outside, something more, the plenitude of the void - the infinite - comes 
from this same unreachable and unfulfillable potential. That is also why it is beyond 
the prehension of reason and in its overwhelming and vertiginous bearing may incite 
excesses of criminality. If the infinite is conceived as something only ever outside 
the human domain, that can have no connection with the finite, then it becomes what 
Nishida calls a ‘dark fate’ and is invariably apprehended as a negative force, ‘The 
infinite which merely denies the finite, is imagined as dark fate, incompatible with 
humanity.’165  
But being prepared to encounter the infinite on one’s own homeground is not 
for the faint hearted. Simon Weil may have been up to it…if her heart had allowed. 
There is another who unexpectedly invites the oscillations of boundless space and 
time into his own small sphere of reckoning. The delight and fascination Watt takes 
in the humble markings of a small and seemingly insignificant picture, conveys a 
delicacy of sensibilities which could inspire suspicions of the Mystic or Bodhisattva 
about him. His extraordinary lucubrations on the circle and boundless space procure 
an unexpected and alleviated joy at the prospect of endless time, as opposed to an 
abyssal despair at the ineluctable recurring noon-tide, which could less surprisingly 
have been the outcome: 
 
And he wondered what the artist had intended to represent (Watt knew 
nothing about painting), a circle and its centre in search of each other, or a 
circle and its centre in search of a centre and a circle respectively, or a circle 
and its centre in search of its centre and a circle respectively, or a circle and 
its centre in search of a centre and its circle respectively, or a circle and a 
centre not its centre in search of its centre and its circle respectively, or a 
circle and a centre not its centre in search of a centre and a circle respectively, 
or a circle and a centre not its centre in search of its centre and a circle 
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respectively, or a circle and a centre not its centre in search of a centre and its 
circle respectively, in boundless space, in endless time (Watt knew nothing 
about physics), and at the thought that it was perhaps this, a circle and a 
centre not its centre in search of a centre and its circle respectively, in 
boundless space, in endless time, then Watt’s eyes filled with tears that he 
could not stem, and they flowed down his fluted cheeks unchecked, in a 
steady flow, refreshing him greatly.
166
  
 
These nimble feats of the mind (and copy-typist) are worthy practice for the 
cerebral summersaults necessitated to hurdle the high horse of a logic of identity in 
contradiction. A logic that concedes the identity of the finite with the infinite and 
that affirms through negation. Just such a logic is met with in Nishida’s 
philosophical odyssey that led him to the outer rims of absolute nothingness with his 
‘looping’167 of universals into an ultimate basho (place or locus). The arrival at his 
ultimate basho is preceded by mental gymnastics of   comparative techne to Watt. In 
his treatise Logic and Life, Nishida investigates the originating structures of logic 
and impels us to look beyond the forms of logic as they appear and into the creative 
generative act before they appear. He recalls the logos of Heraclitus and the dynamic 
contradictory forces of Heraclitean logic. That which appears to us as finite 
determined reality is not, according to Nishida, true reality. But neither is the infinite 
endowed with reality. Only in the dynamic interrelationship and identity of the 
infinite and finite is there true reality; ‘The actual is that which has been determined. 
It is thoroughly finite. The infinite is not actual. Yet neither is the merely finite. 
Actuality would have to be the contradictory self-identity of finitude and infinity.’ 168 
 The doctrine of opposites is at the central ‘axis of Tao’ and from this 
indiscriminating centre there is no differentiation between ‘this’ or ‘that’ and 
everything is present in all their infinite complexities. Therefore Chuang Tzu 
(contested 369-286 B.C.) says, ‘The right is an infinity. The wrong is also an 
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infinity.’169 He is not speaking of what the infinite is, that is not the point he is 
making, but by his comments the infinite can be understood to be beyond 
oppositions created through “comparative relations.” For Cusanus all knowledge is 
come to through these comparative relations and hence since the infinite falls quite 
far from such possibilities Cusanus determines quite simply, ‘the infinite, qua 
infinite, is unknown.’ 170  
 
9.  Fathomless Depths and the Obdurate Fragility of Surfaces  
 
With such a spectacular array of most impressive wares it is not surprising that we 
are easily dazzled by the outer face of reality in its inordinate brilliance and 
irresistible appeal but the surface of meaning must ultimately give way just as the 
fresh skin of youth will eventually succumb to the flaccidity and sag of times scalpel. 
There is joy in the inversion; the liberating abandonment of necessarily fixed 
meaning, the graceful fluidity that allows one thing to be quite another.  
 
In Watt, one of Beckett’s early novels, an ‘incident’ occurs, the first and type 
of many to come we are told. The incident was most peculiar and distressing to Watt 
for the reason that nothing had in fact occurred ‘that a thing that was nothing had 
happened.’171 The overall moment was choreographed to perfection, displaying 
‘great formal brilliance and indeterminable purport.’172 In brief summary of the 
event: after the expected knocking and introductions etc., the Galls, a father and son 
piano tuning team enter the premises of Mr Knott, for whom Watt is the currently 
employed manservant. The piano of Mr Knott is tuned, sundry comments are passed 
between father and son regarding the state of the piano and then they take their leave. 
Watt’s mind continues to be disturbed by this ‘fugitive penetration’173 until quite late 
in his stay at Mr Knott’s, at which point his acceptance of the nothing that had 
occurred was of little consequence itself, altogether ‘too late’ in fact. One source of 
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Watt’s mental malaise, for there were many, was the ‘fragility of the outer 
meaning.’174  
He did not require any real meaning, somehow aware of the futility of such a 
pursuit, at least from an external assessment, but he did wish for some semblance of 
stability in whatever outer meaning was presented. Some form of fortifying “exact 
conclusion” to which he could anchor his oneiric grip of reality. Indeed his need was 
such that ‘The most meagre, the least plausible, would have satisfied Watt…the first 
look, that was enough for Watt, that had always been enough for Watt, more than 
enough for Watt.’ And as a consequence of his efforts ‘he had experienced literally 
nothing.’ 175 Watt was one of those travellers on the great by-pass of life who had 
taken the prudent measure of ignoring, for the sake of survival mind, the 
inflorescence of signs and significance in heady proliferation along the way, and 
notwithstanding his immanent, yet somewhat latent, Bodhisattva-esqueness, had 
entirely missed the exit. 
Before Beckett’s particular authorial presence had unleashed itself he obliged 
the literary and art worlds with various critiques characterised by an often caustic but 
acute and lucid sophistication, one of these essays was Proust. In this serpentine 
guide to the mechanics of Proustian memory, the ‘dolorous synthesis of survival and 
annihilation,’176  Beckett exposes a ‘participation between the ideal and the real, 
imagination and direct apprehension.’177 But in the final analysis, irrespective of the 
extra-temporal mystical communications of this participation ‘Reality, whether 
approached imaginatively or empirically, remains a surface, hermetic.’178  
Proust, Beckett, minors and midwifes, all scratching away at this seemingly 
interminable and impenetrable surface to grasp onto some solid experience of true 
reality and finally get through to the unreachable depths of non-understanding.  
 
Nishida; ‘I have always been a minor of ore; I have never managed to refine it.’179  
 
‘The bottom of my soul has such depth; Neither joy nor the waves of sorrow can 
reach it.’180  
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Heraclitus; Fr. D. 45 You will not find out the limits of the soul by going, even if 
you travel over every way, so deep is its report.
181
  
 
Kant; ‘stars at this distance may be met in space, although no one has, or ever will 
discover them’182  
 
The hermetic surface of reality is but the jetsam of a sinking ship welded 
together by force of its sheer mass and what lies beyond it, through the obdurate 
barrier of stuffs, are the untraceable currents of real life. Calvino speculates on the 
substance of the body of matter that makes up our objective world and concludes that 
‘only what passes without leaving any trace truly exists, while everything held in our 
records is dead detritus, the leftovers, the waste.’183 In a comparative tale of futile 
extrapolation, Chuang Tzu relates a story of the ancient and legendary Chinese 
sovereign, the Yellow Emperor. The Emperor travels to see Kuanch’engtse for he 
has heard he was in possession of perfect Tao. The Yellow Emperor asks what the 
essence of this perfect Tao might be so that he could use its benefits for his people. 
“‘What you are asking about’ replied Kuanch’engtse, ‘is merely the dregs of things. 
What you wish to control are the disintegrated factors thereof.’”184  
A perfunctory brushing of the surface can collect little more than the flotsam 
of thoughts unable to endure the unknown depths, the depths of unknowing. A 
vertiginous plummet indeed. Of Heraclitus (acquiring the infamy as “the obscure” 
from Timon of Phlius) Socrates is recorded as saying it would demand the skill of a 
Delian diver to plumb the depths and meaning of his fragments. In “Why 
understanding Heraclitus requires being a Delian diver?” Francesc Casadesús 
Bordoy proposes that there is a particular resonance and significance of this well 
quoted reference from Diogenes Laërtius (c. third century) with the “hidden 
attunement” of Heraclitus.  
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Bordoy’s own excavatory plunge, for pearls or sponge, into the azure waters 
of Delos, reveals layers of meaning, that perhaps like the island itself, as Pliny the 
Elder describes it in his Naturalis Historia ‘suddenly appeared emerging from the 
water.’185 Bordoy casts his line from the consecrated birth place of Apollo, none 
other than Delos, the central island of the Cyclades ring, yet its trajectory takes us far 
from this ‘far-seen star of the dark-blue earth’186 and into the land ‘beyond of the 
beyond,’187 of Hyperborea, from where it is also said Apollo originates, and where 
Nietzsche implies, in The Antichrist, we are all from.
188
 Presuming that divers from 
surrounding islands were equally skilled as those of Delos for lack of evidence of the 
contrary, Bordoy anticipates a more suggestive and layered reading consistent with 
the nature of utterances we have come to expect from the source and subject of the 
claim, Socrates and Heraclitus respectively.   
The mythological and historical significance of Delos cannot be overlooked, 
nor indeed can its name: ‘the name of the island, Delos, alludes to the concept of 
brilliance, clarity, and transparency, the meanings of the homonymous adjective 
δῆλος [delos] in Greek.’189 Likewise, it also carries a sense of “visible,” “manifest,” 
and “clear”. The opposing allusions of “delos” or “Delian” as something clear and 
visible against the darkness and hidden depths associative with “diver” wittingly 
emulate the often paradoxical and ambiguous statements for which Heraclitus is so 
renowned. With respect to the Apollonian associations of the island and in deference 
to the ‘raving mouth’ of the Delphic Sibyl, oracle of Apollo: Fr. D. 93 The lord 
whose oracle is in Delphi neither declares nor conceals, but gives a sign,
190
 which 
displays a remarkable resemblance to the notoriously enigmatic expression of  
Heraclitus, Bordoy arrives at the conclusion that the interpreter of Heraclitus ‘must 
be someone versed in the arcane oracles of the god Apollo to be able to move freely 
in the sibylline depths of Heraclitean thought.’191  
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From Delos as the consecrated birth place of Apollo, Bordoy proceeds to 
Pythagoras (c.570-495 B.C.) and his recollection of a previous reincarnation as a 
Delian fisherman. With concession to the noteworthy difference of a fisherman’s 
connection with water being markedly less profound than a diver’s, literally speaking 
that is, the significance of the recollection lies once again with Delos and Apollo. 
This is further emphasised by the succession of reincarnations recorded by Diogenes 
as including Hermotimus, whom is more directly identified with the Hyperborean 
Apollo. Peter Kingsley notes an alternative appellation used in reference to 
Pythagoras as no less than ‘Apollo arrived from Hyperborea.’192 Considering 
Heraclitus’s splenetic denouncement of polymaths like Pythagoras, whom he 
reproaches as ‘the prince of imposters,’ it is a curious supposition to connect them, 
and perhaps for its oddity alone begs elaboration.   
A tentative exploration (purely experimental speculation) of Fr. D. 51 They 
do not comprehend how a thing agrees at variance with itself; it is an attunement 
turning back on itself, like that of the bow and the lyre,
193
 could strengthen the weak 
threads of our net cast by a Delian fisherman, stretched across the Ural mountains 
and back into the translucent depths of the Aegean sea. Leaving aside philological 
and textual debate over what have here been rendered as “attunement” (ἁρμονίη – 
harmoniē), “turning back” (παλίντροπος – palintropos) and “it (a thing or logos) 
agrees with itself” (ὁμολογέει – homologeei) the fragment could be a surreptitious 
suggestion on how to interpret Heraclitus himself,  and not just the structure of the 
cosmos. Essentially there is nothing to separate Heraclitus as a part of the cosmic 
whole from the whole that he is part of. T. M. Robinson hints at something similar 
when he writes ‘Heraclitus himself may be the most compelling instance of the 
“interconnectedness of opposites.”’ Robinson is questioning how much Heraclitus 
himself believed of his own account, but leaves the question ‘happily, 
unanswerable.’194  
Both the bow and lyre are instrumental attributes of Apollo, one of war and 
one of peace. Bordoy describes Heraclitus’s connection with Apollo as 
‘notorious.’195 There are several fragments which make either overt or oblique 
references to Apollo. This needn’t signify anything of dramatic import, as has 
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already been touched on, the Ionian cosmologists of which we can consider 
Heraclitus a peripheral member, though not strictly a ‘physikos or natural 
philosopher proper,’196 were still connected to their poetic and mythological 
antecedents. It would perhaps be more significant if there was a conspicuous absence 
of such referral within the fragments, as Kingsley avers ‘After all, history – our 
history- is not so much a matter of what is remembered or repeated as the things we 
prefer to leave unsaid.’197  
The reference to “A thing agrees at variance with itself” could equally refer 
to Heraclitus himself, that is, that he is actually in disagreement with his own 
statements. In disagreeing with what he himself states he is in actual accord, he turns 
back on his own words to create harmony. War in turning back on itself creates 
peace. His reactions against Homer, Thales, Pythagoras and the polymaths are to be 
recanted in harmony. That, despite what he appears to state there is the ineluctable 
condition of flux that will invoke the balance and convert his words into harmonious 
support. On a similar principle, following an approach of “knowledge-how” over 
“knowledge-that,”198 Eugenio Benitez determines it is reasonable to presume that the 
‘structure of opposition’199 in the fragments, which yields often opposing outcomes, 
does not mean that these outcomes are necessarily mutually exclusive. This 
perspective follows a thinking aligned with the Doctrine of the Mean that is found in 
the philosophy of Chuang Tzu, and which holds that without conflict multiple 
viewpoints or paths may be pursued.
200
 
But harmony is also created through discord or opposing notes. Perhaps the 
opposing notes were those of Pythagoras and Heraclitus. Maybe Heraclitus’s 
denouncement of Pythagoras as the ‘prince of imposters’ (from Philodemus D. 81 
Pythagoras was the prince of imposters. Noted that this is a contestable quotation) 
was because Heraclitus makes claim to the Apollonian lineage that Pythagoras 
instead receives; the arrow should have been handed to Heraclitus! ‘Sent by the god 
Apollo with an arrow in his hand, Abaris carried a thread of one-pointedness joining 
the East to the West. And the thread is so fine it has nearly gone unseen.’201 It is the 
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oracular voice of Heraclitus after all that Nietzsche proclaims espouses its profound 
intuitive wisdom ‘in Sibylline rapture.’202 The arrow of Abaris invokes its circle and 
we can only but imagine its centre.  
 
*   *   *   *   * 
 
Another little peculiarity of Watt’s was a great need of ‘semantic succour.’203 
Undoubtedly this was a symptom of his general condition to which meaning, any 
meaning, was necessarily prescribed to appease the dyspeptic fluctuations afflicting 
his external world. So desirous of ‘the illusion of fixity’204 is Watt (a true 
Parmenidean) that he requires the surface of “outer meaning,” the woolly patchwork 
of tangible form, even though at the slightest prod it will perforate, to maintain his 
litigious orientation within the world. There is, however, rather unexpectedly, 
something of a Bodhisattva about Watt, in a deeply unconscious way. He is not so 
deluded as to be convinced by the specious guises of nomenclature, yet short of the 
imaginative faculties to transcend them he remains contractually obliged:  
 
As for himself, though he could no longer call it a man, as he had used to do, 
with the intuition that he was perhaps not talking nonsense, yet he could not 
imagine what else to call it, if not a man. But Watt’s imagination had never 
been a lively one. So he continued to think of himself as a man…But for all 
the relief that this afforded him, he might just as well have thought of himself 
as a box, or an urn.
205
  
 
Ultimately Watt submits to these less than satisfactory terms and 
demonstrates, for the most part, with a serene equanimity, or at very least, a healthy 
“ataraxy.”  The ‘veil of illusion and unknowing [which] cuts us off from any 
possible cognition,’ or, as in the case of Watt, any possible experience, ‘let alone 
valid enunciation of objective truths and relations, even if the latter exist’206 
instigates a reflexive scepticism towards any imaginable “semantic succour.” No 
longer cowering under the fortifying and oppressive baptismal buttress from which 
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hangs the corresponding object, subject, matter, incident etc. we embark: free to 
follow the vagaries of our imagination.  
 
10.  The Silent Aria 
 
The disquieting voice of reason speaking so that Reason cannot hear and interject. 
Which ear is ready to receive word not spoken, not written, not even hummed? 
 
Nietzsche’s deep attraction to and connection with the ancient Greeks that is 
borne out in his grappling with and eventual digestion of the contradictory forces of 
the Dionysian and Apolline, is testimony to his own personal sympathetic resonance 
with these mysterious forces; His own disquieting daimon perhaps guiding his 
attraction and insight. Of Socrates, the optimistic Apolline, he writes in The Birth of 
Tragedy, ‘In exceptional situations, when his tremendous intelligence falters, he 
found guidance in a divine voice that spoke at such moments’207 it is the 
phenomenon of Socrates’s daimonion (from the Greek δαίμων) of which he speaks. 
But this guiding spirit, unlike the illuminative discourse or ecstatic vision of 
epiphany that one might expect from such an exceptional visitation, is a voice that 
‘admonishes.’ That Socrates’s intuitive knowledge or ‘instinctive wisdom’ is subject 
to a critical and rationalising influence presses Nietzsche to declare ‘that Socrates 
might be described as the very embodiment of the non-mystic.’ What is so 
extraordinary about this logical superfoetation of Socrates is that it parallels that 
which is normally encountered only in the ‘greatest instinctive forces.’208   
Fourteen years after the first publication of The Birth of Tragedy in 1872, 
Nietzsche writes “Attempt at a Self-Criticism”, a form of apologia for the book 
which is included in the new edition and its subsequent publications. As Michael 
Tanner points out, this form of personal riposte is not an altogether unfamiliar tactic 
from an author reviewing their early work yet there is still valuable merit in what 
retrospective comment reveals, both of what was said and what wasn’t. In 
Nietzsche’s case it is more a matter of how it was said that comes under his own 
scathing and chagrined scrutiny. He regrets the weakness of not having the courage 
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to forge a new language, or at very least to express himself in terms more appropriate 
to what he was saying, probably in terms more like those of his ‘Dionysiac monster 
called Zarathustra,’ the fourth and final part of Thus Spoke Zarathustra having been 
published the year before. The voice he describes, his own, resounds in reverberate 
accord with the daimon of Socrates; ‘a strange voice, the disciple of a still “unknown 
god”, disguised beneath the scholar’s hood.’209 Critique presupposes interest. Apathy 
or disinterest would never inspire irascibility, disdain, scorn. This is in accordance 
with the disagreeing attunement of Heraclitus’s fragment D. 51. It is a principle of 
critical association (not ‘free association’210).  
 
*   *   *   *   * 
 
With characteristic eloquent disdain, Beckett admonishes the general public, 
the hoi polloi, (a distinctly Heraclitean gesture) for being ‘too decadent to receive’ 
the direct expression of symbolic form of Joyce’s Work in Progress211 which ‘is not 
about something; it is that something itself.’212 Satisfaction with a superficial reading 
that merely absorbs ‘the scant cream of sense’213 may yield immediate benefits, but 
like all those three and a half minute hit singles, easy for the listeners ear to digest on 
the initial sounding, the brevity of interest (and track time) reflects the quality of the 
vintage. 
 
2.1  Yer Awning 
 
From the breezy balcony of world’s edge a procession of triumphant flag waving 
Titans parade past, off to the Olympics to race against Time. But, as fate would have 
it, tired of all the heroic antics, the gaping yawn of Chaos, from the breezy balcony 
of world’s edge, blows them all away. They are sucked into the aitherial vortex of 
no-where in particular, before even the games begin. And from this hallowed void 
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the world continues on as a middle place ‘right in the midst of time,’214 racing no-
where, poised in the in between, the eternal present.  
  
Occupying the liminal territories ‘between the two regions of light provided 
by archaic poetry on one hand and classical philosophy on the other’ in what Kahn 
calls a ‘dark period of transition and creation’215 the Milesian venture itself 
represents in historical terms the equivalent of the “intermediary” and “in-between” 
that in a certain respect have come to qualify the apeiron in lieu of determining its 
exact indeterminacy. The formulation of a substance between elements comes from 
Aristotle, and although there is some confusion and not a little contradicting, it is 
deemed fairly sure that he had the apeiron of Anaximander in mind with the 
proposition.
216
 Amidst several variants, primeval Chaos (Χάος) was also posited as a 
region between, often earth and aither or earth and sky. Verily as it comes into being, 
Chaos, the gap between earth and sky, precipitates the first stage of a differentiated 
world.
217
 The prodigious birth of irreconcilable dualisms in the western 
philosophical tradition thus begins. It is a divine (where all contradictions are 
reconciled) paradox that from a gaping yawn and an elemental nonentity sprung 
forth all that is. It is understandable that a material system predicated on a law of 
non-contradiction could not account for such penumbral activity.  To be consistent 
with his greater program, Aristotle introduces a substance in-between the elements - 
usually between water and air or fire and air - which is a perfectly adequate 
placement if paradox cannot be accepted and dualisms cannot be unified.  
Even whilst commanding such vast expanses and limitless perspectives, 
formulations of the apeiron whether “in-between,” “everlasting,” “immortal and 
indestructible” are still subject to the adjudications of Our Mighty Chronos and 
positioned within the accommodating boundaries of a spatial conception.  Caught as 
we are in the causal nexus of space and time, so too, are the limits of our 
understanding bordered by the “terms which make sense.” One version of the 
Olympic genealogy has Zeus saved from the voracious appetite of his father Kronos 
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(Κρόνον)218 whose ill-begotten megalomania led to the devouring of all his children 
(apart from Zeus, through the cunning wiles of his mother, Rhea, with the assistance 
of Gaia, the two times conspirator contra paternal paedophagy - a most 
commendable accolade on her behalf) by being hung from a tree on the island of 
Crete by the nymph Adamanthea, and thus dangling in “a great, mighty gulf here and 
there,” between the realms of Kronos’s dominion: earth, sea and the heavens, Zeus 
was made invisible to his father. The continuing life of the Gods (Zeus was a most 
productive progenitor) was miraculously achieved by escape through the interstices 
of the “terms which make sense” to Kronos.  
In the Hieroi Logoi in 24 Rhapsodies (Sacred Logos), or as they are often 
more simply called, the “Orphic Rhapsodies,” 269 heterogeneous fragments of 
uncertain authorship, many of which take attribute from the Hesiodic Theogony, 
Chronos is customarily placed at the origin of all and produces Aither as well as 
masterfully orchestrating the dehiscent void of Chaos ‘This Chronos, unageing and 
of imperishable counsel, produced Aither, and a great, mighty gulf here and there.’219 
The Orphic pantheon is not however, a straight forward matter of theogonic 
begetting. There are renegade winged self-fertilizing bisexuals ‘bright and aitherial’ 
vying for top dog/prima donna status, well, at least one on the loose, by the name of 
Phanes.  Who along with Aither, Chaos and an unexpected ‘silvery egg’ which 
sometimes morphs into a ‘shining tunic’ and is probably worn by Phanes, contends 
for prime ring side position. Nyx (Night), daughter of Phanes, also asserts her 
cosmogonical priority and as demonstrable evidence of her Godly prowess produces 
Gaia (Earth) and Ouranos (Sky/Heaven) for a second time, her father having already 
created them along with Olympus, sun and moon, but perhaps she was perfecting the 
paternal patent; ‘And she, again, bore Gaia and broad Ouranos, and revealed them as 
manifest, from being unseen, and who they are by birth.’220  
But then it is also thought that Night could just be primeval matter, preceding 
even Chronos, and not a divine entity at all.
221
 The separation of Gaia and Ouranos 
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from the vaporous exhalations of misty font (or from Night) and from each other to 
rent open the great windy chasm of Chaos, the particulars of which are so 
incalculable and veiled by murk ‘we need not concern ourselves with its peculiar 
geography,’222 is a primordial rendering of the abyss of Great Doubt that opens up 
beneath us as we earnestly enquire into the origins and ends of life, the ‘One Great 
Matter,’ birth-and-death. It is in between the before (Gaia-the life giving Earth) and 
after (Ouranos-the heavenly projection) that we stand in the unknown depths of the 
moment, in chaos and darkness.  
 
11.  Great Doubt 
 
Great in the magnitude of its power, in its expansiveness, depth and magnificence, 
and above all these, the greatness of doubt is its commitment to truth and its courage 
to disbelieve. In doubt we see through to the bottomless suchness of all things. To be 
bottomlessly in time in the world means to be in the world ‘groundlessly and with 
nothing to rely on.’ To rely on nothing is absolute freedom. This is the bottomless 
freedom of Great Doubt that transforms emptiness into knowledge, but it is a 
‘phantom-like Wisdom’ of emptiness. 223   
 
Only in full confrontation with this doubt, “the abyss of Great Doubt,” is it 
converted from despair and the longing to die into the longing for return. In the 
conclusion of Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Zarathustra emerges from the abyssal depths 
of despair and he ‘ends his journey by affirming and blessing life’s recurrence.’224  
In Nietzsche’s estimation the apeiron is not simply Anaximander’s answer to the 
archaic question of originative substances, ‘Anaximander was no longer dealing with 
the question of the origin of this world in a purely physical way,’ but is in fact the 
first declared confrontation with ethics. Weighing up of the world from his 
‘metaphysical fortress’ to which he has fled ‘From this world of injustice, of insolent 
apostasy from the primeval one-ness of all things, Anaximander flees into a 
metaphysical fortress from which he leans out, letting his gaze sweep the horizon…’ 
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the question of existence, the meaning and value of life, emerges. As far as 
Nietzsche sees it, Anaximander’s response is one of expiation through death, thus is 
his interpretation of the ‘lapidary sentence’225 left to us of Anaximander: “out of 
those things whence is the generation for existing things, into these again does their 
destruction take place, according to what must needs be; for they make amends and 
give reparation to one another for their offense.” But it is also through the living 
events of the world as they unfold, and not just in the death of those living events, 
that we determine a relationship with the ethical supposition in the apeiron. The lure 
of the apeiron tempts a courageous movement, a plunge into the abyss, though not 
between being and nothingness, word and world, seen and unseen but into the very 
centre where everything meets on its own home-ground. 
Philosophical skepsis tends towards resolution, it is a productive doubt which 
motivates inquiry and steadies the keel as the peregrinate vessel (mind) lurches 
forward in perpetual search for solid footing, new ground, albeit hitherto unknown, 
yet terra firma is none-the-less the ultimate destination. Skepsis in this sense is 
actually surety, an undisclosed persevering faith. This is the faith that William James 
(1842-1910) sermonises (in his own evaluation) in his address to Yale and Brown 
Universities. James proposes “The Will to Believe” underlies all speculative science 
– where there is a willingness to act, there is belief, the hypothesis is thus imbued 
with life and bolstered by the Will to Believe the momentous event of embarkment 
salutes the high horn of departure and knowledge, with anchors aweigh, is put to sea. 
Believability or verifiability is not an intrinsic property of the hypothesis but rather 
belongs ‘to the individual thinker.’226 Thus in the hazardous enterprise of Nietzsche’s 
‘Will to Truth’ – to which James’s ‘Will to Believe’ has plausible connections, 
though ostensibly arguing entirely to the contrary
227
 – the logical affirmation of 
reality is guided to its port only by the buoyant beacon of belief, in its turn tendered 
by doubt.   
Aristotle would have us believe aporia (doubt or philosophical puzzlement) 
leads to thaumazein (astonishment or wonderment).  And wonder, according to 
Plato, as he has Socrates tell it in Theaetetus, is the starting point of philosophical 
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thinking, ‘a sense of wonder – is perfectly proper to a philosopher: philosophy has 
no other foundation, in fact.’228 
 
1.4  Indefinite, Outside, Unseen, Unsaid but Directly Experienced 
 
How really can we, with such small pin holes to see, ever perceive the true 
grandness of anything? We can peer through our little key holes and only imagine 
what opening the door would reveal, and in fact not even that. Our imaginations 
aren’t up to it either. The whole cannot be conceived but it may be experienced 
through its parts, and that which is inconceivable can be turned into a very pretty 
lyric verse and penetrate to the depths of our souls. And the best demonstration of 
the apeiron may be in the fact that it isn’t. 
 
The conception of the apeiron as an intermediary substance does not 
necessarily break from a material formulation of it. The inexorable boundaries of 
scientific rationale, space and time, gather fortitude with the awakening of the 
natural philosophers and ironically temper their breadth, perspicacity and, dare I say 
it, profundity of vision. It is as if the rising powers of observation cannot yet break 
through the nocturnal covering of the Ouranol bowl. Reaching the limits of 
peripheral vision, the reflective light of observation is deflected back in a ricochet of 
incandescent rarefaction. Passing through the ‘dark and windy’229 gap between, 
aspirations of ascension and illumination are bound to a tellurian order and the 
apophatic lights of divine mystery are finally snuffed out by the “violent winds” and 
“rough movements,” that al-Ghazālī cautioned against, and are converted from ‘spirit 
into matter.’230 The powers of observation will after all only perceive what can be 
seen, which are poor pickings indeed. The field would open to a far greater yield 
from breaching rather than simply reaching its limits. Understanding of the apeiron 
can only be obtained by a breach of limits as well for as Graham affirms, ‘It is not 
itself the matter of the world, as Aristotle wants to claim.’231 Graham then asks how 
we can ever truly know the effects of the apeiron upon our being in the world; a 
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question that follows in the tradition of Nietzsche’s assertion of the apeiron being 
the first expression of ethical interest from Archaic Greece.  
 
What then is the ontological relationship between the boundless and the stuffs 
of our world? We simply do not know. The boundless remains outside the 
cosmos, surrounding and controlling it in some fashion, but it is not, so far as 
Anaximander tells us, in our world. It is forever inaccessible and mysterious, 
beyond empirical scrutiny. We know only its results, not its nature. As to 
events in this world, we must understand them in light of the powers and 
materials in it, and their own behaviour.
232
  
 
The fact that the apeiron is ‘beyond empirical scrutiny’ clearly indicates that 
as a conception it has, just as Nietzsche suggests, far more than a “purely physical” 
significance. ‘The term άπειρον had the advantage of predicating something positive 
of the ἀρχή without committing Anaximander to any view of its nature. He chose it 
precisely because it did not refer to the kind of substance but only to its vastness of 
extent.’233  
By using a physical model, however ephemeral it might be, and even if in its 
infiniteness, it perforates the boundaries of “empirical scrutiny,” the insubstantial 
and invisible can somehow emerge into declared awareness. In Bruno’s explorations 
of the Infinite the ‘dimensional and corporeal substance depends on the incorporeal 
and the indivisible.’234 We can only comprehend the infinite through its 
simplification, or through its potentiality, which means that we can’t really 
apprehend it at all. Through reason we are only forced into ‘a fatal participation with 
potentiality and matter.’235 So, Bruno relates through his interlocutors of the “Second 
Dialogue” of his Cause, Principle and Unity, that: 
 
Of the divine substance then – as well because it is infinite as because it is 
extremely remote from those effects which are at the furthest limit of the 
course of our discursive faculties - we can know nothing, except by the 
method of traces, as the Platonists say; of remote effects, as the Peripatetics 
say; of the raiment, as the Cabalists say; of the shoulder or back, as the 
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Talmudists say; of the mirror, the shadow, and the enigma, as the 
Apocalyptics say.
236
 
 
To many the particular is but a shadow reality, an empty silhouette of a vast 
invisible dominion; merely a ‘“modus” of the “substantia.”’ But from another 
perspective, even on the two-dimensional background of a formless eternity, 
individuality ‘produces form everywhere.’ It is this latter perspective that Nishida 
celebrates in the metaphysics of Goethe’s lyric poetry, an art which he declares ‘the 
formless voice of life.’ 237 It is the directly personal expression and humanity of 
Goethe’s poetry that in Nishida’s analysis is what brings its song into harmony with 
the universal. Calvino expresses the same feeling for the paradoxical communion of 
the finite and infinite in Cosmicomics. The progressive levels of revelation of Qfwfq, 
previously introduced from Calvino’s Cosmicomics, lead him first to the nothingness 
that is everything, and then slightly more challenging, his place in relation to the 
nothingness that is not just a “dark fate, incompatible with humanity.” Qfwfq 
realises there is a vital interpenetration between worlds and that ‘The only contact 
we could have with the void was through this little the void had produced as 
quintessence of its own emptiness; the only image we had of the void was our own 
poor universe.’238 In other words the only way to the universal was through the 
particular.  
Following the beliefs of Bertrando Spaventa,
239
 Zellini positively defends 
Bruno’s conception of the infinite and begs to differ from the scholar’s that believed 
he had confused the indefinite apeiron with true infinity. However, in the “Fifth 
Dialogue” there is given an explication of the Infinite Substance that, not-with-
standing Zellini’s well-founded repudiation of the scholars, displays all the 
trimmings of appearing to be the apeiron:  
 
Because it is the unique and radical substance of all things, it is impossible 
that it should have a certain and determined name and such a term that 
signifies positively rather than privatively; and therefore, it has been called by 
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some “point,” by others “unity,” by others “infinity,” and by others variously 
according to other concepts similar to these.
240
  
 
Nietzsche conceives of the apeiron as eternal and indefinite, as most 
commentators would agree, and he cites the lack of definite qualities – hence one of 
its interpretations as indefinite – as precisely what makes it eternal. Possessing 
nothing which may pass away the, ‘unimpeded course of coming-to-be’ is given full 
passage in Nietzsche’s appraisal of becoming. He interprets Anaximander’s 
“lapidary sentence” to mean ‘that which truly is…cannot possess definite 
characteristics.’241  
Kahn humourously, and with good understanding of how such an enthralling concept 
might mesmerise its audience into tainted truths, points out the very common fault in 
most commentators, who he says are ‘so fascinated by the concept of das Unendliche 
[the infinite] as the source of all that exists that they never seriously considered the 
possibility that τὸ άπειρον might not even be mentioned in the only sentence 
surviving from Anaximander’s book.’242 This small methodological hiccough can 
perhaps be explained away by the fact that the overwhelming import of the apeiron 
is only further confirmed by the fact that it doesn’t actually officially, historically in 
a verifiably documented capacity, exist. It is not the only grand idea that follows this 
invisible course to insubstantiality. Nishida’s basho, which by his own 
acknowledgment owes something to the Greeks, is also interpreted as an 
‘indeterminate nothing.’243 
The apeiron and basho would not then be favoured by ‘the uninitiated’ as 
Socrates calls the ‘uncouth,’ ‘hard, obstinate people’ who refuse to believe anything 
they cannot see or have some palpable physical exchange with; ‘The uninitiated are 
those whose sole criterion of existence is what they can get a good grip on with their 
hands, and who refuse to accept that causes and effects and anything invisible have 
any place in reality.’244 
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1.5  Coincidentia Oppositorum 
 
There is not a little illogic at play within a reality that is the unification of 
contradictory opposites and yet it seems undeniable that ‘wherever there is 
contradiction and struggle, there is reality.’245 
 
The apeiron seems to magically contain and express completely 
contradictory meanings. Following Homer it is ‘concrete bulk, magnitude, and 
extension’246 it implies something so vast that it may very well be entirely 
‘uncrossable,’ (from perao, “pass over”)247 but it remains none-the-less a solid mass. 
Then it came to mean “boundless,” “indefinite,” “infinite,” “qualitatively 
indeterminate,”  “inexhaustible,” all of which would be invalidated by reference to a 
mass of any type – as this infers limit. The apeiron thus conceived becomes perhaps 
the first philosophical articulation of the coincidentia oppositorum. If ‘the name of 
Anaximander stands here as a symbol for the anonymous creative spirit of Ionian 
thought in the sixth century,’248 then in a kind of ygolotnoealap (a slight adjustment 
in the excavatory order) the apeiron could now stand for ‘the lost or impossible 
presence of the absent origin’249 in the creative gesture of the twenty-first century. 
The apeiron continues to demonstrate, to be, the terms of its understanding. With 
munificent largesse it embraces all contenders, allowing and even nurturing the 
variance of interpretations.  
The bewilderment surrounding the apeiron makes even more sense when it is 
tallied up along-side the goading challenge of coincidentia oppositorum. The 
puzzlement and wonder match the contrary forces at work in the word thaumazein 
which allegedly initiates all philosophical inquiry.  John Llewelyn calls thaumazein 
‘one of those wonderful words that face in opposite directions at one and the same 
time…thaumazein both opens our eyes wide and plunges us into the dark. It is both 
startled start and flinching in bewilderment.’250 There is an intriguing meeting 
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between the apeiron as an indefinable concept which houses and transforms 
contradictory meanings, the philosophical inquiry beginning with thaumazein which 
itself is a word of contrary forces working in opposite directions, and the apeiron 
being an ostensible introduction to the philosophical standpoint of coincidentia 
oppositorum. A meeting which would make of that which steers all and is the eternal 
principle element of all things, the ungenerated beginning and end, a coincidentia 
oppositorum. I concur.  
Adorno finds the same structure of contradictory identity at the basis of truth. 
Each truth must carry its own negation to exist at all, ‘the truth of ideas is bound up 
with the possibility of their being wrong, the possibility of their failure.’ This 
potential contradiction does not discredit the validity of truth once arrived at but 
insists on a continuous movement in the dark towards a transcendent absolute where 
the contradictions within truth are negated;  ‘nothing can be experienced as living if 
it does not contain a promise of something transcending life. This transcendence 
therefore is, and at the same time is not – and beyond that contradiction it is no doubt 
very difficult, and probably impossible, for thought to go.’251 
As Nietzsche tells it, Heraclitus was able to overcome the dark and 
indefinable world of his predecessor Anaximander by dent of his unique perspective 
on harmonious tensions. Gazing out at ‘this world of injustice, of insolent apostasy 
from the primeval one-ness of all things’ from which Anaximander fled into his 
‘metaphysical fortress’252 Heraclitus perceived nothing but harmony in the 
disparities of light and dark in the indefinite and undefinable world of his 
predecessor, a world which must be apprehended intuitively to be comprehended. At 
least this is how Nietzsche presents the driving force of Heraclitus’s thought and 
why he is able to overcome the ‘melancholy’ of Anaximander’s perspective. 
 Ironically it is Heraclitus who has borne the reputation for melancholy and 
weeping, infamously labelled the ‘weeping philosopher’ through a mis-interpretation 
of Theophrastus’s attribution of μελαγχολία (melancholia) to him, which rather 
meant ‘impulsiveness’ in its earlier use. The irony of the supposedly humourless and 
heavy hearted Heraclitus overcoming the cruel and evil injustices of the world 
through his vision of harmonious tensions and nihilistic Nietzsche trumpeting the 
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essence of “Greek cheerfulness” – as he calls it – is a paradox most befitting an 
espouser of the unity or identity of opposites and a faithless believer. A perfect 
demonstration of their doctrines, if in the dangerous need for theoretical 
categorisation we must risk calling them so.   
 
12.  On Nothingness, Uncertainty, Unknowing and Truth. The Leap (Forging 
Truth) and the Münchhausen Trilemma. 
 
‘Truth will have no Gods before it. The belief in truth begins with the doubt of all 
truths in which one has previously believed.’253 
 
In our perpetual confrontation with truth: the origin of it, the value, the why 
is it that we even pursue it? there is the tacit presumption that truth is good, truth is 
real, truth in short is, and must be pursued at all costs. Nietzsche takes a bold step 
away from this presumption and asks us why ‘Granted that we want the truth: why 
not rather untruth? And uncertainty? Even ignorance?’254 The moral standing of 
truth becomes very problematic once the idea of morality is overturned, as it is in 
Nietzsche’s Will to Power. He does not deny the value of truth but rather ‘he 
challenges dominant assumptions we have about the good of truth and its normative 
forces.’255 What Nietzsche rails continuously against is the dramatic chiaroscuro of a 
righteous philosophy nurtured on the Aristotelian aversion to the antinomies of 
contradiction and which forever seeks the stable assurance of an Archimedean axis. 
His proposal of uncertainty and ignorance is an invitation to take up the truth of 
unstable and changing realities forged on individual inward truth seeking.  
The “True Dharma” in Zen is a form of truth conception that fully 
acknowledges the individual and therefore contradictory levels of truth. True 
Dharma is an ‘as-it-is-ness’ which is known only in individual experience. 
Śākyamuni transmits this ‘formless form’ through his beatific gesture and then 
saying ‘I have the all-pervading True Dharma, incomparable Nirvāna, exquisite 
teaching of formless form. It does not rely on letters and is transmitted outside 
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scriptures,’ he acknowledges the transmission to Mahākāśyapa. As the truth is 
individualised through experience there really can be no judication on which is the 
right experience or good experience of this truth, it simply is ‘as-it-is-ness.’ It is truth 
beyond good or evil, beyond consciousness, beyond intellection ‘for experiential fact 
does not belong to the realm of logic and intellect.’256  
Nishida presents the possibility of an Archimedean point of truth through the 
teaching of Lin-chi (Japanese: Rinzai), who says ‘When there is complete self-
mastery, everywhere one stands is the truth.’ This means that the more one becomes 
oneself, is oneself, the more one stands in truth. It also pertains to the dialectic of 
absence and presence that is the self-determination of the absolute. Recalling 
Dōgen’s words again ‘To learn one’s self is to forget one’s self,’ thus in the absence 
of self, one exists ‘in a relation of inverse polarity with the absolute.’ By making the 
individual the self-expressive centre of the absolute, Nishida does not wish to imply 
that we become Nietzsche’s Ubermensch, and nor that the individual self is lost or 
absorbed into the absolute but rather that it ‘becomes a unique expression of the 
world’s self-expression’257 
In the wake of Dōgen’s titanic movement of being-time the truth in Nishida’s 
account is also a timely matter. Truth as an individualised point or event of being 
cannot therefore be separated from time either; ‘The truth is known as kairos: it is 
timely in the sense of being the determination of the absolute present.’258 The truth 
too is full of time, it is ‘timeful’ in its timely-ness. Naming truth as kairos as Nishida 
does here, it begins to take on characteristics of Nietzsche’s “Gate named 
Augenblick”.  The cross roads where past and present meet in the eternal now of the 
present thus becomes the Archimedean point of truth of absolute self-determination. 
It is in this one eternal moment of presence that it can be said “everywhere one 
stands is the truth.” 
If we follow the path forged already by Heraclitus then the truth of the logos 
may become clear to us. And if, as Diels suggests, the real starting point for 
Heraclitus was Fr. D. 101 I went in search of myself, then in his stead, with this 
same inward search for ourselves we may see the cosmic pattern of truth without. 
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Heraclitus does not leave us stranded in the obscurity of his words and entangled in 
the ‘thicket of riddles’259 but lights the way for us through his lead, lest our own light 
becomes quenched as we sleep in forgetfulness and fail to recognise what we 
encounter in the dimming of life. All we need do is listen, but with more than our 
ears, and see, but with the depths of our soul.  
Graham advances a view of the fragments as not merely statements but as 
experiences. The very structuring of the fragments is the first “sign-post”260 in 
Heraclitus’s didactic guide to understanding nature and our life as a harmonious part 
of this over-all structure, ‘his style is a manifestation of his conception of the 
world.’261 The excogitative floccillations that an encounter with Heraclitus’s text 
excite ‘are much like our encounters with the world: the superficial meaning 
conceals a deeper structure and reality.’ As we have previously alluded to this kind 
of encounter sponsored by Graham is what Benitez refers to as a ‘knowledge-how’ 
(as the counterpart to the more standard tack of ‘knowledge-that’). In a new reading 
of the fragments that emphasises their concrete and everyday pedagogical qualities 
Benitez harnesses and encourages the ‘dynamic wisdom’ that a ‘knowledge-how’ 
approach elicits. Comparatively, the instructive process of navigating the fragments 
as a ‘knowledge-how’ exercise is identified by Freeman in the parables of Jesus as a 
‘“skilful means” for inviting their hearer to a direct participation in their symbolic 
referent.’262 
Departing from Graham in his central assertion of a ‘Primacy of Doctrines 
Thesis,’ which ultimately drives the outcome of Graham’s ‘knowledge-how’ 
methodology,  Benitez is left to question the nature of the skill gleaned; ‘What kind 
of skill or ability is imparted in working through non-doctrinal fragments that yield 
no solution?’263 He arrives, without ever alighting, on the capricious flickering edges 
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of thought in constant flux, that is, what the experience of reading the fragments 
creates is ‘the elimination of “stillness” in thought.’264   
This experience is ‘imparted to the readers of the fragments’265 in a manner 
reminiscent of what Thomas Kasulis, translator and scholar of Dōgen, calls a 
‘meeting half way.’ Under the instruction of a passage from “Mitsugo,” Kasulis 
determines his role as a translator of Dōgen as a special and vital intimacy with the 
text to bring it into wholeness. His role as a translator of Dōgen is in effect really a 
working relationship with Dōgen. The passage referred to is translated by Kasulis as: 
‘Because “the intimate is what is near you,” everything exists through intimacy; each 
half exists through intimacy’ and by Chodo Cross and Gudo Wafu Nishijima as 
‘Because secrecy surrounds you, everything relies on secrecy, and a single or half a 
thing relies on secrecy.’ Mitsugo is variably translated in these two cases as “secret” 
and “intimate” respectively.266 The two interpretations could imply a rather radical 
difference of meaning, one pertaining to the undisclosed or “secret” and the other 
infers a knowing so inherent it does not need to be disclosed. In fact both are quite 
appropriate, and do not necessarily contradict each-other in the ineffable moment of 
the present in which the Dharma is transmitted, nor in the intimate meeting of the 
other half when reading Dōgen nor in the unplumbable depths of our souls where we 
follow the lead of Heraclitus. Dōgen says ‘Because the present is an ineffable 
moment it is secret to the self, it is secret to others.’267 The “ineffable moment” (nan 
no jisetsu) is a time inexpressible through hours and minutes, it is a ‘real time.’268 
The moment of Mahākāśyapa’s enlightenment was just such a real time, an ineffable 
moment.  
Comparatively Graham espouses the intuitive dimension of Heraclitean 
thought. He situates intuitive cognition in an ‘inductive stage of understanding’ 
which is able to divine unexpected significance from the everyday and from 
disparate elements, comprehend a harmonious whole.
269
 Suggestive of a form of 
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transcendent knowing, Graham discourses on the illuminative principles active in the 
insight of intuitive cognition:  
 
What it gives us is insight into the world and its complexity. Insight, of 
course, is an elusive kind of cognition: understanding comes suddenly, as we 
say, “in a flash of insight,” without any obvious contribution on our own part. 
It is precisely the sort of cognition that seems spontaneous and undirected, 
though it may clarify and organize a large segment of our experience for us.
 
270
  
 
As much as Graham’s rendering of a “flash of insight” is like the sudden 
enlightenment of Mahākāśyapa, kindled by the twisting of the golden lotus, so it is 
also akin to Ibn al-Arabī’s epiphanic “opening” to God.271  
We can, with fortitude and perhaps “a flash of insight,” follow Heraclitus in 
his discombobulating see-sawing of ups and downs in the vertiginous depths of his 
search and we may also perhaps find him while we are at it. For example, as Graham 
suggests, the syntactic ambiguity of the river fragment: D. 12 As they step into the 
same rivers, other and still other waters flow upon them, (which is somewhat 
abrogated in the translation to modern English) precipitates the same flux in 
understanding the meaning as the meaning of flux it purportedly precipitates. The act 
of comprehension becomes an experience, meaning is ingested and assimilated, 
embodied, lived.  
The moveable meaning and purposeful ambiguity within the structure of the 
fragment is the very same as the experience of the reader as they grapple with the 
sense of it and, more importantly, more poignantly and more brilliantly masterful, it 
also reflects the movement of a river: its eddies and pools, turgid depths, shimmering 
stillness and clarity and unexpected turns and activity.  
Graham alleges: ‘The river fragment is not only a statement, it is an 
experience…The statement is an exercise in experience that sharpens our 
understandings in preparation for confronting sense experience.’272 The experience 
of the river fragment may not just be contained to the statement, but may in the same 
sense that Kasulis reads Dōgen, be a meeting half way of Heraclitus. Heraclitus as a 
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dynamic part of the self-determining cosmos cannot be separated from his words, 
neither by the passage of time, which, as we learn through Dōgen, is not just “goings 
and comings,” and nor through a constructed or imagined distance between subject 
and object. We are inexorably connected to Heraclitus through the Word or logos, 
that is everliving and omnipresent.  
Heeding Dōgen’s advice to ‘personally investigate such facts with clarity and 
diligence’273 Kasulis is able to realise the simultaneous forces of esoteric and 
discursive language at work in the Shōbōgenzō and bringing his whole self as his 
‘own “half which exists through intimacy”’ he encounters or “molts” with Dōgen to 
complete the text:  
 
In a remarkable sense, the Shōbōgenzō is Dōgen’s own presence – a 
discursive account of his own self-knowledge as presence and also the 
intimate presence of Dōgen himself, in oneness of body-mind (shinjin 
ichinyo). To separate Dōgen (the physical presence) from his ideas (his 
mental presence) is to deny that oneness.
274
  
 
Historically the approach to the cosmic fragments has been through the back 
door of Ionian physics and from this contextual entry point the philosophy and 
cosmology of Heraclitus is critiqued and compared. Graham’s pivotal positioning of 
Heraclitus as ‘the most articulate and philosophically sophisticated interpreter of 
Ionian philosophy’275 helps open new doors to our perception of what Heraclitus 
could be doing. As Graham contends, he is very aware of the implications and 
shortcomings of Ionian philosophy, particularly where the cosmogonic theories of a 
generating substance lead; nowhere. He is known to scorn most of the developing 
sciences and those who expound their virtues; he has a healthy scepticism towards 
the benefits of writing, though with prudent measure not writing it off altogether, D. 
59 The way of writing is straight and crooked,
276
 and perennially alludes to a species 
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of absolute (in the form of the logos) that is inherent in all and yet beyond them. He 
thus infers a kind of “trans-descendence,” as it might be termed in context of the 
Kyoto School philosophers, to comprehend or experience the cosmic totality within 
the particular ripple each individual casts into the greater current of natural order. 
The notional conjecture I put forward, demonstrable only through attainment in the 
‘skin, flesh, bones and marrow,’277 is that the aphoristic riddles through which 
Heraclitus communicates his astounding wisdom can be experienced in another 
dimension of linguistic activity akin to that transmitted through the Shōbōgenzō.  
Hee-Jin Kim recommends one participate in the symbolic play and artistic 
modulations of Dōgen’s diction which ‘stand for the infinite versatility of a seamless 
reality’278 rather than ‘restate them in more facile language.’279These lexical 
pirouettes are nothing short of ‘an indispensable part of the spiritual discipline 
demanded by the logic of the Buddha-dharma.’280  
In An Address to the Philosophical Clubs of Yale and Brown Universities 
titled “Will to Believe” James contends that faith is, as much as anything else, tied to 
the will, exactly as would be any scientific postulate. The likeliness or un-likeliness 
of the result is in effect predetermined belief. Thus he wonders why, with so much 
contradictory evidence and assumption with every aspect of thought or ‘fact’ we do 
not realise that it is not the result that reveals the matter but rather the query: 
 
There is this,-there is that; there is indeed nothing which some-one has not 
thought absolutely true, while his neighbour deemed it absolutely false; and 
not an absolutist among them seems ever to have considered that the trouble 
may all the time be essential, and that the intellect, even with truth directly in 
its grasp, may have no infallible signal for knowing whether it be truth or 
no.
281
 
 
The nature of truth is the theme of “Socrates’s Second Speech” in Plato’s 
Phaedrus. Madness is considered the privileged first order of communication with 
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divine truth. Anything pertaining to human reasoning alone is secondary. The truth is 
said to lie in ‘that region beyond,’ yet another reference to the mythical Hyperborea 
‘the land beyond’ and from where, if we can catch the whispered trail of Apollo’s 
arrow like ‘whatever soul has followed in the train of a god and has caught sight of 
any truth’282 we may be initiated into admission. The truth is beyond the song ‘of our 
earthly poets,’ ineffable and incomprehensible and ‘It is in this great beyond that 
Reality lives, without shape or colour, intangible, visible only to reason, the soul’s 
pilot; and all true knowledge is knowledge of her.’283 Apart from the fact that it is 
‘visible only to reason’ we could be gazing on the field of śūnyatā. 
Every “skin-bag”284 is residence to varying degrees of perception and levels 
of experience. The truly subjective nature of truth is communicated through the very 
bone and marrow of the Venerable Bodhidharma. In the fascicle Kattō (The 
Complicated) Dōgen retells the story of the discussion of the twenty-eighth patriarch 
(Bodhidharma) with his disciples as he knowingly draws near to his death. Prima 
facie it appears to be a typical solicitation of ascendency, holder of the winning 
ticket, he who draws nearest, but no, ‘everyone’s a winner…that’s the truth (yes, the 
truth).’285 But each disciple receives the transmission of the Patriarch in a distinct 
way. After hearing the words of the Patriarch (Bodhidharma), the first disciple 
Dōfuku says, ‘My view now is, without being attached to words or being detached 
from words, to perform the function of truth’ and Bodhidharma replies, ‘You have 
got my skin.’  After the four disciples present have expressed their particular 
responses, all different, the honourable title of Second Patriarch is bestowed upon 
one of them, Eka, who attained the “marrow.” As Dōgen then elucidates ‘The 
Patriarch’s expression is utterly consistent, but this does not necessarily mean that 
the four understandings are the same’ and furthermore, if the assembly of listening 
monks had been hundreds then along with the speech would have been hundreds of 
expressions for the receiving of the words, not just the ‘skin, flesh, bones and 
marrow’ equated to the four disciples present, in fact, ‘there would be no limit.’286  
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There is no erroneous approach, just different entry points. Lack of clarity 
invites experience ‘knowledge-how’ that a slap, prod or the odd skull crack 
sometimes necessitate. That which though unequivocally experienced, is not 
available for review by conceptual thought. The same viewpoint is notable in the 
readings advanced by Graham and Benitez of the Heraclitean fragments, in that the 
process of extracting meaning is just as if not more than important than the multiple 
meanings that any one fragment may proffer.   
Truth is an individual stage of learning. It varies in depth and texture. 
Understanding the bone is right understanding, understanding the marrow is right 
understanding. Like the learning of the way of the Buddha is learning the way of the 
self in Genjōkōan (Manifesting Suchness), it is individual. Or explained even more 
forcefully, under the tutelage of the famous Zen master Lin-chi who says, ‘If you 
meet a Buddha, kill him; if you meet a patriarch, kill him; if you meet a sage, kill 
him; if you meet your father or mother, kill them; if you meet your relatives, kill 
them.’287 Very thorough, not so nice and tidy. We must annihilate all learning and all 
knowing to encounter the true way. The tug of a tale end of truth with a sceptic’s 
grip will paradoxically allow us to rise up out of the dank swamp of doubt into the 
light of unknowing.  
In his key work De Docta Ignorantia (1440) and its companion piece De 
Coniecturis written shortly after (1442-3), Cusanus sets forth the premise that any 
assertion of truth can be nothing but conjecture and furthermore is subject to endless 
change and metamorphoses, in short, ‘precise truth is unattainable…The 
consequence is that any human positive assertion of the truth is conjecture, for the 
increase of the attaining of truth is inexhaustible.’288  
Whilst Cusanus makes it unequivocally clear that the science of precise truth (much 
like “exact conclusions”) is ‘humanly unattainable’ by doing so he at the same time 
determines absolute truth as the privileged province of God. Rather than damming 
all human speculation to meaningless vacuity as such an outlook may imply, this 
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‘quantum leap’289 in the thought of Cusanus means instead to forge a relationship 
between the creative forces of the divine and the mind of man as the instrument of 
the divine. When the human mind speculates, the conjectures put forward by it are 
the form of its participation ‘in the fecundity of the creative nature’ of God. 290  
In emphasizing the creative powers of both the divine and human he begins 
to shape a cosmologic order that is self-generating and co-expressive. Such a 
cosmological view has distinct Heraclitean over-tones and precedes the self-
determining co-dynamic world structure instituted by Nishida in his final essay “The 
Logic of the Place of Nothingness and the Religious Worldview.” Cusanus creates a 
symbolism based on a natural numerical flux. This is expressed through his 
concentric circles of De Ludo Globi and in the representation of unity in De 
Coniecturis through a more complicated diagrammatic representation from which 
the simpler patterning of the ludus globi is derived.
291
 The workings of natural flux 
are of course very reminiscent of Heraclitus and the manifold possibilities of human 
conjecture. Truth suppositions flow as does the infinitely mutable course of a 
running river. 
 
13.  Light 
 
The hallowed light of learning, the illumination that comes, like a flash of light in the 
darkest night as a lightning bolt through the profoundest darkness, and saved by the 
glorious incandescence of certain knowing, we close another opening to doubt, we 
securely plug the mountain tunnel down to the murky depths of sinful ignorance, we 
close another opening… 
But what is that soft glow we can barely perceive, that we do not know?  
 
Ambiguity is uncomfortable, we like to know what is in the light, what is 
shaded, what should be in the dark, what is meant to be lit, no half wattage, certainly 
not in the fluorescence of the present technological age. Understanding things is 
determined by the clarity in which we see things, illumination is never said to be 
cloudy or subfusc, it is radiant and dazzling. But it is also said to be blinding. In fact 
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the blinding type is of the highest order, the truly transformative. As if to really 
understand we must be rid of the sensory faculties, rise above their helpful yet 
limited ways.  
Heraclitus counsels that Fr. D. 55 Whatever comes from sight, hearing, 
learning from experience: this I prefer. Typically this is not just a straight forward 
appraisal of the senses nor does it favour specifically empirical methods but must be 
read in context with other fragments, some of which would seem to contradict what 
he is saying here if the fragment is not considered alongside the other thematically 
related statements. He is also implying that we have the necessary tools inherent 
within us to understand things (even though we unceasingly fail to comprehend) and 
that the experience gleaned from our own encounters with the world is sufficient. 
Polymathy and great recondite learning are not necessarily the proven methods
292
 
yet, Fr. D. 107 Eyes and ears are poor witnesses for men if their souls do not 
understand the language. Thus the senses, like the ‘imaginal spirit’ of the Ṣūfī 
mundus imaginalis cannot get us into the unseen world though they can certainly get 
us nearer. The vestibule area, no closer.  
Here Nishitani quietly interjects, putting forward a small lamp of his own to 
soften the hard edges of exclusion in the antechamber. The true natural light is not 
that of reason as it has come to be known, but the ‘light of each and every thing.’293 
From neither the fields of senses nor reason is the concentrated point of light that is 
the middle mode of being of things able to be apprehended in a non-objectifiable 
mode. From the fields of reason and sense, which orbit around the resplendent heart, 
‘the centre is always seen from the circumference.’294   
When the ‘fruitless threshing around of the mind to grasp itself,295 winds 
down to more of a rustle (it can’t be expected to stop altogether), it approaches a 
unity of being that extends out beyond itself and settles in what Nishitani terms the 
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‘knowing of non-knowing.’296  The same energy wasting activities that Fujisawa 
describes of the mind are recognised by Nishitani in our frustrated efforts to know 
the self, ‘where, in our attempts to grasp the self, we get caught in its grasp.’297 In the 
turn away from a self-centred mode of being in order to re-orientate ourselves to the 
“middle” of things, boundaries wibble into formlessness, a light of dappled dazzle 
soaks and absorbs, and our abiding and obstinate grasp is weakened as we dissolve 
into a form of non-form.  
Derrida traces the origins of language through a lingering of carbon and a 
vestigial flotsam of the unspoken and happens upon ‘a concentration of light as a 
result of seeing in order not to see.’298 Perhaps this is the light of true seeing, a light 
immanent in all things and that is seen only from the centre of the very thing itself, 
from its “middle,” which in fact cannot be seen at all. This star of disproportionate 
magnitude, this concentration of light that bedazzles us with its transcendent 
phosphorescence, also touches Nishitani’s knowing of non-knowing with its radiant 
glow. Indeed, for Nishitani, they are the very same thing; ‘What we call the knowing 
of non-knowing is, as it were, the gathering together and concentration on a single 
point of the light of all things.’299 
After a thoroughgoing dismissal of any thinking that presumes to know or 
distinguish “this” from “that” or “right” from “wrong” Chuang Tzu directs us to the 
only light of reason whose axis is entirely free of opposition. By this light all comes 
into identity, beyond relativity, comparison and conflict. It is the light of Nature and 
by its illumination does the sage proceed.
300
 It was by similar reasoning that brought 
Cusanus to the light of learned ignorance. He realised that all judgements are formed 
by means of a comparative relation and that which cannot be compared is therefore 
unknowable. Since the incomparable, in other words God, is really the only worthy 
pursuit of knowledge then we must content ourselves with knowledge of our own 
very particular form of ignorance, and thus, ‘the more he knows that he is 
unknowing, the more learned he will be.’ These revelations, as we have remarked 
else-where, came to him on a sea voyage, under the auspicious guidance of the light 
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of Nature and again we have considered Chuang Tzu and Cusanus under the same 
light.  
 
14.  Pure Experience and Withness 
 
The philosophies of William James and Nishida Kitarō are both marked by a deep 
and authentic personal interest in religious experience. The ideas of pure and direct 
experience that they developed are the progeny of inquiries inspired by the ineffable 
and meta-rational reality of the apophatic. Emergent from the lived and cogitative 
explorations of their respective philosophies are the related ideas of a subsuming 
universal that overcomes distinctions between subject and object. What one calls a 
conjunctive relation which acts as a connector between experiences the other might 
call a knowing by becoming. The significance of either of their approaches, which 
cannot be lumped together in the wholesale manner this précis threatens to do, and 
the reason for my returning interest, especially in Nishida with regards to the elusive 
subject of this thesis, is the curious assimilation of object and subject which to my 
mind is one of the most resounding auguries of a thinking that leaves behind 
knowing for a knowing of non-knowing, or learned ignorance, and which 
undoubtedly will at some ungiven moment in the augenblick of nunc stans beckon the 
flag ship of coincidentia oppositorum and ride off into the shimmering Isness of 
absolute nothingness to unite with an opposite.     
 
In A World of Pure Experience from his series of essays in radical 
empiricism, James notes a piquing unrest with the inadequacies of the philosophical 
atmosphere at the time of his writing and proposes a type of personal 
Weltanschauung, which he names “radical empiricism,” in response to these 
urgencies and issues. As we have mentioned, it was the ideas that emerged from this 
Weltanschauung that were to greatly inspire Nishida’s earliest forray into the 
philosophical literary scene with his An Inquiry into the Good. James presents the 
idea of a varied “withness” as an imperfect intimacy between disparate parts and 
experiences as ‘contingent relations’ which ultimately form a greater unity of both 
disconnections and connections. He likens the universe and our independent 
individual experiences of it to a dried human head, the type which ‘the Dyaks of 
Borneo deck their lodges,’ and from which float and dangle ‘innumerable feathers, 
First Episode  
95 
 
leaves, strings, beads, and loose appendices of every description.’301 This colourful 
assortment of livery represents the gallimaufry of subjective experiences that ‘float 
and dangle’ off the shrivelled cerebrum ‘for the most part out of sight and irrelevant 
and unimaginable to one another.’302  
The significance of James’s notion of ‘pure experience’ for Nishida, did not, 
however, have anything to do with this adventurous décor. In fact, you could rather 
say that it represented the shortcomings of James’s theory for Nishida, which lay in 
its emphasis on the outward expression of experience. A grasp ‘not from within but 
from without,’ in Masao Abe’s assessment, misses the true reality of pure 
experience. The true pure experience must be a living unobservable actuality that is 
‘individual and yet trans-individual and universal.’303  The idea of a direct 
unmediated experience prior to any division between subject and object is still the 
basis of James’s pure experience but Nishida’s criticism of it was that it became too 
psychological and generalised to really be the undifferentiated experience that 
Nishida was able to later explain through the basho structuring of progressive fields 
or loci that encapsulate without ever objectifying the self – and therefore all 
experience. None-the-less James helped paved the way towards the ultimate looping 
of the basho structure with his ideas of “withness” and the “conjunctive relation.” 
James’s conjunctive relation emphasises a continuity of experience which allows the 
passing of one experience to merge into the next, from one subject to another, from 
object to subject and subject to object, so that ‘within each of our personal histories, 
subject, object, interest and purpose are continuous or may be continuous.’304    
 
15.  Absolute Nothingness 
 
Absolute nothingness, the fundamental Buddhist standpoint as espoused by the Kyoto 
School philosophers is its own perplexing yet thoroughly simple domain (perplexing 
for this reason) that should not strictly be appropriated into the fellowship of the 
unknown here for the purposes of augmenting the argument. Never-the-less I am 
taking the liberty of alliance with this standpoint of all standpoints as yet another 
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means of articulating something of what I contend the unknown to feel, be, appear 
and dis-appear like. 
 
There is no subject-object dichotomy in absolute nothingness, nor separation, 
distinctions or dualities. The obtainment of this effulgent ekstasis according to 
Nishitani is not a matter of unifying opposing elements, it is ‘neither a monism nor a 
dualism’305 but rather ‘It is the absolute one, the absolute self-identity of the absolute 
two: the home-ground on which we are what we are in our self-nature and the home-
ground on which things are what they are in themselves.’306 On this homeground of 
absolute nothingness the creative declaration ‘I am that’ is also possible. It is not a 
dead space of no return but a living force.  
A relative nothingness can be shown. It is only a relative nothingness that can 
be shown. An absolute nothingness cannot exist in the world for it is not of the 
world. It can only be suggested by describing what is in the world that it is not. 
Absolute nothingness is an Is not a Not, though it is not. Absolute nothingness is the 
being and source of all things, it is the esse over existence that Aquinas speaks of, 
the ultimate basho of Nishida as a universal of universals, the all-comprehensive 
infinity of Bruno, the godhead of Eckhart. Relative nothingness is a human 
apprehension of itself in space and time. Anything that is not absolute is 
apprehended by the subject from a standpoint within space and time where the 
dichotomy of the subject and object holds reign.  
Within relative nothingness there can exist the appearance or suggestion of 
an absolute. When what is perceived around us, as in all perception is understood to 
be a function of relative existence, we can begin to see through the veil of reality into 
the infinite depths of its possibilities grounded in absolute nothingness. 
In confrontation with the nothingness inherent in all things the strictures of perceived 
reality dissolve into a giddying vortex that eliminates all duality and nurtures the 
almost impossible possibility of understanding by becoming. This is not a non-being 
but an all-being where there is no separation between things and beings. It is an all-
inclusive neutralising balance, a shimmery equilibrium between all forces present. 
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α.  The presence of absolute nothingness 
 
James Heisig describes ‘the illumination’ brought to him by the profound 
insights of the Kyoto School of philosophers as an awakening transmitted to him in 
‘sparks’ and ‘flickers.’307 It seems appropriate that like the ghostly remains of a fire, 
a hot contender in the originative substance debate, absolute nothingness, intangible 
and unknowable is apprehended through the flickering flame of suggestion and 
metaphor. One such flame, long subdued and leaving only its untraceable remains is 
the image given to us by Derrida and the infamous cinder. It is not difficult to read 
the presence of absolute nothingness in the name of this ‘being that there is but 
which…is nothing.’  
 
I understand that the cinder is nothing that can be in the world, nothing that 
remains as an entity etant. It is the being l’etre, rather, that there is – this 
is a name of the being that there is there but which, giving itself es gibt 
ashes, is nothing, remains beyond everything that is konis epekeina tes 
ousias, remains unpronounceable in order to make saying possible although 
it is nothing.
308
  
 
Absolute nothingness is not however, a metaphor. It isn’t any thing. There is 
no similitude for it either. It is everything. Aquinas asks ‘Why is there something 
rather than nothing?’309 Heidegger opens his monumental Introduction to 
Metaphysics with what he considers to be the fundamental question of metaphysics 
‘Why are there Essents (Existents, Seiend) rather than nothing? That is the 
question.’310 ‘Why are there cinders rather than nothing?’311 echoes Ned Lukacher 
editor and translator of Derrida’s Cinders. These questions house a presumed 
contradiction between something and nothing. The is and the is not are butted against 
each other as if there can only be one or the other.  From an Eastern perspective this 
would be considered typical of Western thinking which separates materialism and 
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spirituality, wherein the two tendencies of thought are so incompatible they speak 
over each other in language codes undecipherable to the other.  
Sartre determines being as absolutely positive and positions nothingness as 
its negative contradiction. His nothingness ‘haunts’ being, it has a borrowed 
existence that it gets from being, it is in other words a non-being, that has arisen 
from being and ‘exists only on the surface of being.’312 He sees nothingness as 
subsequent to being and warns against positing ‘nothingness as an original abyss 
from which being arose.’313 He critiques G. W. F. Hegel’s (1770-1831) approach to 
nothingness, which is more inclined to see nothingness as an indeterminable 
emptiness, indeed as empty as pure being, and he strives to correct Hegel’s thinking 
by asserting ‘that being is and that nothingness is not.’314 This is the kind of thinking 
that forewarns of a self-immanent self-prehension that Nishitani rebukes when he 
states ‘nothingness is not a “thing” that is nothingness.’315  
Whilst Nishitani says complete nothingness means the absolute negation of 
person that is because it ‘becomes one with it.’  “Person” is not then caught up in the 
difficulty of affirming what one is, a difficulty that might result in statements like ‘at 
once that I am what I have been’316 when in denial of the absolute nothingness that 
lies at the ground of all being. Where we are led by Nishitani is away from the 
illusory appearances of a self engaged ‘in a process of unlimited self-
determination’317 and as Heisig puts it to ‘the restoration of subjectivity from its 
source (which) means a return to this life in a nothingness beyond being.’318  
In contrast with the Kantian premiss, also followed by Sartre, that 
distinguishes the phenomenon with the thing-in-itself, Nishitani’s idea of ‘person as 
a “phenomenon”’319 is person as a real manifestation that lies somewhere in the 
middle of illusion and emptiness. What lies behind the phenomenon of person or 
‘mask of persona,’ is not the thing-in-itself as Kant and Sartre suggest but absolute 
nothingness. Absolute nothingness is not to be thought of as separate or something 
other than person but exactly what person is. In this sense persona becomes a mask 
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but there is nothing other which is real or authentic behind the mask. The mask of 
persona is the surface crystallization of being. 
What is behind person according to Nishitani is true emptiness. The 
awareness of true emptiness is the simultaneous manifestation of true emptiness and 
our true self-nature as self-awareness. This is like the simultaneous realisation and 
generation of reality; reality is literally being realized, in the double sense of the 
word.   
 
True emptiness is nothing less than what reaches awareness in all of us as our 
own absolute self-nature. In addition, this emptiness is the point at which 
each and every entity that is said to exist becomes manifest: as what it is in 
itself, in the Form of its true suchness. 
320
 
 
For Sartre ‘nothingness lies coiled in the heart of being – like a worm.’321 He 
tempers this healthy condition with the human attitudes he considers to be a 
‘“comprehension” of nothingness: hate, prohibitions, regret, etc.’ Ultimately he 
describes the phenomenon of nothingness as ‘anguish.’322 This “anguish,” I would 
say is the encountering of nothing when looking for the self, but it is not absolute 
nothingness.  
 
β.  Absolute nothingness as absolute reality 
 
Of reality one can hardly speak with any authority except to oneself. The 
irregularities of interpretation can never be eliminated. Jung defines reality as an 
entirely individual prerogative in The Undiscovered Self ‘the distinctive thing about 
real facts, however, is their individuality’ he says, and ‘one could say that the real 
picture consists of nothing but exceptions to the rule, and that, in consequence 
absolute reality has predominantly the character of irregularity.’323  Following the 
thinking of the Kyoto philosophers “reality” is nothing other than absolute 
nothingness, ‘the world of being that rests on the nihility of the self and all things is 
only a relative manifestation of nothingness as it is encountered in reality. Beneath 
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that world, all around it, there is an encompassing absolute nothingness that is 
reality.’324 
Sartre’s nothingness that ‘haunts’ being, Jung’s “character of irregularity” 
Nishitani’s mask of persona, are all manifest aspects of the illusory nature of being 
and reality. Reality is rendered a surface appearance, an illusion beyond which lies 
the true substanceless reality of absolute nothingness. 
Without venturing into a dissection of the nature of reality but rather by 
navigating past its surface to the flicker of beyond, into a “knowing of non-
knowing,” where being is in unison with emptiness, where knowledge and ignorance 
converge, only there can we catch a glimmer of what absolute nothingness as a 
reality is, for as Beckett bemoans ‘Reality, whether approached imaginatively or 
empirically, remains a surface, hermetic.’325 
 
γ.  Meaningful meaninglessness from a standpoint of absolute nothingness 
 
When reality is conceived from a perspective of relativity the ever present 
observer becomes aware of itself being aware of itself and hence then should also be 
aware that it is unable to perceive anything beyond itself. From here the subject is 
greeted with a self-reflecting reality that very soon loses any vestiges of meaning and 
spirals inwards to encounter the coiled worm of Sartre’s relative nothingness lying at 
the heart of all being.  
Searching for the origin of nothingness, Sartre concludes that as nothingness 
‘lacks all relation’326 with being, so cannot be in opposition to being, nor its 
negation, nor any consequence of being whatsoever, but yet has to come from 
somewhere where being is, it must then come from a type of being that is its own 
nothingness. He marvels at how we might come to encounter such a rare flower, ‘It 
remains to learn in what delicate, exquisite region of Being we shall encounter that 
Being which is its own Nothingness.’327  
For Sartre it seems that being has more the quality of what the Kyoto school 
conception of absolute nothingness is and everything accordingly is conditioned by 
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the appearance of this absolutely positive being, nothingness included. Sartre states 
the act of doubt in human reality, that is the act of questioning, affects a withdrawal 
from being ‘as one who questions, disengages himself from being’328 and it is this 
disengagement, this withdrawal, that allows nothingness to arise in the world. By 
this reasoning Sartre allows nothingness to exist without it affecting being. Whilst 
this doctrine stands in sharp contrast to the unifying principle that underlies the 
conceptual (at very least) understanding of absolute nothingness that I have strived to 
elaborate in the slipstream of the Great Wave, Nishitani, in my view it still bears 
within it the very thing that it determines cannot exist in relation with it. What I 
mean is the unavoidable presence of absolute nothingness. I am using “presence” 
here much like Derrida uses “cinder” or “ashes,” names that ‘are as good as any 
other.’329 So, it is not a real presence, which would imply being, but perhaps more an 
‘is been,’330 a presence that would be better described by using the trace structure of 
Derrida than giving it a name.  
 
16.  Mysterium Tremendum 
 
In his analysis of the phenomenon of mysterium Rudolf Otto attempts to 
describe what in religious terms would be called ‘wholly other’ which, he continues, 
‘falls quite outside the limits of the “canny,” and is contrasted with it, filling the 
mind with blank wonder and astonishment.’331 Otto looks to St. Augustine’s 
Confessions to illustrate the ‘benumbing’ effect of the wholly other ‘before which we 
therefore recoil in a wonder that strikes us chill and numb.’332 So not only are we 
cold, sensually frozen but we are incapable of cognitive recourse. The power of this 
mysterium tremendum is such that even in allowing for the ‘certain irremovable 
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limits’ of our knowledge, it renders us impercipient. He is careful to clarify that the 
effect, contrary to its seeming negative stupefaction has a positive ‘feeling-content’ 
to distinguish it from nihilism or despair.
333
 John Harvey, a translator of The Idea of 
the Holy, finds in Pascal a quote most befitting in summary of Otto’s viewpoint; ‘If 
one subjects everything to reason our religion will lose its mystery and its 
supernatural character. If one offends the principles of reason our religion will be 
absurd and ridiculous…There are two equally dangerous extremes, to shut reason out 
and to let nothing else in.’334  
 
17.  Becoming Nothing: On Love as Knowing 
 
Worthy of utmost honour for continuing to be the most truly mysterious and 
unknowable yet paradoxically, common to all, event, if we may call it that, in the co-
dynamic, if we may make that considered agreement, creative expression of life, the 
universe and everything, love, deserves a spot.   
 
What makes up the final chapter of An Inquiry into the Good was not 
originally intended for the book at all according to Nishida. He has nonetheless 
appended it for its relation to the general thoughts preceding. It is titled “Knowledge 
and Love.” In it he explicitly relates the activities and unity of love and knowledge. 
This brief addendum could be some of the plainest spoken rhetoric Nishida gives us, 
as Kasulis laments; ‘It is regrettable that Nishida never fully recaptured some of the 
clarity and simplicity of the prose he used in A Study of Good.’335 The simplicity of 
the prose belies the most bewildering of themes, those of love and knowledge. 
Nishida wishes to dispute the long held supposition that knowledge and love stem 
from entirely different faculties: that ne’er the twain shall meet and any betrothal of 
the two will assuredly end in annulment. Indeed it is the inherent compatibility of the 
subjects that Nishida makes most plain in his ensuing and very short, at barely three 
pages long, summary of the monster topic. Notwithstanding, a familiarity with 
Nishida’s particular sympathies towards knowledge is essential to this bold 
                                                 
333
 Otto, The Idea of the Holy, 28. 
334
 John Harvey, Introduction to The Idea of the Holy: An Inquiry into the non-rational factor in the 
idea of the divine and its relation to the rational, by Rudolf Otto, trans. John W. Harvey (London: 
Oxford University Press, 1981), xix. 
335
 Thomas P. Kasulis, Untitled Review of Nishida,  Journal of Japanese Studies, Vol. 15, No. 1 
(Winter, 1989): 325 
First Episode  
103 
 
declaration of union. True knowledge comes with the elimination of distinction 
between the object of knowledge and the knowing subject. We must, in other words, 
‘eliminate our own delusions and conjectures – that is, idiosyncratic subjective 
factors – and thereby unite with the true nature’ of our object.336 Only through the 
union of subject and object can we come into knowledge of the true nature of a 
thing. This process is readily translatable to the somewhat rarefied and ideal 
movement of loving union, in that ‘to love something is to cast away the self and 
unite with that other.’337 This would be a knowing by becoming. Al-Ghazālī relates 
the very same process of unification through the immersive state of love but in his 
terminology ‘it is called “extinction from extinction,” since the possessor of the state 
is extinct from himself and from his own extinction.’ The possessor of this state has 
been fully unified, has arrived on the ‘absolute near side,’338 as the wine and cup, so 
to speak, ‘As if there is wine and no glass, or glass and no wine.’ 339  
The indefatigable forces of love also inspire an unexpected about turn for 
Qfwfq. His turn towards nothingness is a significant step towards the extinction of 
consciousness that precedes the declaration of unity.  Impelled by love he 
reconsiders the marvels and novelties of being and his ‘excessive enthusiasm for the 
glories of the universe’ to meet the faultless clarity of the featureless void:  
 
it was true that there was an absoluteness about the void, a rigour, a presence 
such as to make everything that claimed to have the requisites for existence 
seem approximate, limited, shaky; if one starts to draw comparisons between 
what is and what is not, it is the poorer qualities of the former that strike you, 
the impurities, the flaws; in short, you can only really feel safe with 
nothingness.
340
  
 
Christian Mysticism invokes love as an assured passage for the souls 
yearning. San Juan de la Cruz (1542-1591) describes a ten rung ladder of love by 
which we ascend to God. In The Dark Night of the Soul he immerses us in the 
anguish of a soul tormented by separation but then soars to the ecstatic heights of the 
incomprehensible beyond in glorious betrothal with Our Love. The earlier and lesser 
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known French Beguine mystic, Margaret Porette (died 1310) writes a most moving 
incantation of the illuminating forces of love in her book The Mirror of Simple Souls. 
The ideas contained within far too threatening for the Inquisition, who in their 
eminent wisdom had her burnt at the stake. 
In The Cloud of Unknowing, by an anonymous late fourteenth century 
English author, it is through love alone that we can pierce the cloud of unknowing 
that lies between us and God. Love is not merely the passage through the cloud of 
unknowing but is also what is encountered on the other side. It is through the 
unknown and infinite capacity of love that we can abide in harmonious unity with 
divine will, and divine will is love.  
To pierce the cloud of unknowing one must cast aside all thoughts, 
conceptions, desires, deeds, sins, regrets et al ‘and abandon them beneath a cloud of 
forgetting.’341 The “cloud of forgetting” bares a marked resemblance to Dōgen’s 
“dropping off of body and mind.” In another dominion, stealing out into ‘the dark 
night’ San Juan, casting off his body and mind, rejoices at the blessed union as he 
pierces the cloud of unknowing through his abandonment “beneath a cloud of 
forgetting,” ‘I abandoned and forgot myself, laying my face on my Beloved; all 
things ceased; I went out from myself, leaving my cares forgotten among the 
lilies.’342   
Mo Tzu, a contemporary (and opponent) of Confucius, expounds a doctrine 
of universal love. Mo Tzu believed in a ‘want of mutual love’ which was promoted 
for its beneficial results. The main difference between Mo Tzu and Confucius was 
that of an idealism inherent in Confucianism as opposed to a practical approach 
found in Moism. Therefore an idea like universal love in Confucianism would have a 
moral precept attached to it that was grounded in the goodness of humanity whereas 
in Moism it would be to assure benefits here on Earth and also importantly to please 
Heaven. Mo-tzu’s love may not have the absolute nature of that as espoused in The 
Cloud of Unknowing where-in it could be said that love whilst certainly being the 
assured passage through the unknown it is also the unknown itself and the ultimate 
absolute.   
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Added merely as an addendum to his book, one could easily mistake the 
issue of Nishida’s “Knowledge and Love” as more of an afterthought, or a point that 
needed concession but was not worthy of full development, or perhaps, and this I 
prefer, a matter of such importance it stands alone, or alongside, or like a caboose at 
the end, the best place to be with full view of the infinitely diminishing landscape. 
Like Beckett’s addendum to Watt, which contains what Beckett hints to be the 
principal substance of the book, directing his reader to carefully study the 
‘illuminating material’ and which apart from his claims that ‘fatigue and disgust 
prevented its incorporation’343 perhaps its matter was of another aspect, too refined, 
though not quite ‘out of existence’344 to fit with the body of the book. Perhaps the 
addendum is like a little light house, sending out its beam of love, poised between 
worlds, ready for unification but not quite willing to let go, thinking it has something 
to protect, an idea it believes in, and so it remains attached.  
Believing still in formal consistency, I end the first episode with this little 
addendum on love, its place reserved in perpetuum in the great unknown. 
                                                 
343
 Beckett, Watt, 247.  
344
 Beckett, Disjecta, 27. 
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First Stasimon 
 
Enter Chorus. They transcribe through floating movements of the limbs a circle and 
its centre in search of each other, or a circle and its centre in search of a centre and 
a circle respectively, or a circle and its centre in search of its centre and a circle 
respectively, or a circle and its centre in search of a centre and its circle 
respectively, or a circle and a centre not its centre in search of its centre and its 
circle respectively, or a circle and a centre not its centre in search of a centre and a 
circle respectively, or a circle and a centre not its centre in search of its centre and a 
circle respectively, or a circle and a centre not its centre in search of a centre and its 
circle respectively, in boundless space, in endless time.
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 

 Chorus movements inspired by the contemplation of a painting by Watt. Samuel Beckett, Watt  
(London: John Calder (Publishers) Limited, 1970), 127. 
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Methods of Meeting in Unknowing 
The Odd at Sea 
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II 
Methods of Meeting in Unknowing 
The Odd at Sea 
 
 
Beckett on how to read Joyce: ‘you complain that this stuff is not written in English. 
It is not written at all. It is not to be read – or rather it is not only to be read…his 
writing is not about something; it is that something itself.’1 
 
Adorno on metaphysical thinking: ‘For thought there is really no other possibility, no 
other opportunity, than to do what the miner’s adage forbids: to work one’s way 
through the darkness without a lamp…and to immerse oneself in the darkness as 
deeply as one possibly can.’2 
 
Heidegger on language: ‘It therefore might be helpful to us to rid ourselves of the 
habit of always hearing only what we already understand.’3 
 
Cusanus on ignorance: ‘Then, whilst we are groping in the dark, our ignorance will 
enlighten us in an incomprehensible fashion and enable us to form a more correct 
and truer notion of the Absolute.’4 
 
Directions from Dōgen: ‘An ancient buddha said, “Mountains are mountains, waters 
are waters.” These words do not mean mountains are mountains; they mean 
mountains are mountains. Therefore investigate mountains thoroughly.’5 
                                                 
1
 Samuel Beckett, Disjecta, Miscellaneous Writings and a Dramatic Fragment, ed. Ruby Cohn (New 
York: Grove Press, 1984), 27. 
2
 Theodore W. Adorno,  Metaphysics, Concept and Problems, trans. Rolf Tiedmann and ed. Edmund 
Jephcott (UK: Polity Press, 2000), 144. 
3
 Martin Heidegger, On the Way to Language, trans. Peter D. Hertz (New York: HarperCollins 
Publishers, 1982), 58. 
4
 Nicholas Cusanus, Of Learned Ignorance, trans. Fr. Germain Heron (London: Routledge and Kegan 
Paul Ltd, 1954), 27. 
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Although it may read suspiciously like it, this is not meant as a testimony to 
all the obscure and misunderstood writers and thinkers of history. As a contemporary 
translator and interpreter grappling with the difficulties of delivering one of those 
obscure writers (Dōgen), Thomas Kasulis remarks on the domination in 20th century 
philosophy of a preoccupation with language.
6
 The limits and boundaries of 
language have been probed and scrutinised, explored, tested, stretched, denied, 
challenged and extended. It has been discovered through Wittgenstein that the limits 
of our world are the same as those of our language: apophthegm 5.6 The limits of my 
language mean the limits of my world. What this means is that not only are we 
unable to discover the intractable and unexplored unexpected, as Heraclitus foresaw, 
Fr. D. 18 He who does not expect will not find out the unexpected, for it is trackless 
and unexplored;
7
 but we are incapable of even the most basic expression of this 
incapacity. We are unable to conceive of anything outside of the boundaries of our 
own knowing. These boundaries keep things in and out. The contained effects the 
uncontainable and unexplored.  
The flow according to Socrates as he states in the Theaetetus is strictly one 
way; ‘it is impossible for something known to be unknown, or for something 
unknown to be known.’ From Wittgenstein we have the same sentiment in 
apophthegm 5.61…We cannot think what we cannot think; so what we cannot think 
we cannot say either.
8
 As the Socratic adage goes, we can only know that we do not 
know. But this knowing of not-knowing does not contain all that is not known, it 
does not bring us any closer to knowing that which is not known. By that I mean the 
declaration of not knowing does not suddenly open up the frontiers of hitherto 
inaccessible data to the individual, and nor does it open up the individual to the 
hitherto inaccessible boggling infinitude of data. Frontiers, whether crossed or not, 
are still part of a delineated realm of the knowable and sayable.  
                                                                                                                                          
5
 Eihei Dōgen, Moon in a Dewdrop: Writings of Zen Master Dōgen, trans. Robert Aitken, Reb 
Anderson, Ed Brown, Norman Fischer, Arnold Kotler, Daniel Leighton, Lew Richmond, David 
Schneider, Kazuaki Tanahashi, Katherine Thanas, Brian Unger, Mel Weitsman, Dan Welch and 
Philip Whalen and ed. Kazuaki Tanahashi (New York: North Point Press, 1995), 107. 
6
 Thomas P. Kasulis in ‘The Incomparable Philosopher,’ in William R. La Fleur, ed. Dogen Studies 
(Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1985), 83-98. 
7
 Heraclitus, trans. Charles H. Kahn, The Art and Thought of Heraclitus: An edition of the fragments 
with translation and commentary (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 31. 
8
 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, trans. D.F.Pears and B.F.McGuiness 
(London, New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1974), 68, proposition 5.61.  
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Moving constantly towards understanding only extends the territorial 
dimensions of knowing, moving away from understanding on the other hand – that 
is, utterable comprehension and comprehensible utterance of the apprehended thing 
or idea - will close the distance considerably. The boundaries of culture, history and 
philosophy are contained by the language that they in turn create. ‘There is no 
knowledge which can repudiate its mediations; it can only reflect them.’9 Language 
is the mediator between external phenomenon and more problematically the external 
mediator for an inexpressible immanence. The solving of a problem or “riddle” does 
not mean the end of that problem or riddle, but merely stimulates the reformulation 
of it into a new configuration.  
The problem and its contingent resolution – which resides as a part within – 
will disperse and converge ad infinitum whilst caught in the causal nexus of being 
and time. It is only outside of this world-nexus that the “riddle” ceases to exist. 6.5 
When the answer cannot be put into words, neither can the question be put into 
words. The riddle does not exist. If a question can be framed at all, it is also possible 
to answer it.
10
 Suzuki Teitaro Daisetz writes almost the same thing about the 
objectifying intellect that beholds reality always separate and outside of itself; ‘when 
the intellect apprehends its own way of moving out into questioning, the questioning 
will be the answering and the answer will be directly discovered in the question.’11I 
propose to call this perpetual motion of question and answer, after Wittgenstein, 
ansking. This is Beckett’s hermetically sealed surface of reality in verbal action.  
Only when unchained from the asphyxiating stranglehold of ansking does the 
fresh breeze and “mystery of a strange sky” penetrate into our unknowing without 
need of riposte, without needing to be housed in knowing. But, it is a rare and very 
confident intellect that can put itself to rest upon the strange furniture of a new room, 
for ‘our current habit of living is as incapable of dealing with the mystery of a 
strange sky or a strange room, with any circumstance unforeseen in her curriculum, 
as Françoise of conceiving or realising the full horror of a Duval omelette.’12  
In his lecture series on metaphysics Adorno reminds us of the almost 
forgotten viewpoint of Wilhelm von Humboldt; ‘that language constitutes thought no 
                                                 
9
 Adorno, Metaphysics, Concept and Problems, 129. 
10
 Wittgenstein, Tractatus, 88.  
11
 Suzuki Teitaro Daisetz ‘The Buddhist Conception of Reality’ in  Frederick Franck, ed. The Buddha 
Eye: An Anthology of the Kyoto School and its Contemporaries (Indiana: World Wisdom Inc., 2004), 
92.  
12
 Samuel Beckett, Proust (New York: Grove Press, 1931), 9. 
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less than thought language.’ Going against what he purports to be the prevalent view 
of the times Adorno approaches language as a mediator of thought just as much as 
thought is considered to be the mediator of language. So from this perspective ‘the 
historical-philosophical fate of language is at the same time the historical-
philosophical fate of the subject matter to which it refers,’13 and thus knowledge can 
only ever reflect and never repudiate the world and subject which motivates its 
mediation. Though his attempts at defining what his own concept of metaphysics 
might be came in the form of a repudiation of Wittgenstein’s opening apophthegm to 
the Tractatus,
14
 ‘metaphysics is the form of consciousness in which it attempts to 
know what is more than the case,’ Adorno’s metaphysics is answering to the same 
‘spectacular failure of culture’15 that I believe Wittgenstein is responding to. 
Certainly Adorno’s assertion that ‘thought is as much mediated by language as vice 
versa’ can only be effectively comprehended in the wake of Wittgenstein’s 
philosophy. 
 
.  Knowing of non-knowing 
 
The sapient individual canny enough to realise their servile condition is not 
granted immediate liberty for their exertions. But an awareness may begin to unfurl 
its delicate sensors to the boundlessness of a knowing of non-knowing. ‘Pressed to 
give it a name,’ knowing of non-knowing is what Nishitani calls the point of 
convergence of all things with the self on the home-ground of śūnyatā. It is where 
‘hills, rivers, the earth, plants and trees, tiles and stones’ are confirmed in ‘their truly 
elemental and original appearances.’ 16 The field of śūnyatā is where tiles are tiles, 
trees are trees, the self in self-identity with everything is truly itself as not itself, and 
there is no difference between anything even though everything is radically and fully 
in its own suchness.  On this field we may not only be more inclined to contemplate 
“the mystery of a strange sky” but would find ourselves in the very midst of it, 
amongst the nimbus and crepuscular rays, with the promise of piercing the vaporous 
                                                 
13
 Adorno, Metaphysics, 123. 
14
 Wittgenstein, Tractatus, 5.  Proposition 1. The world is all that is the case. 
15
 Adorno, Metaphysics, 129. 
16
 Keiji Nishitani, Religion and Nothingness, trans. Jan Van Bragt (Berkeley and Los Angeles: 
University of California Press, 1982), 110. Nishitani reiterates throughout Religion and Nothingness 
the sentiment of being “pressed” into naming these otherwise un-categorical states, including a 
“seeing of not-seeing.” See  71 and 110.   
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aither through the mystic ‘cloud of unknowing’17 and straight into the hearteye of the 
unnameable, ‘the god.’18   
A knowing of non-knowing transcends the dialectic of inquiry. It is not 
engaged in the same processes of synthesis that drive the unresolved idea towards 
wholeness, where something morphs from an unknown into a known, or into a 
known unknown, which would be a knowing of not-knowing. In fact a knowing of 
non-knowing hardly partakes in the skirmishes of information gathering that occupy 
the reasoning mind and sense perceptions at all; if enjoined to affiliate it would 
probably err on the side of being, a being that ‘seems to fade away into 
bottomlessness.’19 A being that is non-reflective and comes about as a self-awareness 
‘in a non-objective, “middle” mode of being.’20 The non-objective mode of being 
can only come about on the field of śūnyatā.  
In his final analysis Nishitani proffers up the field of śūnyatā as the ultimate 
homeground where-in all things become possible and which ‘is also the field of 
absolute freedom.’21 The true freedom equated with the field of śūnyatā is beyond 
the power of the will, beyond any individual exertion of the will that might constitute 
the type of subjective freedom found in the existentialism of Sartre and the Will of 
Schopenhauer and Nietzsche for example. It is an utterly pure state (a state of non-
state) that is a non-objectifiable being emanating from a middle mode in which 
everything is encountered in its true suchness through a knowing by becoming and is 
understood as a realisation (which in Nishitani’s understanding is a realisation as 
“manifestation-sive-apprehension”) by a knowing of non-knowing.  Essential to this 
magnanimous gesture – the possibility of all things – is the kaleidoscopic spectrum 
of knowing of non-knowing which issues forth with a centrifugal force from the 
“middle” mode, distributing with dispassionate equanimity a unifying luminescence 
of connection permitting the home-ground of all things to be the one and same 
home-ground of all things.  
                                                 
17
 Anonymous, The Cloud of Unknowing and the Book of Privy Counseling, ed. William Johnston 
(New York: Image Books Doubleday, 2005). 
18
 After Kierkegaard’s name for the infinite, the unknown, the absolute. See Søren Kierkegaard,  
Philosophical Fragments: Johannes Climacus, ed. and trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong 
(New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1985). 
19
 Nishitani, Religion and Nothingness, 122. 
20
 Ibid., 159. 
21
 Ibid., 284. 
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And on this field of śūnyatā, just as conscious intellectual knowing appears 
as knowing of non-knowing, all activity and praxis emerge as an ‘action of non-
action.’ Furthermore, both praxis and knowledge are manifest as the same 
standpoint.
22
  As the true homeground of all things, Nishitani describes the field of 
śūnyatā as a force of ‘circuminsessional interpenetration.’23 The interactive 
dependency transcribed in the dynamics of “circuminsessional interpenetration” is a 
force that moves with the same co-originative arousal that Nishida had established as 
the basis of his basho: also an ultimate field or locus of absolute freedom. Nishitani’s 
explication of śūnyatā is indebted to Nishida’s formulations of basho which 
provided a logical framework for the “trans-descendence” of any opposition between 
subjectivity and objectivity.  
Nishitani’s knowing of non-knowing also resolves all lingering dualisms 
between subject and object that can only otherwise be expressed through paradoxical 
logic, ‘such as: “It is not this thing or that, therefore it is this thing or that.”’24 These 
dualisms are overcome through the “non-cognitive” knowing of becoming that is 
Nishitani’s version of Cusanus’s docta ignorantia:  
 
The field of emptiness goes beyond both the field of sense intuition and 
rational thinking; but that does not mean that the subject turns to the object 
and complies with it, as is the case with sensual realism or dogmatic 
metaphysics. It pertains to the realization (manifestation-sive-apprehension) 
of the thing itself, which cannot be prehended by sensation or reason. This is 
not cognition of an object but a non-cognitive knowing of the non-objective 
thing in itself; it is what we might call a knowing of non-knowing, a sort of 
docta ignorantia.
25
 
 
.  Learned ignorance: the only way to nowhere   
 
Until more recent scholarly interest, Cusanus has perhaps best been known 
for his early work De Docta Ignorantia. It is in this book that he formally develops 
the “supreme gift of the Father of Lights” that he infamously received whilst at sea 
on return from Constantinople to Rome, and from which he shapes his docta 
                                                 
22
 Nishitani, Religion and Nothingness, 122.  
23
 Ibid., 158. 
24
 Ibid., 124.  
25
 Ibid., 139. 
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ignorantia. It is this insight that guides the trajectory of his life’s work, and so the 
book has not been emphasised in ignorance, so to speak. Following this light of 
Lights Cusanus explicates through a language of symbolism and metaphor and using 
games and crafts, the epiphanic force of his “gift.”  
The unexpected inversion of teacher and disciple roles in his Idiota dialogues 
is one of the various ways Cusanus gives voice to the wisdom of knowing 
ignorance.
26
 This reversal recalls the Socratic dialogues of Plato and is also 
reminiscent of Socrates, Cusanus continues to show his avowed approval and 
commitment to the perspicacious enlightenment of the docta ignorantia throughout 
his life and into his final works. This sentiment is clearly stated by Bernard in the 
later dialogue De Possest, ‘the one who knows that he is unable to know is the more 
learned,’ and then reaffirmed unequivocally by the Cardinal (Cusanus) in response 
‘All, even the most brilliant, will have to say this.’27 One would hardly deign to 
contradict such vehement assertion and indeed there is very little room for doubt of 
its sensibility by the end of Cusanus’ corpus. An impressively comprehensive 
remonstration of the expressibility of real knowledge is submitted in De Sapiente, 
the first of the Idiota dialogues:  
 
Hence, Wisdom (which all men seek with such great mental longing, since by 
nature they desire to know) is known in no other way than [through the 
awareness] that it is higher than all knowledge and is unknowable and is 
inexpressible by any speech, incomprehensible by any intellect, 
unmeasurable by any measure, unlimitable by any limit, unboundable by any 
bounds, disproportional in terms of any proportion, incomparable in terms of 
any comparison, unbefigurable by any befiguring, unformable by any 
forming, immovable by any movement, unimaginable by any imagining, 
unsensible by any sensing, unattractible by any attracting, untasteable by any 
tasting, inaudible by any hearing, unseeable by any seeing, inapprehensible 
by any apprehending, unaffirmable by any affirming, undeniable by any 
negating, undoubtable by any doubting, inopinable by any opining. And 
because [Wisdom] is not expressible by any expression, the intended object 
of these expressions cannot be thought, for Wisdom is unthinkable by any 
                                                 
26
 Lee Clyde Miller, Reading Cusanus: Metaphor and Dialectic in a Conjectural Universe 
(Washington D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2003), 112. 
27
 Jasper Hopkins, A Concise Introduction to the Philosophy of Nicholas of Cusa (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1980), 109. 
Second Episode  
116 
 
thought—Wisdom, through which and in which and from which are all 
things.
28
 
 
In De Docta Ignorantia Cusanus reduces the discombobulating possibilities 
of existence into a happily (in)coherent formula of ‘it is or it is not; it is and it is not; 
it neither is nor is it not.’29 This, he asserts, exhausts ‘all that we can say or think’ on 
the maximum truth which is in turn the Absolute Maximum. The Absolute 
Maximum is ‘above all understanding,’ and in that sense, quoting from Dionysius 
the Areopagite, Cusanus states ‘an understanding of God is not so much an approach 
towards something as towards nothing.’30 Just when the intellect declares the horizon 
free, and that we can now abort mission knowing ‘the enemy camp of mysticism’31 
has retired into submission, is when learned ignorance leaps forward in mutinous 
glee, ‘sacred ignorance teaches me that what seems nothing to the intellect is the 
incomprehensible Maximum,’ and lurches forward towards the evanescent territory 
of the Absolute, in a radical abscondence from “the enemy camp of rationalism.” To 
approach the Absolute Maximum we must remove ‘all that has participated being.’ 32 
By this he means that as we are beings we can only understand through our 
participation of being, but since the Absolute Maximum is beyond being we can 
never arrive at an understanding through this approach.  
The ‘removal of participated being’ espoused by Cusanus has distinct 
characteristics of Dōgen’s iconic saying “body and mind casting off” and also of the 
‘releasement toward things’ that Heidegger takes from Eckhartian mysticism.33  
Learned ignorance is an apprehension of the void of unaccountable ‘stuff’. The void 
makes us ask ‘what is the use of the known if it has verified nothing but itself?’ Once 
obtained, knowledge is more or less rendered redundant, for knowledge is the 
constant striving to conquer the unknown. Either aware of the absence of an a priori 
order of things or creating that absence through the act of self perpetuation, the 
incessant becoming of knowledge is caught in a causal nexus of negation and 
                                                 
28
 Nicholas Cusanus, Idiota de Sapientia / The Layman on Wisdom, trans. Jasper Hopkins 
(Minneapolis: Arthur J. Banning Press, 1996), 501.  
29
 Cusanus, Of Learned Ignorance, 17.               
30
 Ibid., 39 
31
 James Heisig, The Philosophers of Nothingness, (Honolulu:  University of Hawai’i Press, 2001), 
48. What Nishida actually states in defeat after writing Intuition and Reflection in Self-Awareness is, 
‘I have broken my lance, exhausted my quiver, and capitulated to the enemy camp of mysticism.’   
32
 Cusanus, Of Learned Ignorance, 39. 
33
 Martin Heidegger, “Memorial Address” in Discourse on Thinking, trans. John M. Anderson and E. 
Hans Freund (New York: Harper and Row, 1966): 44-46.  
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creation. This is what Wittgenstein demonstrates in his Tractatus, 5.634 …Whatever 
we can describe at all could be other than it is.  There is no a priori order of things,
34
 
and which he then most consistently to the proposition, repudiates in his later work 
Philosophical Investigations. The ‘incomprehensible Maximum’ as that which the 
intellect does not perceive, so that which the intellect deems unimportant or non-
existent, is of course the great unknown, and it is this very same inept intellect that 
Suzuki, San Juan, Anon and Dōgen to name a few,  put aside (after use) in favour of 
an ineffable and incomprehensible experiencing. In the words of Nishida, ‘those who 
love and believe in God without knowing God are the ones who best know God.’35     
As Cusanus unveils his sea-borne epiphany of sacred ignorance, the Absolute 
Maximum, ‘which is above all understanding’36 moves further from reason and 
imagination (which though ‘limited to the material order’37 is an important and 
helpful aid to understanding) and comes ever closer to the indivisible immovable 
“simple centre,” at once the zenith and pole of the incomprehensible world. Cusanus 
maintains that because of the ultimate ‘impossibility of comprehending the world’38 
it is only through the back door of learned ignorance that we may hope to garner 
something of meaning and find our flow in the perpetual movement towards the 
incomprehensible Absolute Maximum.  
 
.  Movements of unknowing: casting off and stepping from the hundred foot 
pole 
 
Most Chinese philosophy takes as a given some form of the doctrine of 
following two paths at once. This is a refreshing change from the Aristotelian 
principle of non-contradiction that has asserted itself nearly as tenaciously as the 
Descartian cogito into the mechanisms of western thinking. I for one am happy to 
have two paths (at least) with open access available. Chang Chung-Yuan believes the 
possibility of simultaneous existence and nonexistence (two paths at once) may be 
understood if ‘we follow Seng Chao’s principle of letting the mind be free and 
                                                 
34
 Wittgenstein, Tractatus, 69. 
35
 Masao Abe in the introduction to Kitarō Nishida, An Inquiry into the Good, trans. Masao Abe and 
Christopher Ives (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1990), 176.  
36
 Cusanus, Of Learned Ignorance, 39. 
37
 Ibid., 30.  
38
 Ibid., 110. 
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empty.’39 Chang explains that because existence and non-existence are 
simultaneously nonexistence and existence, nonexistence is in effect not nonexistent 
in as much as existence is itself nonexistence. He refers to a well-known story of the 
white horse which comes from the Chuang Tzu, to illustrate the point, of the pointing 
finger. ‘To insist upon the existence of the horse and the finger and neglect the 
aspect of not-horse and not-finger, is to make the same mistake as to insist upon the 
not-horse and not-finger aspect and to neglect the existence of the horse and the 
finger.’40 What this means is that because nonexistence is concealed within existence 
we can never understand the one without the other, we can never understand A 
without simultaneously understanding its not A-ness.  
Great knowledge in the Chuang Tzu is associated with an empty mind, a 
mind in which ‘no thoughts occur.’ The openness of this mind allows pure thought to 
penetrate before the separation of object and subject. This is the same emptiness as 
that of the field of śūnyatā in which all things meet on their own homeground in 
their own suchness. Seng Chao writes in a recorded letter to Liu I-ming that the mind 
of the wise is ‘Silent, vast, vacuous, and limitless,’ a familiar incantation of 
attributes, not so far removed from those of the apeiron.  The workings of this vast 
and vacuous mind are laid bare by Kuo Hsiang in his commentary on the Chuang 
Tzu:   
 
The man who works for knowledge cannot know knowledge. It is knowledge 
that knows knowledge itself. Knowledge knowing knowledge itself means 
no-knowledge (wu chih). When one understands not-knowledge, one knows 
that knowledge is produced from not-knowledge…as knowledge is produced 
from not-knowledge, not knowledge is most fundamental. Therefore, the real 
man gains knowledge through casting away knowledge.
41
 
 
Through the casting away of knowledge there is an incoming, an opening that 
is of a knowing not-knowledge. Chang concludes that the sense of real knowing, at 
                                                 
39
 Chung-yuan Chang, ‘The Philosophy of Taoism According to Chuang Tzu,’ in Philosophy East and 
West, Vol. 27, No. 4 (Oct., 1977): 409. Seng Chao (384-414) was a Chinese Buddhist philosopher, 
greatly inspired by the works of Lao Tzu and Chuang Tzu. 
40
 Ibid., 410. 
41
 Ibid., 412. The Kuo Hsiang is considered one of the most important and authoritative commentaries 
on the Chuang Tzu, although Wing Tsit-Chan notes it is more a rendering of his own philosophical 
system than an objective commentary on the writings of Chuang Tzu. See Chan Wing-tsit, trans.  A 
Source Book in Chinese Philosophy (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1973), 183.  
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least as it is understood in Taoism and Zen, is a “knowing of non-knowing,” as 
Nishitani has called it, and as Chang states ‘real knowledge is not-knowledge.’  
In a short story from the second chapter of the Chuang Tzu, Wang Yi and Yeh 
Ch’üeh discuss if there is the possibility of certain fixed truth or knowledge. In 
response to Yeh Ch’üeh’s questions about how to know ‘for certain that all things 
are the same,’ Wang Yi says:  
 
How can it be known that what I call knowing is not really not knowing and 
that what I call not knowing is not really knowing? Now I would ask you 
this, If a man sleeps in a damp place, he gets lumbago and dies. But how 
about an eel? And living up in a tree is precarious and trying to the nerves. 
But how about monkeys? Of the man, the eel, and the monkey, whose habitat 
is the right one, absolutely?
42
  
 
Wang Yi’s response bears a striking relationship to various fragments of 
Heraclitus, in particular, Fr. D. 9 Asses prefer garbage to gold, Fr. D.13 Swine 
delight in mire more than clean water; chickens bathe in dust, and Fr. D. 61 The sea 
is the purest and foulest water: for fish drinkable and life-sustaining; for men 
undrinkable and deadly. There are no absolutes, nothing cannot be “this” and “that” 
at the same time. It is just a matter of what is referred to in the Chuang Tzu as 
‘relativity of standards.’  Yet paradoxically, one thing we can be certain of, because 
of the certainty of flux, is that all things at some point are the same. But, because we 
are not eels or asses we can never know the “this” from the perspective of “that,” but 
we can know that we do not know and furthermore when we cast away even this not-
knowing we can pass through the ‘Axis of Tao’ and converge ‘into the infinite 
One.’43 Can’t wait.   
A related story, this time in the form of a kōan from the Mumonkan, tells of 
the ultimate emptiness and blindness of the greatest measure of spiritual attainment if 
one then gets stuck unmoving upon this supposed summit of satori: 
 
Master Sekiso said, “From the top of a pole one hundred feet high, how do 
you step forward?” An ancient Master also said that one sitting at the top of a 
pole one hundred feet high, even if he has attained “it,” has not yet been truly 
                                                 
42
 Lin Yutang, ed. The Wisdom of China and India (New York: Random House Inc., 1955), 640. 
43
 Ibid., 636. 
Second Episode  
120 
 
enlightened. He must step forward from the top of the pole one hundred feet 
high and manifest his whole body in ten directions.
44
 
 
What-ever level of enlightenment one might have achieved, even if it is the 
final ‘little point’45 of satori, it is never the end. One cannot orbit happily in 
perpetuity in ‘a static oneness’46 flat-lining, dead.  One must leap off (no tranquil 
descent in Zen) from the zenith and mingle with the masses. This will not be a 
difficult step after the ‘mental cataclysm’ and ‘fiery baptism’ that one has endured to 
get there.
47
 Only the sneaky cheat will want to rest on their laurels of feigned glory 
and avoid the humiliating nosedive to certain death, which is what will become of 
one who has not authentically “attained ‘it.’” 
Contemporary with Mumon (1183-1260) is Dōgen (1200-1253) who in full 
flame with the fire sale attitude of the times (get rid of it!) experiences his own 
personal satori through “body and mind casting off” (shinjin datsuraku). This phrase 
which has come to be a defining message of the philosophy of Dōgen was received 
by him under the guidance of master Ju-ching
48
 (1162-1228) in Sung China. There is 
some contemporary polemic surrounding the authenticity of the translation of this 
phrase. Some believe it was misconstrued by Dōgen, and possibly done so 
intentionally as this would be consistent with his treatment of classic scripture which 
often involved a radical re-interpretation to suit his purpose. Even if Ju-ching did 
mean “cast off the dust from the mind” as is suggested, it does not diminish the great 
force of this message as it is transliterated by Dōgen into his infamous “body mind 
casting off.” Throwing off of body and mind is the way to the true self and the true 
self is undivided pure emptiness. The great and true mind is “vacuous,” and the 
movement towards unattainable perfection is a “trans-descendence”49 into a 
paradoxical affirmation through negation.   
In Buddhism the way to authentic self-hood is through the abandonment of 
self, somewhat akin to the kenosis of Christian mysticism, except in the self-
                                                 
44
 Zenkei Shibayama, Zen Comments on the Mumonkan, trans. Sumiko Kudo (New York: Harper and 
Row Publishers, 1974), 311. Case 46. 
45
 See Suzuki for very interesting comparative look at Eckhart’s development of ‘a little point’ and the 
Zen moment of satori. Daisetsu Teitaro Suzuki  Mysticism; Christian and Buddhist (London: George 
Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1970), 67-81. 
46
 Shibayama, Zen Comments on the Mumonkan, 313. 
47
 Daisetsu Teitaro Suzuki, Essays in Zen Buddhism (New York: Grove Press, 1949), 229.  
48
 Also known as Tiāntóng Rújìng and in Japanese as Tendō Nyōjo. 
49
 A term attributed to Yoshinori Takeuchi by Abe Masao but which occurs frequently in Nishitani’s 
Religion and Nothingness. 
Second Episode  
121 
 
forgetting of Buddhism there is no union with a transcendent other, but rather more 
an awakening to an immanent nothingness. Nishida distinguishes between 
movements towards the absolute as an outward objective transcendence in 
Christianity and an inward ‘immanent transcendence’ in Buddhism by which the 
absolute is encountered ‘by transcending the self inwardly.’50 As Dōgen says ‘To 
learn the Buddha Way is to learn one’s self. To learn one’s self is to forget one’s 
self.’51 This means that there is no other way to Buddha other than through the self 
and that there is no other Buddha to get to apart from true self, and true self is not a 
fixed point but a way. This is the Buddha Way. Like the warning Mumon gives in 
his poem for the above cited kōan, he who does not step forward ‘has been misled by 
the stuck pointer on the scale.’52  
In Islam, the principle of tawḥīd as the declaration and belief in the unity of 
God is clarified to the believer through yet another instance of willing abandonment. 
In his interpretation of the Qurᵓān’s symbolism, al-Ghazālī unveils the mystery 
behind the ‘doffing the two sandals.’53 Only ‘by throwing off both this world and the 
next world’ can we turn towards the ‘One, the Real.’ The throwing off of the two 
worlds is symbolised through the “doffing the two sandals.” And because this world 
and the next as human constructs can be “donned and doffed at will” (unlike the 
mask of persona) they are likened to the donning and “doffing the two sandals.”54 
And for one more final fling why not throw off the Cartesian ego which stands ‘over 
against the world and all the things that are in it’ and which poses what Nishitani 
presents as a fundamentally flawed first truth.
55
 The problem with the cogito, ergo 
sum as Nishitani sees it is that the cogito fails to apply its method to itself, there-fore 
it stands like a self-evident truth beyond doubt and in doing so creates a massive 
blind spot, a fatal field of deception. In fact this thinking ego needs not so much to 
be thrown off but broken through, and not by the doubting subject of Descartes but 
by the Great Doubt that puts the cogito ‘through the purgative fires in which the ego 
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itself is transformed, along with all things, into a single Great Doubt.’56 From the 
huge wealth of literature espousing the virtues of the Great Doubt of Zen, Nishitani 
selects a particular excerpt from a sermon of Takusui Chômô.
57
 Takusui leads the 
doubter deeper and deeper in an endless search for the ‘subject that hears,’ and in 
contradistinction to Descartes he does not stop there; ‘But however you go on 
doubting, you will find it impossible to locate the subject that hears. You must 
explore still further just there, where there is nothing to be found.’58 
 
.  Great doubt and the abyssal depths of awakening 
 
The despair and angst of Zarathustra as he stares into the deep abyss of 
suffering that is life-sive-death and encounters the “abysmal thought” of eternal 
recurrence is what Nishitani proposes as ‘man’s collision with the essential barrier of 
his own Dasein. This is the so-called brink of despair, and yet also the ultimate form 
of man’s being in the world.’59 The “Great Doubt” that exemplifies Buddhism’s 
ontological grounding is a trans-descendence into the dizzying heights of the 
mountainous abyss that stares back at Nietzsche as he gazes persistently into its 
depths. As Nishitani explains it, despair is the ultimate form of existing in the world, 
a form that belongs to a transcendent dimension as opposed to skepsis, which 
belongs to the dimension of reason. The courageous leap into the bottomless abyss 
of this sense of despair is handsomely rewarded with the glimmering promise of 
“yonder shore.”  
Nietzsche’s infamous gazing abyss presaged by the warning of 
metamorphosing monsters at its brink, ‘Anyone who fights with monsters should 
take care that he does not in the process become a monster.  And if you gaze for long 
into an abyss, the abyss gazes back into you,’60 anticipates the form of knowing, a 
form of existence, that Nishitani calls ‘knowing by becoming.’ The reciprocal gazes 
of abyss and subject into each other signify a meeting on the own home-ground of 
the other. Or in other terms, a meeting on the ‘absolute near side.’ The absolute near 
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side is the near side of the far side. That means a total overcoming of the distance 
between self and other. As the abyss gazes into us we are meeting it on its own 
home-ground. We are also confronting our own “Great Death.” This “Great Death” 
which is a personal participation in nihility that lies at the bottom of and is realised 
in a direct relationship with world-time, it is ‘an awakening to the “eternal” presence 
of the whole world-time.’61  
Nietzsche’s despair is exactly the abyss of doubt that the most profound and 
more often than not, paradoxical, kōan’s incite. One type of kōan, called nanto, is 
particularly complex, illogical and irrational for the purposes of shaking free the 
intellect from all its intuitional directives, devices, learning, strategies and 
preconditioned assumptions. It is as if to mercilessly take away the walking stick of a 
blind man and ‘push him down after turning him around’ so that ‘he will be thrown 
into the abyss of despair.’62 Only from the depths of this Great Doubt can satori be 
realised and can the intellect penetrate into the real suchness of its own being 
through the darkness and intricacies of its self-made maze.  
As Nishida sees it, the contradictions and sorrows of human life, one perhaps 
the seed of the other – and in a bi-directional capacity – come from a profound 
existential awareness of mortality. To confront one’s own death in an existential 
sense, that is, not just biologically, is what gives absolute meaning to individual 
existence. The individual is only considered unique in relation to its temporality ‘a 
deathless being is not temporally unique, and that which is not temporally unique is 
not an individual.’63 
The abysmal thought of eternal return smote Zarathustra dead for seven days. 
The terror of the recurring sameness of life is a terror based on ‘some kind of 
content.’64 It is a terror of delusional proportions that separates itself from life and 
stands aghast, observing itself, ‘Delusion only arises if one becomes attached to 
objective determination, to taking what is conceived of by object logic as concrete 
reality.’65 This is the delusion of Nietzsche, the inability to overcome the “reified 
objective self,” a delusion that perhaps ultimately contributed to his own personal 
overwhelming and far flung despair.  
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Upon arousal from the abyssal depths that rendered him ‘like a dead man,’ 
Zarathustra relives the anguish of his fall, “shuddering” at the memory; ‘The greatest 
all too small! – that was my disgust at man! And eternal recurrence even for the 
smallest! that was my disgust at all existence!’66 until his animals bade him be silent 
and speak no more of such things and listen instead to their gentle song, the singing 
of the healthy as they called it, and prepare himself ‘a new lyre!’67 Ah! Delightful 
salve!  
Zarathustra is not alone in his agonizing over the abyssal depths of a 
recurring noontide; another mendicant sage retreats from the vertiginous chasm of 
eternal return in deflated spirits, this time in the time of Japan (Muromachi period 
1338-1573) and we should say this sage is ‘real’ as opposed to the fictitious 
character giving lively voice to the philosophy of Nietzsche but this is a matter of 
deep debate that shan’t be engaged in here, the point has nonetheless been made. 
Ikkyū writes ‘the thought of so many people, whether related to me or not, passing 
through reincarnations one after another, made me so melancholy, I left my native 
place and wandered off at random.’68  
 
.  On Translation 
 
The complexities of translation are by no means restricted to language. The 
hermeneutic motion is a responsive act of creation and in itself can be translated onto 
almost all creative outpouring. Upon the translation of Blanchot’s L’Arrêt de mort by 
Lydia Davis, Blanchot insisted that Death Sentence, the translation, was indeed now 
her book. This does not mean that her work was inaccurate or insensitive to the 
original, but that the exquisite rendering of the original into another form of itself 
was a new creation and rightly belonged to her authorship. It also suggests that no 
work can be translated without it becoming something else and therefore cannot in 
fact be translated at all. Not, that is, unless the conventions of translation include and 
acknowledge the ineluctable metamorphoses of the original in the hands of another, 
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which is a matter to do entirely with the experience of the translator, and not just as a 
translator and their experience of the text itself but also what is happening to them 
separately from the text whilst reading it, thinking about it, working on it. Although 
these seemingly external factors should perhaps not impress their influence on the 
translator-creator, they invariably do because the translator is alive. Indeed, if they 
are alive, and we presume that is the case, they must. Because they are alive (both 
text and translator) these unquantifiable moments, these inexplicable resonances 
between the text and its interlocutor are not merely incoherent glitches to be “refined 
out of existence” but are the very marrow, the heart, so to speak, of the matter. 
The presence of the translator is a matter of metaphysics more than 
hermeneutics. It stretches back to the concept of the ‘I’ and to the position of that 
seeing ‘I’. If it is at the centre of the seeing of things as Descartes cogito would have 
it then it can only be expected that ‘in the final analysis one experiences only 
oneself.’69 The presence of the translator cannot be ignored, as Kasulis asks, ‘how 
can I distinguish what I read in the text from what I may have read into it?’70  
Following what he discovers as a form of guidance provided by Dōgen himself on 
how to read the Shōbōgenzō, Kasulis embraces a form of translation that is  ‘an act 
of intimacy’ with Dōgen by means of the text. The encounter made possible by this 
form of intimacy is with other than oneself in the text, that is, the meeting of the 
author on their own homeground. The process is not one of objectifying removal but 
of an inclusive empathy; ‘the strong poet peers in the mirror of his fallen precursor 
and beholds neither the precursor nor himself but a Gnostic double, the dark 
otherness or antithesis that both he and the precursor longed to be, yet feared to 
become.’71 
It is supposed by Benjamin that a translation exits because the original text 
wants to be read and the reader is not proficient enough in the original language to 
read it, but we cannot ignore that whether they like it or not, knowing or not 
knowing if it is a good (that is accurate) translation the reader is now reading another 
text, a text that will be transmitting its author in some way. The translator qua author 
qua conduit cannot be removed, though they may remain as neutral as possible and 
consciously not impede on the original they cannot cease to exist. This removal of 
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authorial presence (which in the likes of Beckett became the authorial presence 
removing) is identified by Steiner as a condition and predicate of the secondary text.  
In his well-known and influential essay The Task of a Translator, Benjamin entrusts 
the ‘afterlife’ of a work to the progenitive talents of the translator.72 He maintains 
that the continuing life of a work by virtue of the very definition of “living” must 
undergo transformation and renewal, thus the original must be changed to survive. 
Harold Bloom extends this idea into what he presumes to be an absurdity yet 
which is the vital, in the true sense of the word, necessity of a ‘strong misreading.’ In 
his revelatory theory of poetry, The Anxiety of Influence, he inverts the lineage of 
influence from precursor to contemporary poet and poses ‘a revisionary ratio’ in 
which something even more ‘drastic’ than Borges’s suggestion that poets create their 
precursors, and that is  ‘the triumph of having so stationed the precursor, in one’s 
own work, that particular passages in his work seem to be not presages of one’s own 
advent, but rather to be indebted to one’s own achievement, and even (necessarily) to 
be lessened by one’s greater splendor.’73  That certainly befuddles the order of things 
and challenges not only our notions of being and time, bringing them more into 
alignment with Dōgen’s being-time, but it completely displaces the idea of a fixed 
original source, removed and unmoving. 
Bringing meaning to the ‘“emptiness of meaning” postulate’ by way of the 
indeterminate presence of reception in the reader, or viewer, or listener, or translator, 
Steiner rescues the “secondary text” and interpretative discourse from total 
bankruptcy. The exchange has become one of ontology rather than philology in the 
case of translation; ‘The congruence is never complete. It is never uniform with its 
object. If it was, the act of reception would be wholly equivalent to that of original 
enunciation. Our guest would have nothing to bring us.’74 And by bringing being 
into ‘a solitary language which instinctively speaks within…as soon as anyone who 
writes tries to grasp it, it changes beneath his hand.’75 
These briefest of references to the hermeneutic motion have a common 
feature of exchange. The exchange between text and translator, or re-interpreter as 
the case may be, with a triumphant poet raising his muse from the dead only to smite 
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them down again with the brittle edge and glory of a modernised nib, is that of a co-
dynamic relation very much like the self-determining and interactive form of the 
conscious self in relationship with the creative world. The dynamic structure of the 
creative world is based on a reciprocity between the subjective and objective 
dimensions that act together to co-create the world; ‘These acts are self-originating 
and yet co-originating, too, as forms of dynamic, reciprocal expression.’76 The forms 
of dynamic exchange in the approaches to translation hinted at above all participate 
in some way in this mutually expressive and self-determining world view as 
presented by Nishida. Nishida has created a structure of logic with his basho to 
explain or at least house within a logical framework that which by definition is 
illogical, the religious experience, and he has created a world view by which to 
explain the activity of this reciprocal experience in an absolute present. The dynamic 
structure of the world view he presents is founded on a contradictory identity of the 
many and one and with a horizon of true individuality as the self-expression of the 
absolute. With such a horizon there can be no telling what will appear, or disappear.   
 
.  Transmission: breaking through the spell of language  
 
In a brief excerpt dedicated to Bernard Shaw from Other Inquisitions, Borges 
presents an argument for reading, or perhaps rather receiving, which goes quite 
beyond what the written presents as to be read. In it he writes of ‘a secret and 
continuous dialogue with nothingness or with divinity.’77 This dialogue is surely the 
predecessor of the strange speech of which Blanchot writes four years later in his 
Death of the Last Writer, the strangeness of which comes from that ‘while it may 
seem to be saying something, it may in fact be saying nothing. One could even say 
that depth itself is what speaks within it.’78 Not so distant cousins of the same void 
that transmits to us its secret speech, to each individual as they hear or do not hear it.  
Borges demarcates the transition from written to read as an individual passage of 
multiple emissions: ‘A book is not an isolated entity: it is a narration, an axis of 
innumerable narrations,’79 the differences between these “innumerable narrations” 
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come from how it is read, this in turn is entirely affected by when it is read, not to 
mention who is reading it. Just as with a conversation, which is how Borges 
conceives the book, much can be said not only through the silences and what is not 
said or left out but also by a silent and speechless voice which is transmitting its 
message at the same time as the words, like tendrils of an abandoned web, fluttering 
about and but tickle the surface of meaning with their light caress. In short, it would 
be foolhardy to think words could possibly single-handedly cast the spell of 
meaning. But too often this is exactly what happens, and we are caught in the web of 
words cast by the “spell of spelling” without deference to the subtle channels of air 
without which words would never reach us.  
David Abram is not tricked by the ‘grip of that spell - the spell, we might say 
of spelling,’ he tells Derrick Jensen.80 We are in effect spellbound and the mitsugo 
(secret speech) transmission is fatally interrupted by ‘the mother of all our Western 
technologies,’ the alphabet. ‘Language’ says Abram, ‘doesn’t represent the world 
from outside, but rather that our language is itself a part of the world, that it bubbles 
forth in the midst of the world. Hence it can’t represent thing; it is a way of relating 
to things.’81 
It is inconceivable to imagine that each and every individual relation within 
the world could be perfectly expressed; maybe it is only the inexpressible that can be 
expressed in a “perfectly precise sense.” A dialogue does not consist entirely of only 
the spoken and very rarely does one have the wit and calm to say all that can be said 
in a given discourse. The timbre of a voice may be tuned by the silence of a speaker 
as much as the said, and as Borges writes, ‘an interlocutor is not the sum total or the 
immediate value of what he says: it is possible for him not to speak and yet to reveal 
intelligence.’82  Like Blanchot’s unreadable speaking of non-speaking that sits 
silently at the centre of every book, ‘it is silent’ writes Blanchot, ‘since it is silence 
speaking.’ A decorative border of fine alphabetic weave giving form to the outer 
edges of the infinitely unsayable, ‘it is like the void itself, an insubstantial, insistent, 
indifferent murmur.’83  
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In the tradition of Zen, the transmission of knowledge from master to student 
is a matter of utmost delicacy and importance. The lineage of ‘right Dharma-eye’ 
transmission is a vital and active treasure that continues to emanate its radiance 
through to this day. The traditional lineage originates in India with Śākyamuni 
Buddha, who famously, with no more than a wink and a twist of a golden lotus 
flower, executed the first transmission of the Dharma-eye treasury to Mahākāśyapa 
and then from Mahākāśyapa a lineage of twenty-eight patriarchs can be traced up 
until Bodhidharma (440-528), the first Chinese patriarch. Dōgen states, ‘the right 
Dharma-eye treasury has been personally transmitted from rightful successor to 
rightful successor, and the true life of the Buddha-Dharma is nothing other than this 
authentic transmission.’84 As he specifies, the transmission is made personally, that 
is, face-to-face (menju). The importance of face-to-face transmission of the Buddha-
Dharma cannot be over-emphasised. It is rooted in the essentials of realisation 
through direct and authentic practice and individual experience over and above a 
scholarly or philosophical understanding through merely following and studying 
scripture; ‘the transmission of this real something cannot be actualised solely 
through explanations with words, or simply by passing on some manuscript.’85Hence 
Dōgen emphatically insists on the practice of zazen, though as is often exaggerated, 
not entirely to the exclusion of studying scripture, both play an integral part in the 
realisation of Buddha-nature or Dharma-nature in Dōgen’s pursuit of the Way. 
In the Shōbōgenzō, Dōgen dedicates a fascicle to the time-honoured practice 
of menju (face-to-face transmission) enumerating each transmission in the nearly two 
thousand year history of Buddhist patriarchs. He starts the auspicious lineage of 
masters with the original act of Gautama Buddha on Vulture Peak, ‘Then Śākyamuni 
Buddha, in the order on Vulture Peak in the Western Country, India, among an 
assembly of millions, picked up an uḍumbara flower and winked. At that time the 
face of Venerable Mahākāśyapa broke into a smile. Śākyamuni Buddha said, ‘I 
possess the right Dharma-eye treasury and the fine mind of nirvāna. I transmit them 
to Mahākāśyapa.’86 He then traces the intimacy of the ‘through face-transmission’ of 
the fifty-one patriarchs all the way up to himself. 
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The original Buddha’s face is thought to be contained in each ‘fleeting 
moment of cheeping and pecking,’ that is, each transmission, which channels the 
stream of faith and which manifests the eternal brightness of the Buddha’s 
countenance through the myriad years and kalpas. An authentic transmission occurs 
through the cultivation of openness between master and disciple. It is an intimate 
exchange, a reciprocal action of reception and transmission, literally one face giving 
and one face receiving, ‘Thus, [master and disciple] have directly taken on the 
brightness of the Tathāgata’s face…even after thousands of years…or hundreds of 
kalpas, or koṭis of kalpas, this face-to-face transmission is the appearance of the face 
of, and the realization of the transmission from, Śākyamuni Buddha.’87   
In the Islamic world, a close contemporary to Dōgen writes his own magnum 
opus, al-Futūḥāt al-makkiyya (The Meccan Openings). In this monolithic 
encyclopaedic work, comprising of 560 chapters in 37 volumes, Muḥyī al-Dīn 
Muḥammad ibn ʿAlī ibn al-ʿArabī (1165-1240) discusses the vast world of Islamic 
sciences in the special context of tawḥīd 88 and through his own early extraordinary 
“opening” to God. The title of this daunting work reflects in much the same way as 
the Shōbōgenzō of Dōgen, the fundamental importance of an extra-rational ‘direct 
experience that is other than thinking.’89 It is recorded by one of Ibn al-ʿArabī 
disciples and also confirmed by Ibn al-ʿArabī, though somewhat evasively, that all of 
his knowledge was received in a single fleeting moment, an “opening.”90 And out of 
that one moment all of his writing and knowledge tirelessly pours, and what he has 
written is ‘but a drop in the ocean’91 in relation to the infinite well from which trickle 
his own words.  
Chittick explains the term futūḥ (opening) in the technical vocabulary of Ibn 
al-ʿArabī as a synonym for ‘unveiling, tasting, witnessing, divine effusion, divine 
self-disclosure, and insight.’92 All of these meanings disclose an intimacy, an 
exchange, like that of the master-disciple transmission in Ch’an/Zen and also an 
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undisclosed transmission, like that of mitsugo (secret talk) in Ch’an/Zen. Chittick 
describes the significance that each of these words has as ‘a mode of gaining direct 
knowledge of God and of the unseen worlds without the intermediary of study, 
teacher, or rational faculty. God “opens up” the heart to the infusion of 
knowledge.’93 Conceding the very essential difference of a need for the teacher to 
activate the transmission of the Dharma in Ch’an/Zen, the sudden “infusion of 
knowledge” at this ‘opening of unveiling’94 can be nothing other than a direct 
transmission from one master, the grand master God, to disciple. It is reception and 
openness to the Buddha-nature that, as Hsing-ch’ang suddenly experiences, ‘is not 
received from my teacher,/ Nor is it something I gained either.’95 It was right there 
under his nose.   
In “Mitsugo” (secret talk or intimate words), a fascicle from the Shōbōgenzō, 
the significance of the gesture of twirling the flower and winking in combination 
with the utterance of the ‘World-honoured One,’ (Śākyamuni Buddha) is addressed 
with particular deference to Dōgen’s stance on esoteric and exoteric meaning and on 
the place for both verbal and non-verbal teaching in the transmission of the Dharma. 
The idea of secret talk being something undisclosed to the uninitiated is apparently 
only what ‘stupid people’ would think. When it is used, “secret” is meant more as an 
action or meaning that is beyond recognition, it is ‘the truth of immediacy. It is the 
absence of any gap. It is total containment.’ Dōgen says we are surrounded by 
secrecy, which does not mean that things are hidden from us but that truth and reality 
are so immediate and constantly new in the absolute present that they are in effect 
rendered secret. Dōgen explains, ‘because the present is an ineffable moment it is 
secret to the self, it is secret to others, it is secret to Buddhist patriarchs, and it is 
secret to alien beings,’96 so there is no need for the “stupid people” to feel 
discriminated. It is easy for the intrigue of the wink and the charm of the flower to 
overshadow the simplicity of the statement that Śākyamuni utters in this sacred 
moment, but as Dōgen makes plain, ‘If the World-honoured One hated speech but 
loved picking up flowers, he would have picked up a flower at the later time too.’97 
Secret talk also involves what I said. Both verbal and nonverbal action have their 
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place in the right Dharma transmission and likewise in the transmission of more or 
less everything.   
In fact there is no authenticated record of this event ever having occurred, yet 
it is the very backing upon which the vertebrate lineage of face-to-face transmission 
is built. But, as Shibayama comments in his teishō of the kōan “Śākyamuni Holds 
Up a Flower,” another hypothetically spurious account of the mythic event, the fact 
that the story is not supported by history has very little bearing on the validity of its 
actual objective ‘the significance of the kōan and its historical basis belong to two 
different orders, and the former will not be affected by the latter.’98  
  
.  Silence, the untranslatable 
 
‘Beyond the fusion that comes of great translation - - lies silence’99 
 
Silence is oft perceived, as with nothingness, beyond the jungle of 
somethings and din of declamation as an imperceptible source, quiet, reticent and 
abundantly generous. The quiescent wellspring from which pours all sounds and 
stuffs. One of Beckett’s early and recurring protagonists, Belacqua, in imagining the 
book he shall write, draws on this great wellspring of silence, declaring (in a fit of 
youthful vigor and passion so very remote from silence) ‘the experience of my 
reader shall be between the phrases, in the silences, communicated by the intervals, 
not the terms of the statement.’100 Simone Weil adds a lyric ode to Beckett’s phrasal 
intervals, ‘music starts from silence and goes back to it…creation and duration’101 
she writes, or then there is the silence like that of Cage and Blanchot, a pause amidst 
the noise, an interruption of the ceaseless inaudible murmur that penetrates like a 
gentle wind as a ‘gentle breath of endless recapitulation.’ All of the unsaid thoughts, 
all knowledge and enquiry, like the “chatter” of Zarathustra’s animals, fill the air 
with a dull piercing drone that muffles the silent reservoir of All and we remain 
estranged from the glorious unsaid. Steiner goes as far to say that ‘transcendental 
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intuitions have sources deeper than language, and must, if they are to retain their 
truth-claims, remain undeclared.’102   
 
.  The circinations of communication 
 
In an investigation into Dōgen’s particular relationship with “words and 
letters” Hee-Jin Kim tackles the ambiguous and often contradictory statements and 
usages Dōgen makes of writing and language. He describes Dōgen’s proclivity for 
repetition as a methodology of ‘ripples’ that radiate out from the generative ascesis 
of zazen, to return again, revived and transformed.  
All linguistic activities are the external soundings of the central hub of 
stillness of this non-thinking silence of absolute emptiness, the singular point of 
zazen. The image of concentric ripples orbiting around this absolute point of 
unquantifiable nothingness, illustrates the relationship of kōan to zazen as ‘a living 
force operative in the working of the realization-kōan, and what is more, that, in the 
truest sense, kōan becomes zazen, and zazen becomes kōan.’103  
Kim differentiates Dōgen’s approach to kōan from the traditional teishō by 
an acute awareness of the vital realizational capacities of language. Therefore 
Dōgen’s use of kōan is not just to explain realisation but to activate it in a dynamic 
relationship with zazen. In this way the concentric ripples of linguistic activity 
reaching out from the circumferenceless centre of zazen can be ‘claimed to be the 
very workings of zazen,’104 as indeed Kim does. Furthermore the kōan can now be 
apprehended as a measure through which the intellect is liberated to pursue its own 
ontological possibilities rather than castigated and usurped or abnegated through the 
higher pursuits of dhyāna and transcendent wisdom.  
In Dōgen’s boat we arrive on yonder shore of nirvāna with the very useful 
assistance of the oars provided, and flowing with the centripetal circinations of the 
rippling eddy we alight on the absolute near side, that is, the far side of the near side.  
Zen, like the Tao, is perhaps ultimately most eloquently expressed in silence, and 
this is certainly not a frivolous assumption. We are repeatedly given very solid 
grounds for such reasoning. The Tao Te Ching explicitly states the eternal name 
                                                 
102
 Steiner, Real Presences, 111-2. 
103
 Hee-Jin Kim, ‘“The Reason of Words and Letters”: Dōgen and Kōan Language,’ in Dōgen Studies, 
ed. William R. LaFleur (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1985), 79.  
104
 Ibid., 79. 
Second Episode  
134 
 
cannot be spoken and that what-ever can be named is thus not the eternal name, ‘The 
Tao that can be told of is not the eternal Tao/ The name that can be named is not the 
eternal name.’105  But what Dōgen does with such matchless command, in the 
language and writings of the Shōbōgenzō is ‘realise the ineffable in and through 
speech and discussion.’106 His creative use of language and his propensity for 
tailoring the traditional Zen literature to suit the occasion of his need ‘is in itself the 
realization and expression of spiritual freedom.’107  
Across a timeless void with nothing but hundreds of years dividing them, we 
encounter another spiralling entity. The metaphoric awakening to life, a little point, 
satori, is inscribed in the retina and irises of all the polyps, sea snails and larvae that 
the absent eyes of a Palaeolithic mollusc cannot see, but yet is quite assured has 
‘foreseen,’ and indeed masterminded the great revolution occurring, that ‘all of a 
sudden, around us, eyes were opening.’108 The process of becoming is literally 
analogised by Calvino through the millennium of metamorphosis that confront the 
mollusc, extending like unending infinite oceans before it, teeming with the spores of 
every future life, the reaching towards a longed-for enlightenment – the ultimate 
metamorphosis to hunker down ‘in our true element which extends without shores, 
without boundaries.’109 A mingling of times, a remote past, an unimaginable future, 
crystallise in the radial symmetry of a secreting gastropod. Qfwfq (the posterior 
nomenclature of said gastropod, the very same as whom we encountered in the 
previous episode, not being a popular name) hurtling across rarefied galaxies, 
through violet cumuli, witness to the first sprouting of the moon contains all of time 
in his resilient being in a kaleidoscopic encounter with uji.  
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.  Symbolic structuring and the circle (with Nicholas Cusanus) 
 
In a summary outline of Nishida’s basho, Robert Wargo identifies the tri-
partite structure of the three worlds defined in the enfolding basho system. These 
three worlds are the natural world, that of consciousness and the intelligible world. 
Wargo also identifies a tri-partite structure within each basho. Each basho has 
logical, ontological and epistemological significance. Ultimately the progressive 
deepening of self-consciousness culminates in the basho of absolute nothingness 
where there is no differentiation between the logical, ontological or epistemological 
levels. At this point knowing of non-knowing is possible precisely because ‘the 
distinction between epistemology and ontology is erased.’110  
It may also be possible to discern a hint of Cusanus in Nishida’s basho 
“looping.” Looping is the term Wargo uses to describe the consequence of 
interpenetrating loci that make up the system of independent yet connected basho. In 
De Ludo Globi (The Game of Spheres) Cusanus applies a similar order of concentric 
circles, each enfolded in the next, to explicate the ‘ten diverse classes of 
distinction,’111 with God as the Absolute Maximum at the centre from which the 
other nine orders emanate. This is a diagrammatic inversion of Nishida’s looping 
which has the ultimate basho of absolute nothingness as the outermost enveloping 
loop rather than the innermost and central core. There is however, a limitless 
circumference to this outer field in as much the same way as Cusanus uses the image 
of a sphere without circumference whose centre is encountered everywhere as a 
representation of divine omnipresence. This same image is drawn on by both Nishida 
and Nishitani with reference to Cusanus on numerous occasions, and is probably one 
of the statements for which Cusanus is most renowned. Ironically, as Hopkins points 
out, the image actually derives from the work of Pseudo-Hermes Trismegistus and 
Cusanus appears to have taken it from Meister Eckhart (1260-1328) who is recorded 
to have used the formula in no less than six places.
112
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De Ludo Globi is a two part dialogue between the Cardinal Nicholas himself 
as the major interlocutor, and John (Ioannes/Johannes), “the illustrious Count 
palatine and Duke of Bavaria” in part I and then joined by the Duke’s cousin Albert 
in part II. Cusanus invents a “game of spheres” by which to explain the power of 
powers, believing as he does that the nature of reality can only really be represented 
metaphorically. It is unknown precisely if the game he describes has ever been 
played or existed. It is comparative to the English bowls, the French pétanque and 
the Italian bocce, but it is alone in its symbolic exemplification of the absolute unity 
of God. At the opening of part I the Duke implores the Cardinal to discourse on the 
new game they have just retired from playing, ‘this delightful exercise with the ball,’ 
as he sees within it the profit of deep speculation which he believes ‘represents a 
significant philosophy for us.’113  
The playing field of the game has a central point around which nine 
concentric circles are transcribed. At its most basic the game revolves around this 
central point and the progressive movement towards it. It is metaphoric of the souls 
journey towards the absolute, the centre seat of life, towards ‘the ruler whose 
kingdom is the kingdom of life,’ none other than ‘Jesus Christ, our king and the 
giver of life.’114  
Significantly the globus of the ludus globi is an imperfect spheroid with a 
certain scooped out convexity. What is perfect is never seen, the visible material 
form of human creation is thus necessarily reflected in the imperfection of the 
playing apparatus, ‘This is what I mean’ says the Cardinal, ‘nothing is visible except 
in matter. Moreover, true roundness cannot exist in matter but only the image of true 
roundness.’115  
The roots of this line of reasoning can be found in the discussions of the 
structure of the universe that occur in De Docta Ignorantia. In particular, the 
exposition of unity he espouses in Book I by means of mathematical symbolism 
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through the absolute infinite line coinciding with the infinite circle, clearly precedes 
the later arguments occurring in De Ludo Globi upon the true roundness (perfection) 
of the world and its invisibility and indivisibility. In his demonstration of the 
straightness of the diameter of an infinite circle ‘the circumference of the absolutely 
greatest possible circle will be the smallest possible curve; it will be, therefore, 
absolutely straight’ and the general proposition that an infinite line ‘would be at once 
a straight line, a triangle, a circle, a sphere; similarly, if there were an infinite sphere, 
it would at once be a circle, a triangle and a line; and it would be likewise with the 
infinite triangle and infinite circle’116  Cusanus paves the way for an understanding 
of the relationship he endeavours to articulate between the “Maximum”  - which is at 
once the “Minimum” - with all things. This relationship, formulated by adopting the 
symbolism of mathematics in De Docta Ignorantia, is likewise explicated through 
the metaphoric structuring of the ludus globi in De Ludo Globi.  
In De Ludo Globi the infinite potentiality of the individual element (the 
human) is symbolically activated by the imperfections of the globus as it randomly 
determines the direction of the player when the spheroid is projected onto the field 
(of life) and vacillates between paths. The simple and most serene centre by which 
we come to through the many diverse and curved paths of accident, fateful 
propulsion and design, is the imperceptible point of perfection that equates with the 
eternal now of Meister Eckhart, the decisive Moment of Kierkegaard, ‘the little 
point’ or satori of Mahayana Buddhism and the augenblick of Nietzsche. The 
symbolic structuring of the ludus globi directs the player to this ‘most simple centre’ 
in a gradual unfolding that reveals it as ‘the beginning, middle, and end of all circles’ 
and as the ‘beginning of equality’ by nature of its indivisibility.117 This point of 
oneness enfolds the magnitude of all things within it and is therefore found within all 
things but without all things then becoming one, thus accounting for plurality or the 
“multitude”; ‘Hence it [one] appears in every multitude because multitude does not 
exist except as the unfolding of unity. So you see the same thing in an analogous 
way concerning the point which is the enfolding of magnitude.’118  
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.  The infinite and finite in a coincidentia oppositorum  
 
The relation between the universal and particular, or more specifically, the 
potentiality of the finite and the actualisation of all potentialities in the infinite, is a 
recurring preoccupation central to the work of Cusanus. In the well-known dictum 
from De Docta Ignorantia Cusanus asserts ‘that between the infinite and the finite 
there is no possible proportion.’119 At times throughout the development of his ideas 
it seems as if Cusanus is fated to contradict himself regarding this adamant 
statement.  
Lee Clyde Miller remarks that the human mind which Cusanus presents in 
Idiota de Mente is dependent on its divine exemplar and therefore to some degree 
infinite in its own way. Miller cites a comment made by the spoon-maker/layman 
early on in the dialogue that could problematically contradict the edict of 
proportionality for which Cusanus is so famed; ‘the proportion which exists between 
God’s works and God is the same as that between the works of our mind and the 
mind itself.’120 Yet if we keep in mind, as Hopkins suggests, the idea of ‘a certain 
disproportionate likeness’121 that might deign to filter through to human experience, 
then by dint of the filter (the finite human) which albeit does create a certain 
distortion but whilst allowing this “certain disproportionate likeness” of the 
unimaginable God, the infinite, to penetrate, the lack of true proportionality between 
the finite and infinite is there-by demonstrated in the process.  
The phrase in question is taken from one of the later dialogues, Trialogus de 
Possest (On actualised-possibility) and is part of an attempt to explain the relation of 
the maximum to the minimum as one and the same whilst upholding the assertion of 
the lack of proportion between the finite and infinite. The dialogue is between the 
Cardinal, the Abbot John, and Bernard, an esteemed colleague. Reminiscent of De 
Docta Ignorantia the Cardinal states, ‘Assuredly there is no error in one’s saying 
that God is absolutely maximal and absolutely minimal greatness, alike.’122 From 
this and further ‘gratifying’ teachings from the Cardinal, the Abbot John makes the 
                                                 
119
 Cusanus, Of Learned Ignorance, 73. 
120
 Nicholas Cusanus, Idiota de Mente/ The Layman: About Mind, trans. and intr.  Clyde Lee Miller 
(New York: Abaris Books Inc., 1979), 27 & 63. 
121
 Hopkins , A Concise Introduction to the Philosophy of Nicholas of Cusa, 19 and 73. See Jasper 
Hopkins, The Theme of Beauty in Nicholas of Cusa’s Sermons, (University of Minnesota, 2009). 
122
 Ibid., 73. 
Second Episode  
139 
 
observation referred to above of the absolute beauty of God and the creatable beauty 
that can but be “a certain disproportionate likeness to that Beauty.”  
With regard to this recurrent theme Pauline Moffitt Watts draws on the first 
series of his dialogues (written in 1450) to show the critical inter-relationship in 
operation between the two dimensions of creative life – divine and human - that 
Cusanus labours to bring to light throughout his work. In the first of the Idiota 
dialogues De Sapiente (About wisdom) it is in the very bustle and carryings-on of 
the street that ‘wisdom proclaims [itself] openly.’123The oneness of Wisdom124 
shows its face, not in the singular utterance of words but in the manifold doings of 
the people, ‘the very multiplicity of activities of the marketplace is an expression of 
the single root of infinite wisdom.’125 In the second dialogue, Idiota de Mente (The 
Layman: About Mind), the craftsman of the market place, free from the prison of 
book learning, demonstrates through the humble art of spoon making how all comes 
from one and how the part cannot be conceived without knowing the whole:  
 
The part is not known unless the whole is known, for the whole measures the 
part. When I carve the spoon by parts from the wood, I refer to the whole in 
fitting each part so that I may carve a well-proportioned spoon. In this way 
the whole spoon which I have before my mind is the model to which I refer 
while fashioning each part.
126
 
 
The general schema of ideas consistent with the overall trajectory and 
development of his oeuvre, are already evident in the earlier work De Coniecturis 
(1442-3). As mentioned in the previous episode, this work elaborates upon the 
unattainable oneness of truth that can only be surmised through otherness and as 
every individual differentiates in otherness the same conjecture is never made. 
However, in a species of coincidentia oppositorum the ‘presiding oneness’ of truth 
dwells persistently in the multitude, albeit in ‘various degrees of otherness-of-
mode.’127 In all of the works touched upon, whilst never abandoning the principle of 
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there being no proportionality between the infinite and finite, a very considerate 
relation between the two as inter-dependent magnitudes is cultivated. The infinite 
might fall into the distant realms of ineffability but with recourse to the sensory and 
imaginary the finite marks its trace of flight and brings to us the impression of its 
fall.  
The via negativa by which this impression is recorded is most effectively 
understood in conjunction with the doctrine of coincidentia oppositorum advanced 
by Cusanus. Via the constant way of symbolic language, from mathematical formula 
in De docta ignorantia, a spinning top in De Possest, the craftsmanship of object 
making in the Idiota dialogues and the bowling game of spheres in De Ludo Globi 
Cusanus uncovers the trail to God. According to Hopkins this trail is divided into 
three alternative routes that all converge into the same ultimate destination. These 
three formulae in Hopkins’ account are: ‘(1) in God all opposites coincide; (2) God 
is above (prior to) all opposition; (3) God is beyond the coincidence of opposites.’128 
Implicit in these formulae is the agreement of maximal and minimal resident in the 
Absolute Maximum and the fact of the ‘unnameable and unknowable nature of 
God’129 which inevitably leads Cusanus to the via negativa as a most suitable and 
efficacious approach, and perhaps the only approach, to such an unspeakable and 
unknowable domain.  
Transcendence of the principle of non-contradiction is realised through the 
coincidentia oppositorum in which God is understood to be at once the coincidence 
of all things and yet beyond the distinction of coincidences. This is a standpoint that 
along with Cusanus’ ‘predilection for paradoxical expression’130 is curiously 
reminiscent of Zen. It is not surprising then that in the relatively recent exchange and 
dialogue between western and eastern philosophies, Christian mysticism and 
especially the work of Meister Eckhart has been looked to in a comparative light 
with the philosophy of Zen. Importantly however, it must be noted that most 
commentators contend that Zen is not to be considered merely as a form of 
mysticism, this being a grave and injurious misunderstanding.  
The varying degrees of otherness which for Cusanus are representative of the 
universal, and the ever changing conjecture of truth according to these varying 
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degrees, smacks of a Heraclitean cosmology in which the so-called doctrine of the 
unity or identity of opposites in active conjunction with his theory of flux explain the 
basic structure of the world. Akin to this Heraclitean universe formulated through the 
seemingly contradictory unity of stability and flux, and which is most famously 
illustrated through the analogy of a moving river, Cusanus too demonstrates his 
proposition of the endless variations and gradations of agreements and differences in 
humankind through the constant flow of the Rhein river.   
 
For example, the Rhein river is seen to flow constantly for awhile; but it 
never remains in one and the same state, since it is now more turbulent, now 
more clear, now rising, now receding. So too, it is the case that although it is 
true to say that the Rhein was larger and smaller and that it passed gradually 
from largeness to smallness, nevertheless it is evident that the Rhein was 
never before exactly as it now is.
131
 
 
In both Cusanus and Heraclitus then there is a causal relation between 
oppositional unity and variegated change. Opposites ultimately coincide through 
processional flux emanating from a common and stable oneness. The continuous 
cycles of transformational exchange are most simply expressed in Heraclitus Fr. D. 
126 Cold warms up, warm cools off, moist parches, dry dampens.
132
  Perhaps of 
incidental accord, the imagery and inference of Fr. D. 84a It rests by changing,
 133
   
turns the mind to Cusanus’s spinning top of De Possest, which has the appearance of 
resting the faster it spins. Although a disputed fragment, for recorded through the 
unverifiable paraphrasing of Plotinus it is thus even more open to conjecture and the 
distortions of de-contextualisation than usual, it does serve a serendipitous purpose 
here. The change Heraclitus refers to could just as easily be construed as action, as 
sameness, thus taking the infinite motion of Cusanus’s spinning top the change 
comes as one of stillness or rest.   
 
 
 
 
                                                 
131
 Cusanus, De Coniecturis, 240.  
132
 Kahn, The Art and Thought of Heraclitus, 53. 
133
 Ibid. 
Second Episode  
142 
 
.  Reality, metaphor, symbolism and similitude 
 
Symbols and metaphors are conduits for ineffable realities, worlds bordered 
by a twilight promise that require more than the sharp lines of a probing beam to 
capture the escaping content. Ideas and sentiments that do not tidily end when the 
full stop is grammatically required may be expressed through images and 
associations where-in the varying interpretations of which may be infinite and 
therefore more accurate. That there is need and use of such methods heralds the 
undisclosed other that beckons behind every creative endeavour. By creative I mean 
to include the most basic acts of survival; washing, baking and breathing. Each act or 
object is but a shadow of an imperceivable reality. In Ṣūfī mysticism this is the 
unseen world of Dominion and what we experience in our shadowy reality is the 
living similitude of this mysterious and divine but real world of Dominion. Our 
maladroit fandangos across the irregulated surfaces of illusion are the teething totters 
of an unimaginably fluid flight. This fleet footed flight is the auxiliary route of the 
unseen, directed by a most imaginative design of symbols and signs.  
Dōgen writes in the fascicle Uji from the Shōbōgenzō:  
 
Mountains are time, and seas are time. If they were not time, there would be 
no mountains and seas. So you must not say there is no time in the immediate 
now of mountains and seas. If time is destroyed, mountains and seas are 
destroyed. If time is indestructible, mountains and seas are indestructible.
134
  
 
The immensity, majesty and imperceivable finitude of mountains and seas give them 
an air of hierophanous potency which Dōgen summons to transmit the same qualities 
within his concept of being-time (uji). Mountains and sea are more than symbolic 
referents, containers or carriers, they are simultaneously their meaning. As active 
similitudes, they are more than ‘sheer metaphor, without reality.’135  
In The Niche of Lights, Abū Ḥamid al-Ghazālī elucidates the basic principles 
of Islamic cosmology through an explicit reading of the Qurᵓān’s Light Verse. 
Addressing his reader in the brief introduction he beseeches ‘anoint your insight with 
the light of Reality’ and offers himself as an interpretative guide ‘I unfold for you the 
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mysteries of the divine lights.’136 The text following, once clearly establishing God 
as the real light of which all else is ‘sheer metaphor,’ explicates the significance of 
the niche, glass, lamp, tree and olive that occur in the Light Verse. He attributes to 
each a perceptual faculty of the human soul (senses, imagination, rationality, 
reflection, and the prophetic) of which the niche, glass, lamp, tree and olive 
respectively are the outward similitude. Though it may be through symbols that 
divine knowledge is imparted, these symbols are not then to be ‘nullified’ as simply 
representative of something else. It is only by recognising the parallel between the 
two worlds, of inner mysteries and outward meanings that the perfect way is attained 
and ‘through this it comes to be known that the outward similitude is true and behind 
it is a mystery.’137 In this same sense, apart from making explicit the connection of 
being and time, can Dōgen’s statement that “mountains are time, and seas are time” 
also be understood.  
Grasping the kaleidoscopic “light of Reality” as it flickers and sparks is no 
dim feat. In fact it cannot really be grasped at all, such a slippery amorphous thing is 
it. Similitudes and symbolisms help direct us to the gateway of this imperceptible 
splendour. However, it is a funambulist feat by which our sight is balanced betwixt 
the sign, the signalled and blindness. The symbol can be so convincing it is taken as 
reality and either misconstrued and rejected or deified, ‘but the truth is,’ Suzuki tells 
us, ‘that Symbols are after all symbols and when this inner signification is grasped 
they can be utilised in any way one may choose.’138 Here Suzuki refers to the 
interpenetration of ideas apparent within Shin, Zen and Christian mysticism, and 
how, for example, a distinctly Christian symbolism can be comfortably and 
effectively appropriated to convey something otherwise considered typically 
Buddhist. 
For Mircea Eliade (1907-1986) the only possible way to present reality is 
through symbolism. Symbolism functions as an ‘opening’ that acts as a container 
and transmitter of the rationally challenging form of reality as a coincidentia 
oppositorum, which in Eliade’s understanding, and to which I concur, is ‘the mode 
of being of Ultimate Reality.’139 It is through the symbolic that comprehension of the 
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universal is realized. The understanding comes from an involvement or engagement 
with the symbol that comes about as a lived experience ‘of intuitions, of immediate 
seizures of reality.’140 A similar idea is expressed in the “pure experience” of James, 
and then Nishida in his consequent developments of James’s original notion. This 
direct or pure experience as they describe it occurs outside of the logical mechanisms 
that work to translate reality into a comprehensible form. It could readily be 
described as an “immediate seizure of reality” occurring before the binary codes of 
consciousness assert themselves, and object and subject suffer the disorienting 
estrangement of eternal divorce. According to Eliade the symbol holds its value in a 
‘plurality of contexts’ and it is for this reason that it has access to the universal.   
Alternatively, meaning can also be so coy and ambiguous that the 
presentation of it (meaning and “reality”) is presumed symbolic.  
 
*   *   *   *   * 
 
The advertence of such presumption and projection directs the final words of 
Beckett’s novel Watt; ‘no symbols where none intended.’141 Of course with Beckett 
there is always the possibility (probability even) of irony, and this denunciatory 
maxim, posing as a conclusive disclaimer, cannot necessarily be taken literally, 
certainly not in light of what precedes it and certainly not with the retrospective 
foresight of what was to follow.   
Or then again, travelling on a continuous by-pass, hurtling with blinding 
intention towards a fixed destination, we are likely to miss the exit altogether, that 
gateway to the true “light of Reality.” On this superhighway of symbols, signals and 
meanings it can all become a little overwhelming. The prudent measure is to just 
ignore all the signs and carry on. But so much gets missed, so little is experienced, as 
demonstrated in the outstanding example of the character Watt. And yet, too much 
significance given to the symbol, too much weight on the word, unbalances the 
teetering act, the featherweight hovering supported only by the slightest thread of 
matter: a fraying line suspended between beginning and end, birth and death, upon 
which we wobble our way along.  
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This sobering high-wire act of meaning gleaning, takes literal and symbolic 
form in the spavined gait of so many of Beckett’s ‘people.’142 Their halting and 
reluctant yet ineluctable motility echoes Beckett’s own disgruntled, exasperated and 
inexorable compulsions to write, covertly confessed in Three Dialogues as ‘The 
expression that there is nothing to express, nothing with which to express, nothing 
from which to express, no power to express, no desire to express, together with the 
obligation to express.’143 Expressing, in other words, the perpetual purgatory of 
Beckett’s mortal condition as an artist. The conclusive “no symbols where none 
intended” is Beckett’s strategic bow out in what makes up the addendum of Watt, 
like an unrehearsed encore, its fragments, no less ‘precious’ than the gems of the 
greater setting of the novel, are neglected only through ‘fatigue and disgust.’144  
In an essay on Symbolism, the literary movement, of which Beckett is no part 
(and nor is he part of the same movement within theatre), Mary Lydon exposes the 
double entendre of the unavoidably symbolic inference of Beckett’s repudiation: 
‘one might say that Beckett is arguing here against interpretation, while slyly 
acknowledging that it is hopeless to do so.’145 The lurching and limping of the 
majority of Beckett’s (mostly) recalcitrant protagonists is a perfect embodiment of 
the faltering, hesitant and determined movements of the passage of existence through 
time and space - our most stalwart companions throughout life.  
Perhaps Beckett’s tortured company of dancers inspired Pina Bausch in her 
production of Frühlingsopfe (Stravinsky’s Rite of Spring), or at very least, a study of 
his ungainly footpath waltzes would be of undoubted profit for budding 
choreographers.  
Although nearly any work, randomly selected, would furnish us with many 
prospective leads for the troupe we might as well continue plundering the wealth of 
symbolic material in Watt (a fitting irony I think). In fact, within one short paragraph 
of opening, the novel in question introduces us to the gyrations of the first character, 
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Mr Hackett, ‘His walk was a very agitated walk,’146 we are told, which is peculiarly 
understated for the early prose, but then again, we are graced with more visual 
disturbances further on. In the company of Mr Hackett – though from a marked 
distance - we find Watt, whose pedestrian tango deserved a whole hearted analysis, 
which I also think deserves an airing here: 
 
Watt’s way of advancing due east, for example, was to turn his bust as far as 
possible towards the north and at the same time to fling out his right leg as far 
as possible towards the south, and then to turn his bust as far as possible 
towards the south and at the same time to fling out his left leg as far as 
possible towards the north, and then again to turn his bust as far as possible 
towards the north and to fling out his right leg as far as possible towards the 
south, and then again to turn his bust as far as possible towards the south and 
to fling out his left leg as far as possible towards the north, and so on, over 
and over again, many many times, until he reached his destination, and could 
sit down. So, standing first on one leg, and then on the other, he moved 
forward, a headlong tardigrade, in a straight line. The knees, on these 
occasions, did not bend. They could have, but they did not. No knees could 
better bend than Watt’s, when they chose, there was nothing the matter with 
Watt’s knees, as may appear. But when out walking they did not bend, for 
some obscure reason. Notwithstanding this, the feet fell, heel and sole 
together, flat upon the ground, and left it, for the air’s unchartered ways, with 
manifest repugnancy. The arms were content to dangle, in perfect 
eqipendency.
147
 
  
This is modern dance at its best. It is also a splendid co-ordination of 
ostensibly counter-intuitive movements that somehow miraculously produce the 
desired advance. The result is all the more profound for its unexpectedness.  In a real 
and active sense of a similitude, that is, in the actuality of a thing or, in the case of 
Watt’s example, a movement (physical representative of the existential) the 
prodigious powers of the symbolic and metaphoric are communicated. There is 
something of the tragic and the comic about the ‘high stamping mass’ of Watt, and 
viewed at ‘a judicious remove’148 the paradox of the parody unveils its finer features. 
The fact that the fact of a body, the housing of our material corpus, somewhat, 
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alotwhat, impedes movement and seriously curtails the flight of free passage, and yet 
without it, here, on this material plane, movement cannot be traced at all. Indeed 
without it, the encumberment of a body, there would be no it, no here, no being here, 
not in a body that is, moving along. There is a strange co-dependency of origination 
transcribed in the movements of a body moving through its life as life moves 
through the body. Much as, once again “mountains are time, and seas are time.”  
 
*   *   *   *   * 
 
Lodged in the embodied forms of metaphor the transcendent makes an 
appearance without having to land. Because the language of metaphor is imagistic 
and indirect a distance is always maintained that grants a freedom of meaning. The 
‘access to a transcendent idea’149 that metaphoric language gives us is conditioned in 
some way by this distance. The liberty of discretion permitted by what Steiner names 
a ‘cortesia’ is what ‘allows us to inhabit the tentative.’150 This cortesia provides the 
vital distance between individual truths that prohibits telling someone what to think. 
Jaspers cites Socrates, Nietzsche, and Kierkegaard as amongst those who ‘dare not 
presume to tell their companions what to believe.’151 And this is why, according to 
Ward in her appraisal of the fleeting moment of augenblick, ‘having no absolute 
truths to offer, they say nothing in a straightforward manner.’152 We could add 
Heraclitus as an inspiring forebear of this little clan, though he seemed to wish 
people would think how he tried to tell them to, he never told them using 
straightforward statements and ‘preferred to explain, if at all, in imagistic terms.’153 
 The curving and indirect route, ‘the arc of metaphor, without which there 
can be neither shaped thought nor performative intelligibility, spans an undeclared 
foundation’154 and in the absence of declaration everything becomes possible. The 
“arc of metaphor” is the rainbow bridge of Iris, ‘offspring of Thaumas’ the ‘shining 
wonder’ that becomes the symbol of philosophy in Plato’s Theaetetus. Iris is the 
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Homeric messenger, the ‘link between gods and men,’ 155 the aery spectrum that 
Ward draws from in her related images of ‘bridges, tightropes and rainbows’ as 
‘arcing metaphors which serve the purpose of spanning a divide, and maintaining the 
tension between one realm and another.’156 These arching metaphors are supports for 
the ‘gateway moment’ of augenblick as it occurs specifically in Nietzsche’s 
Zarathustra. The very phrase the “arc of metaphor” transcribes a floating world of 
symbolic inference. The Ark as the original metaphor then becomes a ship of fools, 
sent out to warn the believing blind who could not believe their eyes and did not 
want to believe the mad. On it goes in a manner reminiscent of Borges’s question of 
whether universal history is nothing more than ‘the history of the diverse intonation 
of a few metaphors.’157 
At the same time as being an indirect means to “a transcendent idea” 
metaphoric language is also a means in some respect to literally express ‘in a 
concrete mode a certain dimension of the Divine Reality.’158 In the hermeneutic 
work of Ibn al-‘Arabī’ as he is “opened” to the teachings of the Qurᵓān, each 
individual word is given full attention as an appointed word, specifically chosen by 
God through the messenger of Muḥammad. The word itself is representative and 
holder of an entire world of meaning that cannot be transliterated by another. It 
becomes the living metaphor of what it means.  
Nishitani explains the ‘primal fact’ of metaphor as it arises on its own 
homeground ‘stripped of the discerning intellect that infiltrates our ordinary talk of 
sense perception.’ From the groundless centre of a non-objectifiable “middle” mode 
of being, the true suchness of a thing is in its primal fact at one with emptiness. 
Therefore it is what it is without being caught in what it is. It is in a sense a metaphor 
of itself but without there being any other thing which is more truly it, ‘the metaphor 
as such is the primal reality or fact.’159 The bridge between the appearance and the 
reality is held in the likeness between the thing and its appearance, without there 
being anything more real behind the appearance. The likeness or ‘true suchness’ is as 
that which Nishitani says is ‘contained in the assertion “the bird flies and it is like a 
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bird.”’ With this phrase Nishitani invokes the sublime “primal reality” of the final 
stanza of a Dōgen poem, “The point of Zazen,” to which he is undoubtedly referring: 
 
Clear water all the way to the bottom; a fish swims like a fish. 
Vast sky transparent throughout; a bird flies like a bird.
160
   
 
.  On language 
 
Everything which is involved in the expressiveness of language remains itself 
inexpressible and therefore outside language, but according to Bertrand Russell this 
incommunicable hiatus can be expressed in a ‘perfectly precise sense,’ and 
Wittgenstein graciously demonstrates it by saying a ‘good deal about what cannot be 
said.’161 Wittgenstein also makes patently clear the impossibility of saying anything 
about the world as a whole. It can only be spoken of in bounded proportions, the 
finite, or, in other words the particular. In Nishida’s reckoning all relativity is the 
self-determination of the absolute or universal, so through the particular the whole 
world is spoken. But how are we to know the whole as a particular? How can the 
individual utterance ever be representative of this whole when it cannot be said that 
which cannot be thought? We bumble unwittingly through the complex conventions 
of language ‘just as people speak without knowing how the individual sounds are 
produced.’162 
 
*   *   *   *   * 
 
Interlude: We are afforded a perfect exhibition of this common failing in an 
absurdly comic scene of Molière’s social satire Le Bourgeois Gentilhomme (The 
would-be gentleman). Monsieur Jourdain, a buffoon of bombastic proportions, 
representative of the vulgar and vainglorious ambitions of the rising middle-class of 
seventeenth-century France, requests of his philosophy master a lesson in 
orthography  - after being successively flummoxed by the altogether overwhelming 
dimensions of Latin, logic, morality and physics. The philosophy master thus 
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proceeds to direct M. Jourdain through some very rudimentary exercises of the 
proper enunciation of his vowels, to which M. Jourdain displays his usual excesses 
of bedazzled ignorance and bemusement. The same airs of deception are captured in 
this poem by Zen master Mumon:  
 
 
The wind moves, the flag moves, the mind moves:  
All of them missed it. 
Though he knows how to open his mouth, 
He does not see he was caught by words.
163
 
 
The transitory and diverse nature of language as the tongue of (wo)man, ‘the 
“lingo”’ as Heidegger puts it, is a “showing” of the same diversity within the 
individuality of (wo)man. If each individual “showing,” each articulation of sound is 
the soul transposed through the enunciatory skills of the muscular hydrostat then 
even Aristotle in his categorical treatment of language concedes (unwittingly) that it 
is possible that there can be no correct speaking, no precise immutable 
pronunciation, only a sounding of the soul, ‘Now, what (takes place) in the making 
of vocal sounds is a show of what there is in the soul.’164 
 
*   *   *   *   * 
 
One tried and trusted approach to grasping the ever elusive esse, thing-in-
itself, apeiron, fixed “exact conclusions” about reality, God, the unreachable “depths 
of soul,” so on and so forth, is the via negativa. Both Wittgenstein and Cusanus in 
their respective manners employ such an approach. In his Tractatus, with quite a 
finesse for detail, Wittgenstein clipped and groomed his way down a via positiva to 
arrive unexpectedly at the boundless and mystifying via negativa “where-of one 
cannot speak.” Cusanus unabashedly pursued the twilight groves of a tenebrous 
Absolute and even with constant recourse to the divine calculations and clarification 
of mathematical symbols and diagrams, he abdicates to the “camp of mysticism” and 
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the paradoxical ineffability of the via negativa and also saying an awful lot about 
what cannot be said. The via negativa is not taken as a means of keeping the Heathen 
“uninitiated” from the ambrosial scent of the Divine and nor is to be thought of as an 
evasive means by which to eschew definition.  
It can be that the clearest spoken or written account gives so very little 
information, important information is not always easily nor clearly conveyed. 
Information that might otherwise be conveyed by the initiated activities of the 
imagination, for example, by the infinite possibilities in the interstices of 
interpretation, by the pregnant enigma of silence, by the slight twist of a flower and a 
glittering iris. Information conveyed in other words, through the arcus iris of 
metaphor.  
 
Language disguises thought. So much so, that from the outward form of the 
clothing it is impossible to infer the form of the thought beneath it, because 
the outward form of the clothing is not designed to reveal the form of the 
body, but for entirely different purposes.
165
  
 
*   *   *   *   * 
 
Interlude II: Again M. Jourdain provides an unsuspecting model for the 
fraudulence of frippery in his ludicrous extrav-organzas of attire. As language acts as 
a disguise by which the real thought is concealed, the plumes and satins of the 
nobility can supposedly conceal the ingenuous bourgeoisie beneath its virago 
sleeves, reticella collars and galligaskins. In the case of M. Jourdain however, his 
authentic self could not be disguised under any amount of hosiery and headwear 
because he did not have the outer form of language quite right. Part of the deception 
of language is its persuasive charms and beguiling ways. If these are not in place 
then the spell will not be cast.    
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.  On poetry   
 
Temperament veils and tints, the individual cannot escape their own 
projection of the world, caught in the refractive glow of mood’s light ‘each and 
every thing we see or hear contains our individuality.’166 Poetry is the recorded 
observation of a direct and pure experience, that is, according to Nishida an 
experience that is always relative yet unified. It precedes the distortions that occur 
through the opposition of subject and object and is a single activity that is in 
interrelationship with a universal sole reality. Poetry is not always about the laments 
and joys of our discombobulating existence but is also a dry and flowery account of 
reality; a natural science with literary skills. The reality evoked by this coded 
language is most poignantly individualised even whilst expressing universal 
principles. Poetry is an express conception of the world and existence that applauds 
and honours the unspeakable, unfathomable and unknowable, it is the most direct 
way of saying something without knowing what it is that is to be said.     
In his own particular and untiring crusade, a dedicated quest for cosmic 
clarity, Cusanus treads the time honoured paths of the ‘Ancients’ and ultimately 
yields to the abstractions of mathematical symbolism to illuminate his way. His 
conviction that the mathematical sign is the only way to divine knowledge compels 
him to challenge the pre-eminence of Thales with uncontained rapture at the genius 
of Pythagoras, and he queries, ‘who was the first philosopher in fact?’167 Tooting in 
celestial concert with the unknowable dimensions and harmonies of the spheres, he 
believes that ‘the more we abstract from sensible conditions, the more certain our 
knowledge is.’168 There are, however, many modes of travel to arrive at the same 
understanding and the vehicles of carriage do not necessarily use the same paths. 
Although their quest is not dissimilar, and nor indeed their method for that matter, 
there are however, certain conflicts between opinions regarding the expression of the 
equally ardent missions of Cusanus and Nietzsche.   
In his impassioned apotheosis of the Übermensch (Superman) Nietzsche 
decries all abstraction as delusional misdirection and beseeches ‘you should follow 
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your sense to the end!’ for ‘the poets lie too much.’169 And in another scathing rant 
in Human, All-too-Human, he even further indicts the “wizardry” of poor poets as 
conscientious treachery: 
 
All that is generally called reality, the poets, conscious of this power, proceed 
with intention to disparage and to distort into the uncertain, the illusory, the 
spurious, the impure, the sinful, sorrowful, and deceitful. They make use of 
all doubts about the limits of knowledge, of all sceptical excesses, in order to 
spread over everything the rumpled veil of uncertainty. For they desire that 
when this darkening process is complete their wizardry and soul-magic may 
be accepted without hesitation as the path to “true truth” and “real reality.”170 
   
Never-the-less, with this withering damning of the occult thaumaturgics of poetry 
behind us, with the poets we go, our stalwart guides, most suitable crafts for crossing 
into the Dominion of “invisible things.”  
In his maiden work, An Inquiry into the Good, Nishida Kitarō sets out on his 
life’s philosophical trajectory to ultimately alight at the hallowed grounds of basho, a 
self-determining locus of bi-directional dynamic expression between the absolute or 
universal and the individual or particular. Nishida may not be known for his poetic 
flair, though it could be said the sometimes criticised abstruse nature of his prose 
shares something with the often obscure expression of the poet.
171
 What-ever his 
persuasions, he does make known early on in his career a distinct regard for certain 
poets. In An Inquiry into the Good he quotes the Romantic poetry of German writer 
Heinrich Heine (1797-1856) to make his point about a ‘true reality prior to the 
separation of subject and object.’ This “true reality” is unified, independent and self-
sufficient. It does not differentiate between mind and matter and is constituted 
equally by volition and feeling as objective dispassionate knowledge. The ability to 
capture and express the complex of activities involved in this reality may very well 
lie in the mastery of the poet. Nishida writes: 
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As a concrete fact, a flower is not at all like the purely material flower of 
scientists; it is pleasing, with a beauty of colour, shape and scent. Heine 
gazed at the stars in a quiet night sky and called them golden tacks in the 
azure. Though astronomers would laugh at his words as the folly of a poet, 
the true nature of stars may very well be expressed in his phrase.
172
 
   
Cusanus keeps company with the very same he claims as ‘all our wisest and 
most divine teachers,’ (though it is not he that includes himself in such rarefied 
society, but I) who, ‘agree that visible things are truly images of invisible things and 
that from created things the Creator can be knowably seen as in a mirror and a 
symbolism.’173 Thus perceived reality is the “through and through real” surface of 
true reality which is imperceivable and unknowable.  
Of neither water, air, earth nor any other body, but of some infinite nature 
besides, the apeiron can only but have been conceived through the ‘inner vision’ of 
Anaximander, as claims Jaspers,
174
 and imagined or “knowably seen” through the 
reflective illumination of symbolism and metaphor.  
Marc Chagall describes an increasing despair at the impotence of old belief 
systems and wonders if the resulting, perhaps natural, turn away from the vagaries of 
‘religious spirit’ have not had an over-all disheartening and withering effect on the 
creative outlook of man. He asks ‘Doesn’t this so-called scientific gift of nature, by 
emptying the soul, limit the source of poetry?’ In the face of the ‘contracting scene’ 
of progress where can the depth and meaning now be found that can answer to the 
‘throbbings of a world, its sighs and its dreams?’ 175  
 
.  On mathematics  
 
The problem with poetry is its wordyness. Even though each word, divinely 
appointed, may be the only way to frame the gap, the void through which apophatic 
knowing issues its formless form, and each word, divinely appointed, may be the 
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only way to contain or carry the delicate aither of the ineffable through to the 
denseness of our perception in this weightiest of worlds, the word is not ever a 
simple world. The message carried by such a complex and tricky chaperone is not 
necessarily trustworthy; the tint of such a peculiar hue the original colour is 
indiscernible. What’s more, how really can we imagine the mystery and immensity 
of the universe, Divine Reality, to be conveyed by anything, much less than a little 
scribble or squeak? Borges expresses similar concerns when it comes to the voluble 
pontifications of philosophy, ‘It is hazardous to think that a coordination of words 
(philosophies are nothing else) can have much resemblance to the universe.’176 He is 
entitled to critique his own world, his internal and infinite library of Babel but he 
does so with such poetic deftness that he weakens the merit of such questioning and 
perhaps not unwittingly appeals to the very cause he wishes to condemn.  
Such intricacies and contradictions in fact make a sound case for words being 
the perfect reflection of the universe. However, putting aside these small persuasions 
to the contrary, perhaps mathematics and geometry are a much more reliable and 
appropriate language for divining the meaning and structure of reality? And perhaps 
this is why so many philosophers have turned to the abstractions of the mathematical 
sign, like Cusanus, as mentioned earlier, like Pythagoras who inspired him to do so, 
and also like Bruno, Wittgenstein, Nishida and Russell who all make appearances 
here.  
The mathematical sign and formula hold such promise of clarity, potentiality, 
exponentiality and impossibly infinite finites drawn out in evanescent meetings 
called wonderful things like oblique asymptote (very poetic). Nicholaos John Jones 
is another more contemporary figure to add to the list of philosophising 
mathematicians. He gives a thoroughly boggling account of the internal and external 
negations of the soku-hi logic that the Kyoto School philosophers are the famed 
exponents of. The nature and form of soku logic is that of paradox.  How can 
paradox be broken down into a logical formula? One could be assured that what-ever 
had been explained by the logical formula procured from such deductions that it 
would be anything but the logic of soku-hi that had been explained. Like the Tao, 
once named then it is no longer the Eternal Tao that is being named, it is something 
else. This something else, as in a via negativa may get us closer to understanding 
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what the Tao is, but by no means can we ever say “Eureka! I’ve got it!” What Jones 
does is ‘remove the appearance of contradiction from the logic of soku (soku hi) 
through the presentation of a formal system for this logic.’177 Therefore he is not 
explaining away the paradox
178
 but is finding a way to demonstrate how it can exist 
without rendering itself meaningless through absurdity. Meaningless to a system of 
objective logic founded on a principle of non-contradiction that is. Otherwise a kōan 
would do. Jones presents a very convincing case for the place and value of soku 
logic, and he does so in the language of the accusing party, which is the only way to 
convince the opposition.  
As Dilworth notes on the system of logic developed by Nishida, which 
happens to be an example of one of the finest uses of soku-hi logic, the logic only 
makes sense from within the system itself, or rather, the system he develops and the 
depths he goes to within it is precisely for the benefit of completing the system he is 
developing which then becomes a self-enclosed unit. Having said that, Nishida’s 
logic of nothingness and the basho structuring does provide a logical framework in 
which to situate the full face of human experience in relationship with the absolute, 
and this is no small feat and nor is it a self-enclosed unit, quite the contrary. The 
point being that it is very rare to speak in a foreign language to yourself, but of 
course makes complete sense to speak in the same language as to whom-ever you are 
speaking speaks. That is not always possible however, and often the possibility is 
driven by choice.   
Nishida was unique in many ways, but perhaps mostly for his insistence on 
creating a concrete logic that could account for the hitherto seen as unaccountable 
and ineffable. The challenge Nishida undertook was to meet the ‘silence of the 
saints’ with a verifiable report of what they had experienced. Dilworth writes in his 
introduction to Nishida’s Last Writings: Nothingness and the Religious Worldview, 
‘To Nishida, the philosopher can reflect on the via negativa forms of religious 
expression, including Zen Buddhist’s notorious “method of no method,” no less than 
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he can reflect on scientific procedure, the process of aesthetic creativity, or moral 
behaviour.’179  
Jones has also put forward his argument in the appropriate terms for the 
receiver and with integrity to the individual uses of the soku logic within the Kyoto 
School. A very small sample from his formulations is as follows:     
 
(T1)   ├SL P ↔ ~P → = ⇒  ╞ ⇔ 
Proof: Suppose P. Then ~P (by ~-intro). So P→ ~P. Suppose ~P. Then P(by ~-elim). So ~P→ P. 39 
 
(T2)    v(P) = T ⇒ v(~P) = T   
Proof: Let Q = ~P. v(P) = T ⇔╞P (by Df1) ⇔╞ ~P (by T1) ⇔╞ Q (since ~P = Q) ⇔ v(Q) = T (by 
Df1) ⇔ v(~P) = T (since Q = ~P) 
 
(T3)   ╞ ~P ⇒ v(~P) = T 
Proof: ╞ ~P⇔ v(P) = T (by Df2) ⇒ v(~P) = T (by T2)180 
 
One has to ask, even considering the very crude and unjust manner in which I 
have just represented a very thorough and insightful investigation by Jones, does this 
new language really get us any closer to understanding? In this case I think it better 
to do away with signs altogether and twist flowers instead, with the odd slap in the 
face for emphasis. But then given that this episode is about the movement away from 
understanding then I should commend such executions of the cerebrum. 
 
.  Elusive understanding: whose language? 
 
A not incidental connection between Heraclitus, Dōgen and Nishida is the 
criticism they all received for their obtuse and recondite language. Yet this criticism 
comes in the face of them all exhibiting a masterful use of language through word-
play, neologisms, double-entendre, puns and paradox. One particular confrontation 
between Nishida and a well-known literary critic, Kobayashi Hideo, resulted in 
Kobayashi dismissing the impenetrable style of Nishida as ‘a bizarre system that is 
neither in Japanese nor, of course, in a foreign language.’181  As an eminent scholar 
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and translator of the Kyoto School, Heisig himself agrees that Nishida’s ‘language 
can seem hopelessly matted at times.’182 But as Heisig concedes, the discontinuities 
of his style must be accepted as ‘they reflect the creativity of his way of thinking and 
of his adventure of ideas as a whole’183 and they are also a direct effect of the 
bridging between the radically opposed discursive traditions of the East and West, a 
feat of semantic engineering very few had been willing or even interested in 
attempting prior to Nishida’s arrival on the philosophical landscape. Perhaps most 
important though is the fact of the necessity of his language, we must assume chosen, 
very particularly, to transmit his message. A style of language that not only reflects 
his creative thinking but that is also the form of those thoughts, not just their 
explicative arrangement.  
Kahn identifies the same necessity of expression in the ‘tantalizingly 
enigmatic’ pronouncements of Heraclitus which he refers to as ‘linguistic density.’184 
The consistent and deliberate use of ambiguity by Heraclitus is a tactic of evocation 
that ‘methodically undermines all certainties’185 and requests of the reader an 
engagement which an explicit exposition would never be-able to achieve.  
The problem of understanding may be one more of reception than delivery. 
Nietzsche aims his own “numerous complaints” at people who in their dissatisfaction 
and discomfort at what they might be reading blame the style of the author, ‘such 
dissatisfied people are also responsible for the numerous complaints about the 
obscurity of Heraclitus’s style. The fact is that hardly anyone has ever written with 
as lucid and luminous a quality. Very tersely, to be sure, and for that reason obscure 
for readers who skim and race.’186 We may recall from the previous episode a very 
similar statement directed by Beckett to the public reader of Joyce, ‘and if you don’t 
understand it Ladies and Gentlemen, it is because you are too decadent to receive 
it…The rapid skimming and absorption of the scant cream of sense is made possible 
by what I may call a continuous process of copious intellectual salivation.’187 Such 
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complaints by the dissatisfied reader are not only the affectation of aesthetic 
percipience but inadvertently expose the plaintiff as somewhat wanting in sensitivity.   
Heraclitus remarks that he is misunderstood even before he is heard, which does not 
indicate a train of psychic aural connectors along the Ionian coast but a people who 
had already decided what they thought and what something to be correctly 
understood should sound like, if they preferred not to listen that is. Some two and a 
half millennia later, Heidegger is still battling the same thorny barriers put up by the 
embarrassed resistance to new relationships with language. He asks if we have any 
idea what kind of relation we have to the language we speak and how we might live 
with it, how it lives with us and how the two form each other. He suggests it ‘might 
be helpful to us to rid ourselves of the habit of always hearing only what we already 
understand.’188  
Sometimes, the meaning exists between understandings. Many of the 
Heraclitean fragments can be read from multiple perspectives with equal conviction. 
This is the “linguistic density” that Kahn refers to and it recalls the various means of 
right understanding that are demonstrated through the symbolism of the “skin, flesh, 
bones and marrow” in the fascicle Kattō of Dōgen. Without making one reading 
more correct than another understanding is suddenly expanded because of the 
processing required to navigate multiple meanings and simultaneously hold all to be 
true. Thus Kahn says of the ambiguity of the fragments that ‘the difficulty of 
deciding between them is itself the intended effect.’189 
Allegations not only of stylistic obscurity, but the invention of entirely new 
languages, private idioms that no-one could possibly understand shroud the reception 
of these vagrant thoughts attempting touch down on any willing runway. Even 
Kasulis, the master of Dōgenese and mitsugo transmission submits his charge; ‘It is 
regrettable that Nishida never fully recaptured some of the clarity and simplicity of 
the prose he used in A Study of Good. One of the misfortunes of his trip to the 
dragon's cave was that he came out speaking Dragonese.’190  
One of the many remarkable feats of Dante’s great work, The Divine 
Comedy, was that it was written rather revolutionarily in the regional dialect of 
Tuscany and not in the expected Latin.  Dante is known to have strived for a unified 
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Italian language that could become the new language of literature and to this end 
Beckett remarks: 
 
He did not write in Florentine any more than in Neapolitan. He wrote a 
vulgar that could have been spoken by an ideal Italian who had assimilated 
what was best in all the dialects of his country, but which in fact was 
certainly not spoken nor ever had been. Which disposes of the capital 
objection that might be made against this attractive parallel between Dante 
and Mr Joyce in the question of language, i.e. that at least Dante wrote what 
was being spoken in the streets of his own town, whereas no creature in 
heaven or earth ever spoke the language of Work in Progress.
191
  
 
Indeed, even Borges as an ardent admirer of Joyce felt pressed to admit, or at least 
make some-one admit (the other Borges perhaps, ‘the one things happen to’192) that 
‘we have those two vast and – why not say it? – unreadable novels, Ulysses and 
Finnegans Wake.’193  
Another surprise litigant is Hopkins, whom is now considered the pre-
eminent scholar of Cusanus
194
 yet still levels his own misgivings against this ‘partly 
bizarre Renaissance mind.’ Hopkins summarily introduces some of the issues which 
have plagued the reception of Cusanus’s work; ‘All in all, the writings of Nicholas 
Cusanus display a perturbing impenetrability which has militated against their being 
enthusiastically received by the Anglo-Saxon philosophical community,’195 and also 
else-where he writes, ‘the speculative and highly metaphysical character of 
Nicholas’s writings render them especially difficult to comprehend.’196 So, not only 
the nature of his thoughts but the manner in which he expresses them prove complex 
and far from clear.  
I think at this point it would be safe to surmise there is a direct connection 
between these two “issues,” and not only in the work of Cusanus. This is confirmed 
at least in part by Heisig in his summation of the criticism Nishida’s stylistic 
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idiosyncrasies have borne the brunt of, ‘I conclude that simply to chide him for not 
having written simpler prose is to ask him to be a different kind of thinker. The 
discontinuities in his style reflect the creativity of his way of thinking and of his 
adventure of ideas as a whole, and must be accepted.’197  
No idea is static. It changes in response to perception, to how it is received by 
the mirror reflecting it. Much like the idea of transmission given by Kasulis in his 
approach to translating and reading Dōgen, and just as Benjamin contends no 
translator can be absent from the translation, the reception or understanding of an 
idea undergoes the same treatment. Even in one’s own language translation is 
required for challenging ideas that are expressed necessarily in a new language, one 
befitting most probably of the newness of the idea. This was the dilemma facing the 
critic Kobayashi in understanding, or rather, not understanding Nishida’s bizarre new 
language of “Dragonese.” 
There is another element at play in the elusive mysteries of creation, 
something to do with unity and contradictions. There seems to be a design of 
melding, straddling, forging and bridging underlying the recondite perplexities of 
transmission. In Nishida’s case it is clear, since he stated so himself, he was forging 
specific paths or bridges between the philosophical traditions of east and west. To 
keep up with the lead, Heisig recommends swinging a leg over either side of the 
fence, ‘his literary style reflected his attempt to cast bridges between worlds that had 
been walled off from one another. To read him is to be obliged to the same 
straddling that defies simple affiliation with either of those worlds.’198  
Simone Weil expresses the same thing but by suggesting discretion in the 
language one chooses, depending on which side of the fence one treads, ‘it is simply 
that the language of the market place is not that of the nuptial chamber.’199 Finally, 
in the work of Heraclitus, the bridging between waking and sleeping worlds, the 
forging of meetings between beginnings and ends, the melding of extremes are all 
supported by the structure of the prose alone. Then upon this structural support, his 
bridge of scaffold, there is the logos and the layers of meaning all bound together as 
one indivisible system:  
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his style is a manifestation of his conception of the world. He views nature as 
part of a “logos-textured world” in which our experiences are laden with 
meaning. But the layers of meaning are hidden. Our encounters with 
Heraclitus’ text are much like our encounters with the world: the superficial 
meaning conceals a deeper structure and reality.
200
  
 
.  The concrete and everyday reality: lived experience 
  
The deeper structure of reality cannot be immediately perceived and it may 
never be encountered in the dense layers of outer meaning. Like an impenetrable 
marzipan sarcophagus encasing the fruity innards, the cake of our desire remains 
aloof, like the ‘fruitless waiting’201 Adorno designates as authentic metaphysical 
experience. However, it may be experienced in the most humble of tea drinking 
moments once the idea of fruity cake has been put aside. 
  
Drinking tea, eating rice,  
I pass my time as it comes;  
Looking down at the stream, looking up at the mountains,  
How serene and relaxed I feel indeed!
202
  
 
The poem quoted above is a response to what Nansen meant by ‘everyday 
thought.’203 Suzuki explains the poem as the experience of one full of Zen, whose 
life tone has been altered by the over brimming cup of satori. From this ‘perfectly 
normal state of mind,’ which is that of satori ‘The drinking at the moment to him 
means the whole fact, the whole world.’204 The whole world squeezed into a sip of 
fragrant tea, like a ‘moon in a dew drop.’205 Though it is not the tea that contains the 
whole world, but the sip. Not the thing, but the fact.  
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1.1   The world is the totality of facts, not of things. 
1.11   The world is determined by the facts, and by their being all the facts.
206
  
 
There is a vast and sonorous chorus proselytising the everyday, it is not only 
religion or spiritual endeavour that prevails upon the immediacy of our quotidian 
encounters to transmit the effulgence of epiphany. But also the rational mind, the 
scientific and the pragmatic all turn to what is right here immediately and directly in 
front of us in the concrete facts of the mundane. Where would science be today 
without Archimedes’s sudsy ritual of bath-time?  
Descartes also arrived at his famous dictum through the reflective 
observations of his immediate and particular circumstances. With recourse only to 
his present surroundings he illustrates the first phase of his Method, the active 
principle of doubt working towards clarity. In a fabulously genteel vignette which 
entails the description of himself seated by a fire in his dressing-gown, having finally 
obtained for himself ‘assured leisure in peaceful solitude’207 Descartes proceeds to 
unfold what is possibly the most renowned philosophical meditations and all by the 
simple means of his setting. Another reclining pontificator is struck by the bright 
light of true reality as he observes his idyllic surrounds, 
 
Gustav Fechner said that one morning, while relaxing in a chair in the 
Rosenthal in Leipzig, he gazed in the bright sunlight at a spring meadow with 
fragrant flowers, singing birds, and flitting butterflies and became engrossed 
in what he called the perspective of the daytime, in which truth is things just 
as they are, as opposed to the colourless and soundless perspective of night 
found in the natural sciences.
208
  
 
Looking into ‘reality at its most essential level,’ Adorno attempts to rescue 
metaphysics from the demonization of theology and re-instate a principle of absolute 
into the individual experience of life in an immanent sense. He arrives unequivocally 
at the decision that to do so with the hope of anything genuine coming out of it ‘we 
have no option but to measure by our concrete experience.’209   
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Significantly challenging the dominant trend in Heraclitean scholarship of promoting 
the abstract over the concrete, Benitez proposes an entirely new premise for the 
import of the Heraclitean fragments. He puts forward the idea that what Heraclitus is 
doing, more than anything else, is providing a form of skilful training by which to 
navigate not only the meaning of the fragments but the myriad ambiguities of life, a 
form of ‘dynamic wisdom.’ The value of this wisdom is of equal benefit for the 
titivations of the intellect as the quotidian rhythms of practical daily life. Benitez 
selects three fragments to demonstrate his proposition, all of which house a little dust 
or dung from the daily grind: Fr. D. 9 Asses prefer garbage to gold, Fr. D. 124 The 
fairest order in the world is a heap of random sweepings, and Fr. D. 87 A fool loves 
to get excited on any account.
210
 The emphasis of Benitez’s analysis is on a reading 
that does not eliminate the abstract nor give primacy to the concrete. Nor is it 
insistent on arriving at some doctrinal cosmology that can in turn give meaning and 
provide solutions to the fragments themselves, not to mention life, the universe, and 
everything.  By using objects and activities that do not immediately manifest 
qualities of great importance, like “garbage” and “sweepings,” one is naturally 
directed to presume there are hidden layers of meaning, but like the patriarchs 
‘behaviour of drinking tea and eating meals’211 that is so significant in Zen 
Buddhism, this does not mean we are to randomly sweep aside the activity as 
insignificant. No, the activity itself contains all there is, it is not inconsequential, it is 
vital. Yet great importance cannot be placed on it otherwise it would lose its vitality. 
There-in lies the rub.  
 
Put somewhat differently: after Hegel too much was asked of art, but now 
almost nothing is asked of it; and nothing is asked just because too much was 
asked of it. For the asking was improper. Art was treated as a god, but it is 
not a god, and when treated as such, it is an idol.
212
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In Nishida’s basho of ‘true nothing,’ both being and nothing are enveloped in 
a ‘peri-logical’ lived experience; ‘The oppositional relationship between form and 
matter is established in [this] basho of lived experience.’213 The structuring system 
of basho that Nishida develops is not able to be explained by means of any ‘so-called 
logical form’ but rather it is meant to explain logical form, and ultimately this logical 
form comes down to ‘true lived experience’ that subsumes knowledge; ‘True lived 
experience entails the standpoint of complete nothingness, a free standpoint separate 
from knowledge.’214 That is, at the base of any real experience there lies nothing, 
complete nothingness. Liberation from being paradoxically allows the “true lived 
experience” to exist. Freed from objectification lived experience enters into its 
essence. According to Heisig, Nishida was convinced of the meeting ground where 
eastern and western philosophies fused and that ‘the real way to get to it was through 
a relentless pursuit of the “depths of ordinary, everyday life”.’215  
Throughout his magnum opus, Religion and Nothingness, Nishitani 
demonstrates with unyielding persistence that the everyday world is precisely where 
– without it being a place or thing – the field of emptiness can be found, or rather, 
experienced. He strives to combat any possible misunderstanding brought about 
chiefly by the perspective of ‘objective transcendence’ that might keep us removed 
from this very real experience. To this end we are directed to the work of Meister 
Eckhart as a relative form of what he means and which he believes ‘takes its stand on 
the immediacy of everyday life.’216 Indeed there are some distinct correlations 
between the Godhead of Eckhart and the Absolute Nothingness of Nishitani. Both 
have a profound awareness of the ‘subjectivity of egoity’ and both exact a ‘high 
praise for the practical activities of everyday life.’217 
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In the philosophy of Zen the state of transcendent illumination (satori) is 
inherent in all beings although it may not have yet blossomed, but lies dormant like a 
seed eternally poised awaiting favourable conditions. The climate of enlightenment 
is not some remote and idealised island of sunshine and coconuts but lies in a very 
grounded and intimate connection with the everyday. This is why Dōgen sites our 
daily meals as carriers of great and profound suchness. He also means to indicate the 
passage, the way to attainment. It is through the passage of daily ritual and 
commonplace activity that the diurturnal reward of lucid knowing is gleaned.   
The true nature of things or the Dharma-nature (Hōsshō) is present in 
everything in the same way. It is the essence of all things, the essence of the 
universe. Each thing has its own suchness or hōsshō as an innate intelligence, an 
untutored ‘or natural wisdom.’ Hōsshō could start to sound like another transcendent 
principle or originative substance that can never be fathomed or reached. It is that, 
but it is also very real. Dharma-nature does not do away with the appearance of 
things and look through the illusion to a greater reality, the greater reality is in all 
things and activities as their Dharma-nature. In the fascicle Hōsshō, Dōgen quotes 
from Zen Master Baso Daijaku who says; ‘Dharma-nature: putting on clothes and 
eating meals, speaking and conversing, the working of the six sense organs, and all 
actions, are totally the Dharma-nature.’218 In an alternate translation of the Hōsshō 
fascicle by Thomas Cleary, the nature of things is expressed quite simply as ‘eating 
breakfast, eating lunch, having a snack.’219  
 
.  A ship of fools: mythmaking 
 
In what he suspects might be ‘a foolish, an insensate flight’ into the more 
vulnerable interstices of perception, where ‘cognition holds it breath’ Steiner makes 
a ‘step embarrassing beyond words.’220 He gives this passage of embarrassment the 
‘almost technical’ name of transcendence.  To attempt this embarrassed passage 
beyond words, where we must leap like fools off the ladder, off the 100 foot pole and 
into the twilight glow of unknowing, he follows the guiding prow of Dante; ‘Dante is 
                                                 
218
 Dōgen, Shōbōgenzō: The True Dharma-Eye Treasury, 172. 
219
 Dōgen, Shōbōgenzō: Zen essays by Dōgen, trans. Thomas Cleary (U.S.A: University of Hawaii 
Press, 1986), 38. 
220
 Steiner, Real Presences, 200. 
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of help when he tells of “turning the bow (la poppa) towards morning.”’ 221 And 
within this wonderful gesture turns the serendipitous “step embarrassing beyond 
words” and we are off on our folle volo, with our bow astern.       
Mythology is seated deep in the foundations of our most basic and core 
understandings of life. Within the malleable form of myths is the chaotic image of 
the universe in its most spectacular guises. Further even than that, as Schelling 
would have us believe, mythology is the universe represented ‘in its absolute form,’ 
and done so with a poetic form that at once expresses the universal through the 
particular and is the universal it particularises.
222
  In an unexpected twist Beckett 
imbues myth with the sort of objective status that has seen the demise of these 
magnificent allegorical transmissions: 
 
Moreover, if we consider the myth as being essentially allegorical, we are not 
obliged to accept the form in which it is cast as a statement of fact. But we 
know that the actual creators of these myths gave full credence to their face 
value…It was precisely their superficial metaphorical character that made 
them intelligible to people incapable of receiving anything more abstract than 
the plain record of objectivity.
223
  
 
As if the more ridiculous something is the more readily we can accept it for 
we are not obliged to believe it, yet, it does get in. Sneaks on stage from the wings 
and juggles with our heads. The “superficial metaphorical character” of myth masks, 
with the illusion of reality, the real reality of its illusion. The conversion of 
superficiality into substance by the farcical fact of reality is another instance of 
Nishitani’s “through and through real” mask, not of persona this time, but of 
myth.
224
   The dialectic revelation of myth is a bidirectional process between the 
Divine as creator and created. The classical myths were not so much stories as states 
of this dialectic revelation. They were living entities undergoing constant renewal. 
According to Wiles the classical myths of ancient Greece ‘were endlessly 
                                                 
221
 Steiner, Real Presences, 200. Note: “la poppa” is the stern of the boat not the bow, and the phrase 
in question occurs in Canto XXVI of the Inferno ‘having turned our stern toward morning.’  
222
 F.W.J. Schelling, The Philosophy of Art, trans. and ed. Douglas W. Stott (Minneapolis: University 
of Minnesota Press, 1989), 33-82. 
223
 Beckett, Disjecta, 26.  
224
 See chapter I, 4. Prosōpon and Real Appearances. 
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malleable,’225 and constantly renewed through a rich variety of poetic recitation, 
image, song and dance. The originally performative nature of myths made them a 
living and transformative state that had immediate and concrete effect. Far from 
being merely explanatory historical records of genesis and conception they kept the 
motions of creation creating whilst being created.  
The “plain record of objectivity” may clarify and confirm, but it also refines 
nearly “out of existence” those subtle but vital unspeakables that are represented 
through myth. The natural sciences that replaced the mythological conception of the 
world were not actually addressing the same questions, and they certainly couldn’t 
answer them. As Eagleton comments on the explanations of life provided by 
Christianity suddenly being made redundant by the telescope and microscope; ‘It is 
rather like saying that thanks to the electric toaster we can forget about Chekhov.’226 
Likewise the scientific descriptions of the world do not answer the questions posed 
in mythology – they are of an entirely different standing, one cannot resolve the 
other. 
The wiping out of myth is not possible, we just form new ones that are prone 
to be taken more seriously according to the climate of the times, the ‘paper 
Leviathan’227 too heavy to resist. If the arc of metaphor can bridge worlds and be the 
messenger between gods and (wo)man may the ark continue in its insensate flight 
and fool the sensible and free the foolish. 
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 David Wiles, Greek Theatre Performance; An Introduction (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2000), 5 and 19. 
226
 Terry Eagleton, The Meaning of Life: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2007), 7. 
227
 Steiner, Real Presences, 48. 
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Second Stasimon 
 
Enter Chorus. Advancing due east, chorus members turn their busts as far as 
possible towards the north and at the same time fling out the right leg as far as 
possible towards the south, and then turn the bust as far as possible towards the 
south and at the same time fling out the left leg as far as possible towards the north, 
and then again turn the bust as far as possible towards the north and fling out the 
right leg as far as possible towards the south, and then again turn the bust as far as 
possible towards the south and fling out the left leg as far as possible towards the 
north, and so on, over and over again, many many times, until reaching the 
destination, at which point chorus members can sit down. The arms dangle 
throughout in perfect eqipendency.
1
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1
 Pedestrian tango after Beckett. Samuel Beckett, Watt (London: John Calder (Publishers) Limited, 
1970), 5. 
  
170 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
171 
 
 
 
 
Third Episode 
 
 
In a State of Unknowing 
Being Ruin Time 
 
 
 
  
Third Episode 
172 
 
 
 
 
III 
In a State of Unknowing 
Being Ruin Time 
 
 
Prima facie, ruins are inert, inanimate sites of large stones in various stages of 
decrepitude or restoration. There are usually small stones too. Very much like 
abandoned grave yards, full of inaudible history, monumentalized broken life and 
sentimental visitors. The comparison is not an idle one, for apart from the surface 
similarities, of which there are many, there lays beneath the toppled pediments and 
fallen angels a most potent symbol of the mysterious regenerative forces of life and 
death which in mutual negation and affirmation form a rich source of fuel indeed for 
a cosmic fire.
1
 Cenotaphs to the unremitting presence of death in life, a presence of 
absence that is encountered as an affirmative negation and which completes the true 
image of life, as ‘true life must include death. Death is essential to life.’ 2   
Inspired by Florence Hetzler’s notion of ‘ruin time’ as a unifying process that views 
the ruin as a state of being, the ruin is conceived of not as a monument to our remote 
past and harbinger of an inevitable future, but as a nexus of continuous activity that 
makes perceptible a paradoxical co-existence of presence and absence and unifies 
time in an absolute present. Through the lens of Nishida Kitarō’s logic of basho 
(place or locus) and Dōgen Kigen’s concept of uji (being-time) ruins are re-
navigated adrift from their historical and archaeological berthing’s and take on a 
new metaphysical significance as a locus of demonstrative becoming.  
                                                 
1
 On the belief that Heraclitus asserts fire as an elemental principle I would agree with Kahn in that 
Heraclitus means it as a symbol rather than an actual originative substance. This seems to suit the 
subtleties and metaphors of his thinking far more and would avoid making the mistake of disregarding 
his own instructions on how to read him, ‘treating the mode of expression as irrelevant to the 
meaning’ a grave mistake indeed, one that Beckett would add a tenebrous peal of admonishment to.  
2
 Kitarō Nishida, ‘Logic and Life’ in Place and Dialectic: Two Essays by Nishida Kitarō, trans. with 
annotations John W.M. Krummel and Shigenori Nagatomo (Oxford Scholarship Online: Oxford 
University Press, 2012), 7.  
Third Episode 
173 
 
Though the philosophies of Nishida and Dōgen are grounded in the 
characteristically eastern precepts and practice of Zen they both in many respects 
share a particular resonance with Heraclitus of ancient Greece, one of those great 
thinkers who like Dōgen is renowned for his supposed obscurity. His work survives 
in fragments, many of which are recorded through secondary sources and whose 
true meaning and authorship is under continuous doxographic scrutiny. Perhaps one 
of the better known fragments would be ‘As they step into the same rivers, other and 
still other waters flow upon them.’3 The dynamic and unifying forces of continuous 
flux conjured by this metaphor in association with the principles of co-origination 
and the simultaneous arousal of being and time that we find in Nishida and Dōgen 
respectively form the basis and directional enquiry of ruins that is here proposed.  
As much as a determined form as an indeterminate formlessness, the ruin seems to 
transcend itself whilst becoming more itself and through this continuous visible 
becoming invites its visitors to do the same. The ruin is conditioned by an obvious 
impermanence that is paradoxically a permanent impermanence. To borrow the 
idioms of Nishitani and Dōgen, it is an infinite finitude laid bare in being-time. 
This is not about the ruin, but through the ruin. As a physical site it is essentially a 
spatial construct, as a historical site it enfolds time within its construction and 
deconstruction, as an instrument of transmission it transcends itself as a physical 
site and enters into a co-creative expression of  ‘a momentary self-determination of 
the absolute present.’4 It is not a site of ‘merely quantitative forces’5 extended 
spatially, it possesses the vitality of continuity, what Leibniz posits as a requirement 
of a truly active being.
6
 
The written form of this episode attempts to invoke an imaginary movement through 
a site of ruins. The particular site is not specified, for the flâneur of the imaginary 
who is identified as the perambulatory peruser of the ruin, should not be inhibited by 
such moderations. However, the truly august, evocative and numinous ruin of 
Ephesus is suggestively featured not only on account of its stated qualities but 
                                                 
3
 Charles H. Kahn, The Art and Thought of Heraclitus: An edition of the fragments with translation 
and commentary (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 53, Fr. D. 12. 
4
 Kitarō Nishida, Last Writings-Nothingness and the Religious World View, trans. David A. Dilworth 
(Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1987), 96.  
5
 Ibid., 50. 
6
 Leibniz is referring specifically to a biological being over and above a merely physical being, and 
whilst an archaeological site of ruins is not normally conceded as either, I am however, suggesting it 
is both. Liebniz’s theory of individual monads has tentative associations with the seriatim passage of 
being-time.  
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because its fragmentary remains coincide with those of Heraclitus, a most 
outstanding citizen of the historic city and whose place in this thesis is of no small 
influence.  
In the following account ruins are apprehended beyond their phenomenal rendering 
that considers them primarily as grand scale artefacts of human-kinds prodigious 
trail through the eons and encounters them on the noumenal plane. Here in the 
clouded stratosphere of unknowing ruins are no longer inert and inanimate sites but 
are activities of resonant being. By means of Hetzler’s mode of ruin-time in which 
the active and vital principle of nature applies its spontaneous palette, the ruin is 
converted from a has-been into an is-being. The irreversibility of time is transformed 
as the site becomes one of end to endless beginnings.  
Nishitani sees the ‘incessant becoming’ of our own existence as an outcome of the 
causal nexus of being and time. Caught in this nexus we are condemned to constant 
activity which is the form of being-in-time that becomes ‘our nature as time-being 
(or being-time).’7 From site to insight the ruin is the living similitude of our 
positioning in this causal nexus of time and being. Its ponderous flow of non-
resistant self-determining expression is in absolute harmony with the natural flow of 
creation.  
 
Fragment I 
Resonance 
 
Tacit keepers of a vestigial and mysterious resonance of unknown origin, 
ruins shelter a guarded covenant between the is and is not (soku-hi). The fragmentary 
remains once colossal and now irrevocably collapsed, scattered amongst tenacious 
weeds and perhaps an enduring tree, normally solitary, are charged with a presence 
that confounds the expected passage of time. The resonance of ruins solicits a mode 
of enquiry that steps outside the demarcated excavations of archaeological discovery.  
The quiescent resonance of a ruin as ‘an immediately perceived presence,’8 may 
superficially be construed as the lingering vestiges or spectral remains of a past now 
                                                 
7
 Keiji Nishitani, Religion and Nothingness, trans. Jan Van Bragt (Berkeley and Los Angeles: 
University of California Press, 1982), 220-1. 
8
 Georg Simmel, Essays on Sociology, Philosophy and Aesthetics, ed. Kurt H. Wolff (New York; 
Harper Torchbooks, 1959), 265. 
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vagrantly occupying the groutless cobbled ‘ground of the present,’9 but in fact, the 
inaudible reverberant tintinnabulation of this resonant appeal, is the silent air of a 
gateway bell. A threshold, a momentary crossroads of infinite contradiction, the 
causal nexus of space and time, a paradox of affirmation through negation, the 
eternal now of being-time, the numinous and mysterious moment that opens up in 
the bottomless depths of nihility as a true absolute nothingness that is the wellspring 
of all things and being. An illuminated niche, a propylaeum to the ultimate basho, 
the field of śūnyatā, the gaping yawn of χάος, a hiatus of interminable duration in the 
blink of an eye, the ‘infinite openness of nihility at the ground of the present.’10 Yes, 
all this amidst the alluvium and Corinthians.  
Nishida names a ‘pure quality as the root of reality’11 that is the only thing 
truly immediate to us. Notwithstanding the various misunderstandings that such a 
phrase as “pure quality” beckons he contextualises it within the greater structure of 
his basho as that which signifies something deeper than an act, thing or substance. 
Something that ‘entails a tranquil and…the most immediate existence.’ 12 This pure 
quality can be understood in the locus of ruined time, in ruin time, as the resonance 
of ruins – a tranquil immediate nothingness that is not a thing or substance.  
Within another ‘tranquil mood,’13 swelling like a gentle tide, there rises the 
numinous of Otto, and within the resonance of ruins something of this subtle 
swelling presides. The thrill, awe majesty and even the element of tremulous 
awefulness that he inscribes in the mysterium tremendum of the numinous have their 
presence in the ruin. With the full contrast of experiences that make up the 
mysterium tremendum intact, an ‘absolute overpoweringness,’14 awakens in the 
perambulatory peruser of the ruin. Witness to the vacant forces of time as it stands 
crumbling against its own exertions the contemplative visitor may well feel an 
overwhelming awe akin to what Otto describes as an experience of the numinous: an 
awakening to something outside of oneself, a sensation that rises up and overwhelms 
                                                 
9
 Nishitani, Religion and Nothingness, 230. 
10
 Ibid., 239. 
11
 Kitarō Nishida, ‘Basho’ in Place and Dialectic: Two Essays by Nishida Kitarō, trans. with 
annotations by John W.M. Krummel and Shigenori Nagatomo (Oxford Scholarship Online: Oxford 
University Press, 2012), 28. 
12
 Ibid., 30. 
13
 Rudolf Otto, The Idea of the Holy: An Inquiry into the non-rational factor in the idea of the divine 
and its relation to the rational, trans. John W. Harvey (London: Oxford University Press, 1981), 12. 
14
Ibid., 19. 
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with a discombobulating apprehension. The majestic proportions of history now 
transformed into vacant spaces of a disquieting and intangible fullness.   
 
Fragment II  
Similitude 
 
Ruins are a living metaphor in the sense that al-Ghazālī uses metaphors as 
literal embodiments of the given similitude, not merely symbolic of, but ‘as if.’ The 
principle of “as if” is the major point of difference between Ṣūfī writings and 
traditional Islamic philosophy which holds that there is nothing of God that can be 
seen in this world since God is beyond this world and primarily accessible through 
the rational faculties. The imaginal dimension that is permitted full bloom by both 
Ibn al-‘Arabī and al-Ghazālī is the key translator of the “as if” principle. Ibn al-
‘Arabī writes ‘Had the Lawgiver not known that you have a reality known as 
“imagination” which possess this property, he would not have said to you “as if you 
see Him” with your eyes. Rational demonstration prevents the “as if,” since it 
declares through its proofs that similarity is impossible. As for sight, it perceives 
nothing but a wall.’15 Not very helpful.   
In direct contrast is Dōgen’s Buddha-nature, which having an entirely non-
substantial nature cannot be represented by anything, neither symbolically nor in 
similitude, but instead is that thing, it is the ‘whatness’ of each and every thing.16 Yet 
even with these radical differences I contend that both perspectives are represented 
aesthetically and metaphysically in the ruin.  
In his explication of the niche, glass, lamp, olive and tree, al-Ghazālī presents 
a world view in which matters no less than ‘the structure of the cosmos and the 
human soul’ are at issue. 17  In much the same way Nishida’s logic of basho 
encapsulates a way or view of placing the self-determining consciousness in full 
dynamic bi-directional relation with the world and ‘it is in this transpositional form 
that our worlds of consciousness construct the world’s order and continuity.’18   
                                                 
15
 William C. Chittick, Ibn al-‘Arabī’s Metaphysics of Imagination: The Ṣūfī Path of Knowledge 
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 122. 
16
 Masao Abe, Zen and Western Thought, ed. William R. LaFleur (Honolulu: University of Hawaii 
Press, 1985), 39. 
17
 Chittick, Ibn al-‘Arabī’s Metaphysics of Imagination, xiii.  
18
 Nishida, Last Writings, 52. 
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Appropriating the model versed by al-Ghazālī in his ontological and epistemological 
explanation of the Qurᵓān’s Light Verse in The Niche of Lights (Mishkāt al-anwār) 
ruins are introduced here as the similitude of our own movement through being and 
time as self-determining individual expressions and as ‘monads of eternity’19 that 
embody the life-sive-death and death-sive-life structure of real existence.  
The understanding of the individual as a self-determining yet co-originating 
mutual expression is derived from Nishida’s final development of his logic of basho 
and the religious self-consciousness. Attendant and simultaneous to the individuals 
self-determining expression is the dynamic transactional formation of the world. 
Using Leibniz’s terminology of “monads” to substantiate and contextualise his own 
formulations of the consciously active individual, and the structure of the human-
historical world as a self-contradictory identity Nishida is able to simplify his intent 
in the following; ‘each monad expresses the world and simultaneously is an 
originating point of the world’s own expression.’20 This is then qualified and restated 
in his particular lexis of contradictory identities, ‘As such the act is a bottomlessly 
self-contradictory identity: it reflects the world in itself, and reflects itself in the 
world (the absolute other). Thus the act lives to die and dies to live. Each moment of 
time both arises and perishes in eternity.’21 The “act” as he calls it is the existential 
self and the same contradictory identity of this self is also displayed in the 
contradictory forces that are at work in the ruin. The combined life (of nature) and 
death (of structure) of the ruin perform the “life-sive-death” and “death-sive-life” 
mode of being that Nishitani presents as a kind of ‘double exposure.’22  
This same mode of being in turn can be thought of as a similitude of the 
creative act as it both negates and expresses the absolute. It negates it by expressing 
it, but in the only way possible which is in a finite dimension that can never express 
the true absolute. Each act, and this act could be the existential self of Nishida but 
also the creative gesture of making and the creative act of being, is ‘like the various 
tomographic plates of a single subject.’23 Each has its own reality no less true than 
any another but only by being superimposed together does any picture of true reality 
emerge.   
                                                 
19
 Nishitani, Religion and Nothingness, 266. 
20
 Nishida, Last Writings, 53.  
21
 Ibid., 19 and 53.  
22
 Nishitani, Religion and Nothingness, 93 and 52. 
23
 Ibid., 52. 
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Fragment III 
A movement through: the flâneur 
 
But grits upon the earth, crumbs of a great feast, ruins are remarkable not so 
much for their sufferance of the savages of time, their consumption and obliteration, 
but rather for their extraordinary endurance, their digestive and transformative 
abilities in the face of such an insatiable appetite. A once monumental buttress now 
provides a make-shift and humble seat; in its time an impenetrable and fortifying 
wall now creates a lace work of framing to view the surrounding landscape. 
Wandering with the delicate shuffle of reverence normally observed in houses of 
God, national galleries and cemeteries, the perambulatory peruser of ruins is the 
flâneur extraordinaire.  
As if a nonchalant scrape could portend the final fall of the fading Empire 
that we now suddenly have access to, or in a moment of unconscious obliviousness, 
stumbling over a reclining head we give a small kick to the left nostril of Artemis, or, 
in mounting the closest rock to survey the view one finds oneself ingenuously 
crowning the ravaged remains of a noble statesman, the flâneur of the imaginary – 
our perambulatory peruser of ruins -  moves with a tentative languor through the 
crowds of history, incognito under the guise of untraceable years. Ruins are the Holy 
Sepulchre of the devout historian, but it is not just history that imbues the remains 
that remain with a resonant presence, ungraspable but palpable, it is something else 
altogether. It is the Isness. Which is pretty much everything.  
Is not a site of ruins the ultimate home for the ‘perfect flâneur’?  Perhaps the 
only true flâneur is a flâneur of the imaginary, not Baudelaire after all.  
 
The crowd is his element, as the air is that of birds and water of fishes. His 
passion and his profession are to become one flesh with the crowd. For the 
perfect flâneur, for the passionate spectator, it is an immense joy to set up 
house in the heart of the multitude, amid the ebb and flow of movement, in 
the midst of the fugitive and the infinite. To be away from home and yet to 
feel oneself everywhere at home; to see the world, to be at the centre of the 
world, and yet to remain hidden from the world - impartial natures which the 
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tongue can but clumsily define. The spectator is a prince who everywhere 
rejoices in his incognito.
24
 
 
What Nishida’s basho proffers up to the flâneur of the imaginary is an all-
enveloping visionary domain. An entirely mirrored and infinite arcade: endlessly 
circumnavigating and reflecting the world, generating the world as it goes.   
 
Fragment IV 
The temple of Artemis: a goddess of contradictions 
 
It is said Heraclitus dedicated and deposited his book in the splendidious and 
grandiose temple of the Ephesian Artemis.
25
 This may be because there was no 
library in the city at that time or because it was simply traditional to place gifts and 
treasures of value in temples for safe keeping. Perhaps it was as a sign of his 
devotion to Apollo’s twin, or again perhaps, as Diogenes surmises, because he was 
an arrogant snobby elitist who didn’t want the hoi polloi getting their hands on 
things that were clearly beyond their capacity to comprehend. Diogenes further 
implies that the whole enterprise of Heraclitus was made purposefully obscure so 
that only those with ‘rank and influence’ could access it.26  His supposed obscurity 
has another dimension to it and that is in connection with the Delphic oracle, the 
voice of the ‘lord’ or Apollo.27 
Even though Apollo has come to be associated almost exclusively with light 
and clarity (in contradistinction to his Dionysian counterpart) he in fact draws his 
remarkable powers from most intimate affiliations with what might be considered 
the ‘dark side.’ In the Milesian colony Istria on the Black Sea, Peter Kingsley tells us 
he was known as ‘Phôleutêrios, the god of lairs and incubation.’28 Kingsley also 
traces the mythic and historic connections of Apollo with the underworld and a 
                                                 
24
 Charles Baudelaire, The Painter of Modern Life (New York: Da Capo Press, 1964).??? 
25
  One of the seven wonders of the ancient world that, as legend has it, put the other wonders quite in 
the shade. ‘The Artemesium must have been incomparably the most opulent Greek temples of its 
time’ A.W. Lawrence, Greek Architecture (Pelican History of Art, 1957), 136. 
26
 Kirk agrees and perpetuates the myth, ‘his pronouncements were undeniably often cryptic, probably 
intentionally so,’ G.S. Kirk and J.E. Raven, The Presocratic Philosophers: A Critical History with a 
Selection of Texts (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971), 186. As opposed to Kahn who 
reads the integrity between the style of prose and the content there-in ‘his tantalizing and suggestive 
form of enigmatic utterance,’ Kahn, The Art and Thought of Heraclitus, preface. 
27
 Fr. D. 93 The lord whose oracle is in Delphi neither declares nor conceals, but gives a sign. 
28
 Peter Kingsley, In the Dark Places of Wisdom (California: Golden Ṣūfī Center, 2010),169. 
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particular connexion with serpents that leads Kingsley to some extraordinary and 
contentious insights into hither-to-ignored mystical and shamanistic traditions in the 
pre-Socratics.
29
  
Through a gradual assimilation of the regional deities the Ephesian Artemis 
became a peculiar combination of opposing forces. Those of fertility, abundance and 
child birth on the one hand, whilst also being a symbol for virginity, and on the other 
being renowned for her unsurpassable skills as a death dealing hunter; in other words 
life and death.
30
 This combination of antithetical ideas is entirely consistent with the 
unification of light and darkness in the form of her twin Apollo. In Borderlands of 
Psyche and Logos in Heraclitus: A Psychoanalytic Reading, Jessica Ann Mayock 
describes Artemis as ‘a goddess of contradictions’ who as a bridging figure between 
opposing forces and places, at once separates and binds. Mayock also points out the 
connection of Artemis with the transition that marks the passage between 
adolescence and maturity.
31
  
Transitions and metamorphoses are where the tensions of opposites become 
co-creative and harmonious. Crucial to Heraclitean thought is the very same balance 
of harmonious tension between opposites. This is most explicitly expressed in Fr. D. 
51 ‘They do not comprehend how a thing agrees at variance with itself; it is an 
attunement turning back on itself, like that of the bow and the lyre.’32 Both the bow 
and lyre are symbolic attributes of Apollo, the lyre being his chosen instrument, (as 
with Zarathustra) and Artemis as the legendary huntress is also unsurprisingly often 
represented with bow and arrows in hand.
33
   
A telling connexion it is then between the symbolic elements of birth and 
death, a seemingly contradictory union,  that are representative of Artemis and the 
harmonious tension and everliving flow that merges life with death in the mutual 
                                                 
29
 See Kingsley, In the Dark Places of Wisdom and Peter Kingsley, A Story Waiting to Pierce You: 
Mongolia, Tibet and the Destiny of the Western World (California: Golden Ṣūfī Center, 2011).  
30
 She has connections with the Anatolian mother goddess Cybele which meant the emphasis was 
moved from the virginal to the fertile and explains the many breasted Ephesian statue of Artemis.  
31
 Jessica Ann Mayock, Borderlands of Psyche and Logos in Heraclitus: A Psychoanalytic Reading 
(Ann Arbor: ProQuest, 2009), 14. Mayock references Jean-Pierre Vernant, ‘The figure and Function 
of Artemis in Myth and Cult,’ in Mortals and Immortals: Collected Essays, ed. Froma I. Zeitlin, 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991, 198; where he writes ‘where the wild and the cultivated 
exist side by side – in opposition, of course, but where they may also interpenetrate one another.’  
32
 Kahn, The Art and Thought of Heraclitus, 65. 
33
 See also Fr. D. 48 The name of the bow is life; its work is death. This is a word play on the Greek 
for life and bow which are both bios but one carries an accent over the ‘o’. This fragment possibly 
illustrates even more clearly the co-originating contradictory identity of self-determination that 
Nishida is demonstrating through his logic of basho. 
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point of beginning and end (Fr. D. 103 The beginning and the end are shared in the 
circumference of a circle
34
) that has come to characterise what we know of the 
philosophy of Heraclitus.   
 
Fragment V 
The absolute 
 
Nishida determines the absolute as a contradictory identity that possesses its 
own absolute self-negation. He maintains the true absolute must be opposed to 
nothing. Therein because nothing stands opposed to it, the absolute must express 
itself by negating itself. This is the paradoxical structure of life itself. As Nishida 
contends, ‘every living being must die’ and in death every living being, or relative 
being, must face an absolute. In fact the facing of this absolute undoes the relative 
being, ‘when a relative being faces the true absolute it cannot exist.’ Nishida quotes 
the passage from Isaiah 6, 5 when Isaiah faces and sees God, saying, ‘Woe to me! 
For I am undone.’ Isaiah’s undoing is his confrontation with the absolute, or in this 
particular encounter, ‘the King, the Lord of hosts.’35 His relative being cannot 
withstand the resplendent fulgour of such apotheosis. 
Nishida is careful to distinguish between the death that is an encounter with 
the divine through dying and the objective death of the self that in dying can no 
longer relate to anything, let alone bask in the gloriousness of non-relative being. 
The death he wishes to speak of he says lies outside the framework of objective 
discourse. The death that ‘involves a relative being facing an absolute’ is a 
paradoxical form of encounter where-in the absolute is expressed through its own 
negation. This form of death displays the same cosmological dimension as 
Nietzsche’s eternal recurrence as it becomes a participatory dynamic in the world-
time continuum. In the confrontation with the absolute that signifies the death of the 
relative lies the very life-force and essence of the absolute. As there is nothing that 
can oppose the absolute, it must possess its own self-negation, and this paradoxical 
form of self-contradiction of the absolute means that it is not simply non-relative. If 
the relative did stand in confrontation with the absolute then the absolute would be 
non-relative, but it also would cease to be absolute, it must contain the relative 
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within it, hence its own self negation and hence ‘the true absolute exists in that it 
returns to itself in the form of the relative.’36  
Even though the absolute does of course transcend the relative, without the 
relative being at the same time immanent in the absolute there would be nothing. 
Without it, life, creation, the gesture of God, the creative act, would fall utterly back 
into silence without ever having made a sound. Without the relative, without ‘this 
little,’ the absolute would lose all contact with the ‘quintessence of its own 
emptiness.’37  
As a form that contains its own self-negation and in which nothing stands 
opposed to it the absolute must be absolutely nothing. The self-negating act of self-
expression realised in the absolute nothingness of Nishida curbs the extremism of 
absolutism that would render it a form of pathological delusion, as Nietzsche decries 
‘everything absolute comes under pathology.’38 The absolute in Nishida’s terms 
comprehends all the contradictions and dis-equilibriums of our convoluted world and 
expresses them simultaneously through presence and absence, ‘The world of the 
absolute is the dynamic equilibrium of the many and one, a world constituted in the 
relation of simultaneous presence and absence.’39   
 
Fragment VI 
From the formed to the forming, the created to the creating  
 
Creation is taking place unstoppably at all times. It is not only that things are 
created, but those created things are at the same time creating and that they are 
creating, the act of creating, is what they are. This is meant in the same sense as 
Suzuki’s illuminations on the questions created by the intellect being ‘the intellect 
itself.’40 Somewhat more poetically, and with the imagery of Dōgen’s fascicle Kūge 
(Flowers in Space/the Sky) Suzuki explains, ‘It is not the eye that sees the flower or 
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the stars, nor is it the flower or the stars that are seen. The eye is flower and stars; 
flower and stars are the eye.’41 In Kūge Dōgen inverts the usual understanding of the 
appearance of phenomenon and makes the effect the cause. He says it is not that real 
dharmas (things, phenomenon and also actions) exist because of the real world but 
that the world ‘abides in its place in the universe because of real dharmas.’42     
The interpenetration of illusion and reality, or, the so called objective world and the 
appearance of phenomenon within it, and the interdependency of cause and effect 
adopted by Dōgen are both rendered in the continuous evolution of absence in the 
ruin that determines its presence and form.  
Ruins in the full capacity of an active similitude demonstrate the absolute 
near side where “life-sive-death” and “death-sive-life” are manifest as one and the 
same. The continual processes of renewal and decay that mutually and 
simultaneously create and destroy the ruin, display the fleeting moment of 
Nietzsche’s augenblick, where past and future chance in the ‘indifferent gateway of 
the moment.’43 The intersection of time and being that is present in the ruin gives 
visible form of the relation between existence and Buddha-nature, described as the 
‘mutual identity and mutual penetration’44 of the co-creation of myriad things in the 
vehemently non-dualist philosophy of Dōgen.  
Nishida’s conception of the creative world takes this principle of non-dualism 
and turns it into an active matrix of self-transformation that is always ‘moving from 
the created to the creating.’45 This is the active principle at work in the creation of a 
ruin keeping it constantly alive through its eternal movement “from the created to the 
creating.” At the end of his precursory evaluation of “limit” Zellini celebrates the 
paradoxical revelations of ‘cognitive intuition’ that allow for the ‘possible final 
victory of the potential over the actual, of absence over formal presence.’46 The ruin, 
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not in contradiction to this victory but in full (broken) support, paradoxically gives 
formal presence to absence. 
The incessant becoming of the ruin, whose form from the created to the 
creating and whose endless life is a sequence of endings of beginnings, is, as the 
circle inscribed by Heraclitus’s aphorism “the beginning and the end are shared in 
the circumference of a circle,” not an infinite regress but egress. The pendulums “arc 
of metaphor” traces its eternal path in the ceaseless “swinging back and forth over 
nihility” that Nishitani prescribes as the movement of our incessant becoming and 
which I transcribe into the remains that remain of the ever forming ruin as it passes 
through phases of destruction which herald the resurrection of yet another becoming. 
‘Our existence is an existence at one with nonexistence, swinging back and forth 
over nihility, ceaselessly passing away and ceaselessly regaining its existence. This 
is what is called the “incessant becoming” of existence.’47 Is this ceaseless becoming 
the resident presence, the haunting resonance of ruins?  
Viewed through the final standpoint of Nishida, ruins can be seen to express 
the self-transforming act of real creativity that is determined by an identity and 
relationship between absolutes and relatives, ‘Creation, real creativity, entails that 
the world, the contradictory identity of the one and the many, expresses itself within 
itself; it is its own self-transforming process in the form of a movement from the 
created to the creating.’48 Reciprocally, if Nishida’s perspective is viewed through 
the similitude of the ruin, this constant movement from the formed to the forming, 
the created to the creating is concretised through the immediacy of the palpable and 
physical, a process which we are able to actually see in the ruin, albeit on its most 
superficial level.  
 
Fragment VII 
The illustrative guide of ruins: the form of emptiness  
 
Ruins are not merely urns charged with the ashes of our historical heritage. 
These treasured reliquaries of sublime unease are gardens through which we are bid 
to wander with wonder. Sublime because they conjure that numinous awakening to 
something other outside the self and unease because they conjure the awe and 
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awefulness of the mysterium tremendum. Ruins exist in a removed and remote time 
zone of their own making, yet are somehow unified with all the other sites of ruins in 
the world through a vibrational stasis. An eerie vacancy of life permeates the ruins 
atmosphere which is at once alive and charged with a quiet intent, a nigh explosive 
inertia. But in time, at a different pace, the impenetrable stillness reveals the rhythm 
of its vibrational stasis. It is an unlikely wave-beat that we would do well to keep 
time with, but the visitor is oft-pressed to leave too soon.  
The form of emptiness so apparent in the ruin is an emptiness with the 
capacity of fullness. It is the form of emptiness that Dōgen describes as ‘a piece of 
rock in emptiness.’ 49 This emptiness is an absolute emptiness in the form of 
emptiness. By this he does not mean that form is emptiness and emptiness is form in 
a dualistic dialectic but that form absolutely is form and emptiness is absolute 
emptiness in form and emptiness. It is an entirely non-objectifiable position that 
frees the intrinsic emptiness of true form to reveal itself. When the purpose of a form 
is no longer apparent then its true form of emptiness transpires.  
A Doric triglyph buffeted by the breath of a millennium becomes a new 
dolmen resisting interment and masquerading as a piece of rock in emptiness.  
 
Fragment VIII 
Ruins as hierophanous sites 
 
I have already touched upon the sea as a hierophanous site with reference to 
the seaborne epiphany of Cusanus, and hinted at the heights of reverie and 
illumination Nietzsche obtained from the rarefied air of a mountain summit. I would 
also like to commission ruins to the register of hierophanous sites. It is not so 
surprising that the potency and sheer overwhelming magnificence of the natural 
world can inspire revelations of equable magnitude and perhaps less likely that such 
an existential conversion could occur within the artifice of our constructed world. As 
Stambaugh writes of the observations within contemplative exertion or practice that 
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lead to awakening ‘this occurs most readily and appropriately with nature; it is less 
likely to occur, for example, with an oil refinery.’50  
Ruins however, may enjoy the privilege of being an exception to this 
arbitrary rule because of their peculiar positioning between ‘the human-made and the 
nature-made.’51 The natural forces of ruination integrate with the human-made 
structure and in a confluence of times and being, create a new dimension of nature. 
The unity and exchange between the divine (nature) and human (structure) that is the 
being-time of the ruin could ostensibly provide the ideal site for epiphany.  
For example, and this again relates to Nishida’s self-negating and forming 
absolute which I have previously alluded to, the self-determining individual of 
Nishida is consciously self-formed only in confrontation with its own absolute 
negation. This confrontation comes about as a realisation of the ‘bottomlessly 
contradictory depths’ of the individual self as it is at the same time an expression and 
negation of an absolute. The self-expression of the individual in fact means the self-
negation of the absolute. When the individual stands in the radical dimension of 
existential ‘decision between eternal life and death’ a whole new abyssal field of 
life-sive-death opens up.
52
  
Suppose this teetering individual happens to be contemplating the alluvial 
swamps of the temple of Artemis in Ephesus, the native city of Heraclitus, a once 
opulent and resplendent centre on the Ionian coast of Asia Minor and now an 
archetypal ruin of majestic proportions about five kilometres inland in present-day 
Turkey. I do not think it implausible that an atmosphere of such radical and unified 
contradictions as that of a ruin could be the site of an existential revelation that 
brings about a confrontation with the absolute within the individual. And what more 
appropriate place for this conversion could there be than the home-ground of 
Heraclitus, philosopher of cosmological logos, the identity of opposites and 
indefatigable self-searching.   
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Time in Ruins 
 
Time passed may very likely be the initial perception of time in the ruin. But once the 
subtle persuasions of the ruins tenuous being seep through our skin-bag and into the 
resonant depths of our cellular structure and then out the other side of that, a hiatus 
may occur in which our own fleeting moment of being melds with the overwhelming 
magnitude of all that lies before us of what lies behind us, both equally 
incomprehensible. Poised here at a precipice of wonder, incredulous at a 
nondescript lump of worn marble, we may come to comprehend the seriatim passage 
of being-time as it creates the present being of ruin time. The expressivity of time is 
not found in the comings and goings which fly past unhindered, ungrounded and 
unbelievably. The real expressivity of time is encountered in its incompleteness. This 
is also its entry point where it is imbued and interacts with being. The myriad cycles 
of time whilst recurring incessantly are always changing, and in the 
‘unchangeability of the endlessly changing’53 impermanence stamps its mark. The 
eternal moment is one of movement, and in its infinite bottomless depths, is free of 
time. The movement is that of the eternal now of becoming, in the stillness of an 
everliving moment. The ruin houses this eternal becoming as a resident presence and 
sits in the crossroads gateway of augenblick. We may not see ourselves as having 
anything to do with what passes through this gateway. Certainly there is a 
remoteness, an inaccessible otherness that pervades the arrested time of a ruin. So 
much so that we might feel it all so far removed from where we stand, but where we 
stand is right there in the midst of it, at the gateway itself, being the gateway. Just as 
Nietzsche recognised himself as part of the causes of eternal recurrence, that without 
him in fact there was no eternal recurrence, such is the message of the ruin. The time 
and being of a ruin is never separate from our own time and being. As we stand 
amidst the flow of ruin-time we too form part of its being as we are simultaneously 
formed by it.        
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Fragment IX 
Impermanence 
 
In a lonely grotto on the grounds of the Villa Serbelloni, David Wiles 
discovers a humbly hewn figurine of Bernadette Lourdes kneeling in beatific 
devotion to an alabaster Virgin, he describes the vision in his introduction to Mask 
and Performance in Greek Tragedy; ‘as a common mortal the luckless Bernadette 
was only made of plaster, she had lost an arm, and her face was little more than a 
white blob.’54 But the effect of this muted and compromised visage was such that, 
for Wiles, it conjured the ritual, religiosity and reality of Greek tragic theatre in a 
way that had it been perfectly preserved, painted or sculpted, would undoubtedly 
have failed to have been captured. The featureless eloquence of Bernadette’s 
transfigured face is not after-all unlike the masks of ancient Greek theatre, though it 
was not in reference to this that Wiles experiences the proximity of the remote past 
in his contemplative reconnoitre of the Villa’s illustrious gardens that lead to his 
encounter with the pious “white blob.” Rather, it was the rawness and immediacy of 
the tableau whose ‘expressivity stemmed in part from the passage of time written 
into her features, which tied the past to the here-and-now of present performance.’55 
The expressivity of times passage, even if through the happenstance of the caves 
dripping eaves, takes form in the unassuming and artless Bernadette. Like the 
apparition of the Immaculate Conception before which she now kneels in perpetuity, 
Bernadette manifests the same ephemeral vagaries of materiality that normally 
separate the real from the mystical. In contrast, the Virgin’s solid casting eternally 
arrested in alabaster, opaque yet luminous, defies the ineluctable pull of nullification 
that lies at the bottom of all being and time.  
 
Time is at all times on the verge of vanishing, and all things show the frailty 
of being that keeps them ever poised on the brink of collapse. Time and being 
display a constant pull to nullification from beneath their very ground. That is 
impermanence.
56
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Fragment X 
Gateways in time: recurrence, re-creation and infinite finitude  
 
In Nietzsche’s Thus Spoke Zarathustra a “gateway” marks the moment of 
union where the opposing paths of past and future come together. Nietzsche names 
this gateway Augenblick, customarily translated as “Moment,” but more literally 
rendered would be ‘in the blink of an eye.’57 This momentary twinkling of an eye is 
the dwelling place of all time, it is the crossroads of the ‘long lane behind us: [that] 
goes on for an eternity. And that long lane ahead of us – that is another eternity.’58  
Nietzsche’s revelation of eternal return is given full expression in the figure of 
Zarathustra.
59
 We are given a small insight into the arrival and admittance of this 
revelation into the reticent, trembling mind of Nietzsche/Zarathustra in ‘The Stillest 
Hour,’ the final chapter of part two of Zarathustra. ‘I tell you this in a parable’ we 
are alerted, which artfully hints at the double device of the tale. Zarathustra is told by 
‘something’ that he must speak bravely of his knowing; ‘Speak your teaching and 
break!’ beseeches the ‘something.’ The teaching could be both what he has received 
and what he now has to impart, but Zarathustra balks at the command. Finally the 
‘something,’ full of compassionate mirth at his fearful folly (though it tore and 
ripped at the heart of the now ashamed Zarathustra) declares, ‘O Zarathustra, your 
fruits are ripe but you are not ripe for your fruits!’60 Thus the ‘most consequential 
discovery of his career’61 withdraws for further incubation into the silence of 
solitude.  
Certainly the airing of such a radical doctrine as this supposedly was must be 
approached with caution, with parable, fiction even. The device of philosophical 
literature can be traced back to Plato’s dialogues, and in fact the “teaching” of 
eternal recurrence fully expounded in Thus Spoke Zarathustra is in many ways, 
supported by the notions of reincarnation and immortality presented in Plato’s 
Phaedo.  Loeb argues for the significance of this poetic and fictional narrative in 
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both Plato and Nietzsche as a form of filtering that separates the sincerely interested 
or ‘appropriate’ reader from those that might indulge in “the rapid skimming and 
absorption of the scant cream of sense” as Beckett most appositely puts it. So it is 
with the ‘expectation that his appropriate readers would come to share his belief in 
the truth of eternal recurrence,’62 but only after the examination and testing that the 
symbolic form of a fictive narrative necessitate that Nietzsche (and Plato, according 
to Loeb) makes the deliberate and poignant choice of voicing his beliefs, on this, 
‘“sein schwerster Gedanke,”   his most weighty thought’63 through a fictional 
character – albeit one based on an actual historical figure, the revolutionary religious 
prophet Zoroaster/Zarathustra.   
Presage to the full consequences of the revelation as it unfolds in Zarathustra 
are the preliminary warning tolls in The Gay Science. Loeb convincingly proposes 
that the development of this most weighty of thoughts, eternal recurrence, has 
cosmological proportions that hint at a fellowship with Heraclitus (extraordinary 
event that that would be if Diogenes is to be taken verbatim, but then they would 
make quite the dynamic duo – even without suits) and has overtones of the 
Pythagorean theory of eternal recurrence.
64
 Through the synecdoche of an hourglass, 
an image introduced in The Gay Science and repeated again in Zarathustra, the 
temporal cosmological implications of eternal return are sifted through the dust 
flecks of being in an ‘explicitly time-centred, cosmological image of a perpetually 
revolving eternal hourglass of being.’65 The finite time of the cycle of the hour glass 
could represent the individual lives within the greater universal life cycle as the hour 
glass is infinitely turned. But as a synecdoche for the ‘immeasurably greater, but still 
finite’ cosmic structure of eternal return it also represents the  
 
time it takes for the course of the cosmos to reach an end and start over again 
exactly as before. Since any single human being is merely a grain of sand in 
this hourglass-cosmos, it follows that he is also perpetually turned over—that 
is, dies and is then reborn so as to live a qualitatively identical life.
66
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From the first mention in The Gay Science an important expansion occurs in 
Zarathustra to account for what Loeb attests to as the greater cosmological 
dimensions of the theory or doctrine, if we can call it that; perhaps vision, insight or 
revelation would be more befitting. The significant import of the development lies in 
the ‘self-recreating’ structure of the cosmos. This is demonstrated through the shift 
from the synecdoche of the music box which occurs in The Gay Science to the 
hourglass of Zarathustra and then to the “colossal” or “monstrous” cosmic year 
within which ‘the small, ordinary years’67 are contained. The images of the hourglass 
and music box did not admit the contextual amplification of the internal temporal 
structure in accordance with the “immeasurably greater” cosmic temporal structure 
in the way that the inter-related cycles of years can. “Year” is used as a metaphor for 
a comprehendible concept of finite time which also, however, re-occurs infinitely 
within a ‘great year of becoming.’68 Nishitani also understands and presumes the 
greater world-time or “Aion” daimonstrated through the synecdoche of finite life and 
samsāra – the cycle of birth-and-death in Nietzsche’s eternal recurrence.  
This same continuous seasonal balance of infinite finitude is expounded by 
Heraclitus in numerous fragments as it is by Nishitani in his expositions of śūnyatā, 
time and history in Religion and Nothingness. In Fr. D. 30 the stable ordered world 
‘the same for all’ provides the structural foundations for an eternal cycle of change 
‘kindled in measures and in measures going out.’69 Nietzsche pays homage to this 
double helix of flux and order in his configuring of the incessant becoming of eternal 
return ‘there is a great year of becoming, a colossus of a year: this year must, like an 
hour-glass, turn itself over again and again, so that it may run down and run out 
anew.’70 Nishitani’s explication of what he terms “infinite finitude” expands on 
Nietzsche’s eternal recurrence so that the “self-same life” lived eternally, is 
radicalised through an encounter with the “original self” on the home-ground of 
absolute nothingness. As with Loeb, Nishitani also observes the connections with 
Heraclitus and says we could in fact call the unbounded meaninglessness of 
Nietzsche’s eternal recurrence, which is overcome through the Will to Power, a 
‘“voluntaristic,” modernised version of Heraclitus.’71  
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As well as suggesting Nietzsche could be read as a modernised version of 
Heraclitus, Nishitani also appeals to the standpoint of Dōgen as a compatible 
approach to Nietzsche’s eternal recurrence; ‘we seem to be breathing the same pure 
mountain air.’72 As the present moment of Nietzsche’s eternal return ‘draws itself 
after itself’73 it follows the “seriatim passage” of Dōgen’s uji. As past and future are 
present in each moment or augenblick as it returns eternally to the very same 
moment in time, the gateway that marks the crossroads of past and future can be 
understood as the eternal now of both life and death. The augenblick of death is the 
moment of re-birth at an intersection of time and space. It is only at the moment of 
death that the truth of eternal recurrence is revealed, this is the ‘midnight Augenblick 
of death’74 as it occurs in The Gay Science. The gateway inscribed augenblick as it 
occurs in Zarathustra explicitly refers back to The Gay Science – a slowly 
developing idea that Nietzsche imagines continuing without him, his pending 
absence somehow already present within him, perhaps disclosed through his 
daimonion. Thus spoke Zarathustra.  
The self-creating cosmology of Nietzsche’s eternal recurrence starts to 
display the same inseparability of being and time that characterises Dōgen’s concept 
of uji. Relayed through his animals, Zarathustra tells us, ‘I myself am part of these 
causes of the eternal recurrence,’ and that being part of these causes ‘I shall return 
eternally to this identical and self-same life.’75 Also, whilst the eternal recurrence of 
Nietzsche has definite affinities with the ‘interminable finitude in birth-and death,’ it 
does not reach the bottomless depths of the true finitude espoused by Nishitani and 
also falls short of his true infinity. 
This true infinity, in Nishitani’s reckoning, as opposed to “bad infinity,” is a 
confrontation with the intrinsic nature of life as death, death as life, or put in another 
way samsāra-sive-nirvāna. Where-in the cycle of birth-and-death, known as samsāra 
in Buddhism, is nullified by embracing the life of death in nirvāna. In other words, 
nirvāna, as a death to the life of birth-and-death cycle, is therefore ‘“life” in its 
essential sense’ as it is hence an end to death. Adopting the term from Heidegger, 
“being-unto-death,” Nishitani explains that the ‘essential conversion from true 
finitude to true infinity’ is a breakthrough of this “being-unto-death” to a truly new 
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life in the leave taking of the endless cycle of samsāra, or in other words, eternal 
recurrence.
76
 What he calls “bad infinity,” (or schlechte Unendlichkeit), taken from 
Hegel, is for ‘the finite to continue on infinitely,’ and this is what he means by 
infinite finitude. But, when ‘one’s own finitude is represented as finite, as something 
that will one day cease to be’ then the existential conversion of an infinitely finite 
‘Existenz’ overcomes the logical contradiction of infinite finitude.77 In a re-emphasis 
of this point Nishitani further qualifies true finitude on the level of samsāra-sive-
nirvāna as ‘the real suchness of birth-and-death, its reality, its bottomlessness.’ 
Actually, in vigorous and unequivocal confirmation he calls it ‘truly true finitude.’ 78  
This true infinity is nothing other than śūnyatā (emptiness) and in the 
paradoxical logic of the soku hi (is and is not) true finitude is only truly true in its 
conversion to true infinity. That is, the true infinity encountered in Existenz, ‘is an 
essential conversion from “death” in its basic sense to “life” in its basic sense’ which 
is thus a conversion ‘from true “finitude” to true “infinity.”’ Existenz, according to 
Nishitani, is the only way through which an awareness can arise of true infinity, for 
‘Infinity, as a reality, is cut off from the prehension of reason,’ therefore it can only 
be experienced or understood as a lived possession and not as a merely conceptual 
dimension.
79
  
 
Fragment XI 
The stillest movement: eternity and the infinite 
 
The ‘infinitesimal moment of every becoming,’80 as it is delightfully phrased 
by Gaston Milhaud, belies the constancy of eternity with the eternal movement of 
becoming.  It is within the framework of the paradoxical logic of the Prajnaparamita 
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Sutra tradition that Nishida endorses the present as ‘the eternal present.’81 Only 
through a logic of paradox can the simultaneous presence and absence of eternity be 
understood to be contained within each moment, and indeed be precisely what makes 
up each moment. As Nishida further explains, ‘Each instant of time, which does not 
stop for even an instant, is the simultaneous presence and absence of the eternal 
present. Each instant is the paradox of samsāra and nirvāna.’82  
According to Nishitani, while the augenblick of Nietzsche stretches infinitely 
into the future before us and infinitely into the past behind us, it ‘does not possess 
the bottomless of the true moment.’83 He grants that the eternal recurrence of 
Nietzsche does come close to the standpoint of śūnyatā but because it is grounded in 
an eternally recurring moment it is not free of time and is not therefore bottomless. 
To experience the bottomless of the true moment, which is to be free of time, is to be 
time rather than be in time ‘by realizing that I am not in time because I am time, 
which therefore means that I am free from time.’84 
The stillest movement of time that is the eternal moment of the present as it is 
cut off from the past and future is like the bow of Heraclitus which turns back on 
itself and the road that both up and down is one and the same. It is the vertical 
movement of time which assures the eternal presence of the moment. Stambaugh 
explains what she calls the “vertical vibrancy” of Dōgen’s equivalent to the nunc 
stans or eternal now, ‘the moment does not fly away. It moves, but within itself, or, 
as Dōgen also says, up and down.’85 The other radical aspect of Dōgen’s time 
concept elucidated by Stambaugh is its reversibility. The utter overturning of any 
constancy or lineality that might be found in the usual progressive framing of time 
establishes time as an eternal passage of flow occurring not in time but with being 
‘all at once, all of it, every moment anew.’86  
This brings a whole new appreciation to the activity of eternity as an 
infinitely endless becoming. It is only when time is not irreversible that we can say, 
as did Heraclitus, “the beginning and the end are shared” or otherwise it would be 
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‘time endlessly open in both directions from the present.’87 The eternal sameness of a 
recurring moment as in the eternal return of Nietzsche implies a reversibility of time. 
As David Loy states of Dōgen’s eternal present of time, it is ‘a very different present 
which incorporates the past and the future because it always stays the same,’ and that 
to experience this present we need to be present and ‘be the present.’88 Nishida offers 
further elucidations on this “monad of eternity” the eternal now, and makes the 
eternal present a perfect unity of opposites  ‘Past and future are confronting each 
other, as the dialectical unity of the present.’89 Perhaps nowhere else is this 
dialectical unity as explicitly present as in the ruin. The ruin may be superficially 
sensed as a broken, an abandoned or bent gnomon where the passing of time is no 
longer registered. 
In the confrontation between past and future they dissolve into the present 
moment in which they find themselves, the only true time. They are in effect negated 
by each-other; they cancel each-other out in their moment of face to face meeting. 
Their illusionary existence is seen through, and they disappear like mirages on a 
desert plateau on approach. Even though they are illusionary they exist within the 
present moment; that is the only place they exist. In his very emotive appraisal of the 
ancient Greeks Nietzsche ascribes an extraordinary power of intuitive thinking to 
Heraclitus’s vision of time. This ‘regal possession’ awakens Heraclitus to the true 
passage of time, and he sees that the ‘past and future are as perishable as any dream, 
but that the present is but the dimensionless and durationless borderline between the 
two.’90 It is a rather misty borderline between the two, Nietzsche and Heraclitus, as 
Nietzsche reads his own gestating vision of eternal recurrence into Heraclitus’s 
shared circumference. 
The “stillest hour” of Zarathustra is the awakening to the stillest recurring 
moment of eternity. But even though it is the same, it is eternally different; the 
moment stays the same but that does not mean events do not occur within it, 
continually but without passing away, only moving up and down. This is the gaze of 
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the deep wellspring of bottomless timelessness, a ‘serene and terrible noontide 
abyss.’91 
Being grounded in the present does not mean being tethered to a spot. There 
is an infinite openness to time. Awareness of the infinite openness at the ground of 
time comes about however, within an actual moment of time, in the present time. 
This infinite openness gives absolute presence to the present. For only the present 
actually is present, ‘Its presence is beyond doubt.’92 What’s more, present within the 
presence of the present, the now, the eternal now, is that very time of endless 
beginnings without beginning or end,  ‘the beginning and end of that time in itself 
can be sought within this actual presence itself.’93 The presence of the actual moment 
comes from its possession of both past and future within it, yet because the moment 
is also its own dwelling place, as a nunc stans, then it is also cut off from the past 
and future. This is what assures the constancy and eternity of time that does not fly 
away from itself and create gaps.
94
  
It is also important not to see the endless beginnings spoken of as merely a 
reconfiguration of time as cyclical as opposed to lineal or momentary. It is through 
the capacity to display all of these features at once, in each continuous moving 
present, that time manifests the ‘vertical vibrancy’ Stambaugh speaks of. The 
interpenetration of times different modes of being all in the same moment gives 
some clue to understanding the quality of presence that time has. Then the resonance 
of ruins could be understood as the presence of time as it is constituted in the 
instantaneity of all modes ‘as if midnight were falling at noon.’95 
 
Fragment XII 
Dōgen and uji: Heraclitus and flux  
    
The short fascicle, Uji (being-time), from Dōgen’s Shōbōgenzō, presents 
what is considered one of his most challenging and original concepts. Within the 
abundant literary sources that form the wellspring of Zen philosophy the issue of 
time does not surface with the same saturating prominence as it commands in the 
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western philosophical canon. When it does emerge from the depths of contemplation 
it is likely to be in partnership with a complimentary current of thought, one that can 
ground and lift the spiralling force of such an evanescent abstraction. In other words, 
time is considered within the context of actual existential experience and not as a 
separate force acting with indomitable authority in its own exclusive domain, 
irrespective of the needs and wants of its subjects, as it is understandably easily 
misconstrued as doing. Dōgen’s uji takes this partnership to such dizzying heights 
that we are obliged to completely sever the now straining lines of connection 
between the clodding plod of a diachronic teleology and the soaring possibilities of 
an “eternal now” lived in ‘discontinuous continuity.’96    
Also uncharacteristically for Zen literature, Dōgen’s conception of time, or 
rather being-time for they cannot be thought of separately, holds a central position 
throughout the Shōbōgenzō and is a key theme that underlies many of the other 
fascicles. For example, when Dōgen refers to the “self” or “I” in its true suchness, 
which is the true self, he means it in exactly the same way as he explains being-time.  
It could be said ‘the words “self” and “I” are synonymous with being-time,’97 as do 
Waddell and Abe in their translations that form The Heart of Dōgen’s Shōbōgenzō, 
which necessarily includes the fascicle Uji. They make particular note of the 
contextual significance of uji in relation to the whole scheme of ideas presented in 
the Shōbōgenzō.    
The overwhelming import of uji is an immediate and simultaneous mutual 
interpenetration of being and time. This manifests as a constant transcendent 
immanence in a momentary yet continuous expression of ‘causal kinship.’98 A 
diurturnal interlude of seriatim passage that encompasses all being within time and 
makes being of all time, that is, it makes time be time, ‘time, just as it is is being, and 
being is all time.’99 
Dōgen begins this fascicle with a series of quotations he has apparently 
assembled together from various sources
100
 within which are disclosed the 
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fathomless depths and ‘glorious radiance’ of times being which is as equally evident 
in the ‘sixteen-foot golden Buddha’ as ‘Mr. Chang or Mr. Li.’101 Time inseparable 
from being means that without something being in time, time cannot be. Likewise all 
being is inseparable from time, time allows being to be. The whole of time, every 
single moment, is full of being, otherwise it would not be. It would not be time, 
being-time. Time is not just empty passage, it passes through being, it is carried by 
being through its passage. While each moment contains all of time within it, past and 
future, each moment is an individual passage of time. Each moment is the ‘constant 
merging of past and future in the present’ and stands at the crossroads of the eternal 
now, the ‘immediate present’ as the meeting point of the contradicting trajectories of 
past and future.
102
 What Dōgen calls “seriatim passage” is the authentic movement 
of being-time. It is a movement that never leaves the ‘immediate now’ of the present 
and yet is part of a continuous flow of independent stages of time, thus it forms the 
passage of a discontinuous continuity. When this is grasped, time can no longer be 
thought of as simply ‘going and coming.’103  
The ideas of time as simply rushing from the past into the future as an 
historical or organic process or from the future into the past in an incessant unilateral 
cycle are some of the most tenacious delusions that colour the typical perception of 
time. In Joan Stambaugh’s reckoning these delusions stand like an impenetrable 
barrier to an ‘authentic conception of time’ and most particularly to whatever Dōgen 
may be telling us about anything; ‘what we know time to be absolutely blocks any 
understanding of Dōgen’s conception of time, or more importantly, of anything 
else.’104 Dōgen himself is all too aware of the difficulties in overcoming such 
obstinate and determined perceptions, especially when all apparent evidence 
persuades to the contrary; ‘Since a sentient being’s doubting of the many and various 
things unknown to him are naturally vague and indefinite, the course his doubtings 
take will probably not bring them to coincide with this present doubt.’105 In other 
words, it is virtually impossible to doubt something one does not know and it 
certainly seems counterproductive to doubt something one does know, but this is 
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precisely what is required. As Heraclitus tells us in Fr. D. 18 If he doesn’t expect the 
unexpected, he will not discover it; for it is difficult to discover and intractable.
106
  
Again, in the same vein, quoting Wittgenstein, 6.5 If a question can be put at 
all then it can also be answered. All sense, if we are to make any of the world, is 
demonstrated to lie quite outside the world. Accordingly questions and problems 
only form the limits of the world but any solution to the problem must lie outside the 
world, or more concretely, 6.521 The solution of the problem of life is seen in the 
vanishing of the problem. Very thorough, nice and tidy. Heraclitus may find the 
unknown difficult and intractable, but Wittgenstein officially designates it out of 
bounds, off limits, an outright impossibility. Well, that is logically speaking. 6.375 
As there is only a logical necessity, so there is only a logical impossibility.  
The barefaced evidence of times passing in the ruin, combined with the bi-
directional generative forces of ruin-time, adds the dimension of space to the time 
vector and substantialises the “seriatim passage” of uji. Like-wise, time being being-
time in the ruin gives a whole new inference to the passage of time as a co-creative 
immediate presence in the ruin. By immediate I mean, it has not left its mark, but is 
continuously leaving its mark in a living active sense of being that is at all times in 
the present mark of time. The sharpness of the past world passed is worn smooth, 
fuzzy. Outlines smudged, rubbed off, therefore distinctions are erased and worlds 
collide; ‘if time were to give itself to merely flying past, it would have to leave 
gaps,’107 that is, without the unifying principle of the present, there would be no 
continuity and therefore “gaps” would appear, lacunae, alzheimic moments.  
Conceding the significant difficulty for a western mind conditioned by 
dualisms to grasp just how Dōgen’s vivifying yet bamboozling108 conception of 
being-time might make its impact on actual life, Loy assists by drawing on the 
spatial metaphor of a thing in space – as opposed to a being in time. Transferring the 
more abstract notion of time into a spatial analogy and using something more readily 
graspable, like a cup, Loy is able to make the notoriously complex and confounding 
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business of uji reasonably straightforward. He uses the metaphor of a cup even 
though it is precisely because of the tendency to treat time spatially, as a container 
through which we move and where events occur and things exist, that time becomes 
objectified. This leads to the cauterised unilateral perception which clouds a more 
open view, although it serves its purpose as a preliminary key to the “gateway” of an 
immediate present, the “eternal now.” As the fundamental philosophical problem of 
time is essentially ‘the relation between “things” and “time,”’ through Loy’s 
explanation of the cup in space, we are able to start to imagine how we could 
correspondingly be in time as being-time; ‘one way to express this is to say that the 
cup is not “in” space but itself is space: the cup is “what space is doing in that 
place,” so to speak.’109  
The individual moments that make up the seriatim passage or discontinuous 
continuity of times flow do not however accumulate in a haphazard jumble like a 
basket of slippers at a Moroccan bazaar. They ‘do not overlap or pile up in a row.’110 
Similarly, in Heraclitus’ thought we find the affirmation of a stable structural order 
that endures through the continuous flux and change of individual moments of 
elemental transformation. In fact, the thesis of “Reciprocal Material Flux” that 
Daniel Graham puts forward as ostensibly the most appropriate reading of 
Heraclitus’s supposed theory of flux, which is notoriously subject to unending 
interpretations, has many affinities with Dōgen’s treatment of the flow of time. The 
so called flux theory of Heraclitus cannot be properly conceived in isolation and to 
do the palintropos harmoniē111 of Heraclitean thought any real justice one must 
simultaneously consider another theory that dominates Heraclitean scholarship, that 
of the “Identity of Opposites,” which Graham interprets rather as ‘a more general 
account of the unity of opposites.’112 This “general account” is characterised by the 
same self-determining contradictory identity that is the final enveloping “loop” of 
Nishida’s logic of the place of nothingness. Nishida comprehends the dynamic flux 
and stability of Heraclitus logos-bearing structure which he expresses as the deep 
“unchangeability of the endlessly changing.”  
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In a thorough delve into the historical and ontological dimensions of time 
Nishitani’s more contemporary configuration of Dōgen’s uji gives us another 
presentation of how the individual moment is positioned in relation to the flow of 
time. Time is considered primarily from the standpoint of śūnyatā which is the axis 
of emptiness around which his overall thought oscillates. Exhibited once again are 
the simultaneous possibilities of supposedly contradictory forces, those of change or 
flux - the flow or movement of time - and constancy in the eternal moment or 
‘present instant.’  
From a different perspective, in the present instant, the present is at the 
home-ground of all points of time past and future without ever taking leave of the 
home-ground of the present. An instant is ever a present now; each point of time past 
and future, when it is constituted as time, can only do so as an instant. In this way, 
the present, while inexorably the present of time, is nonetheless simultaneous with 
each and every point of time past and future. The past never ceases to be before the 
present, and the future after the present; the order of before and after in temporal 
sequence is never abolished.
113
 
 
α.  Logos 
 
Although this account [logos] holds forever, men ever fail to comprehend, 
both before hearing it and once they have heard. Although all things come to 
pass in accordance with this account, men are like the untried when they try 
such words and works as I set forth, distinguishing each according to its 
nature and telling how it is. But other men are oblivious of what they do 
awake, just as they are forgetful of what they do asleep.
114
 
 
The logos is introduced in what is generally agreed to be the opening 
statement or introduction of what would have been Heraclitus’s book. It is the 
longest of the fragments and perhaps the most plainly stated, though typically, it is 
not entirely innocent of ambiguity. In fact, Dilcher for one, goes so far as to say the 
‘proem deliberately provokes confusion’115 as a stylistic invocation preparing readers 
for what is to come. Exactly what Heraclitus is taken to mean by his logos is yet 
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another point under contestable scrutiny which we will for the present moment give 
a reasonably wide berth. Whatever the logos precisely is, it remains difficult, if not 
impossible, to comprehend. Heraclitus was not to know that the modern language of 
English would derive its word for logic from the Ancient Greek logos, but 
presuming there is a “logical” connection between the two usages then the 
incomprehensibility of Heraclitus’s logos can perhaps be understood through the 
lens of Wittgenstein’s proposition of logical impossibility. That is, the logos of 
Heraclitus is understood to be incomprehensible because it lies outside of logic, and 
quite simply, cannot be understood, not, that is, in logical terms. Yet, as Heraclitus 
tells us, the logos is there for all to hear, is indeed forever present, omnipresent 
even.
116
 It is there to be heard and understood even before it is spoken. This could be 
the clearest indication we have that it “lies outside the world” like Wittgenstein’s 
‘solution to the riddle of life in space and time.’117 
Although Heraclitus’s own “account” (logos) is revealed through-out the 
fragments, and as doxographic history has shown, this too has proven to be its own 
ill-comprehended riddle, the logos to which he refers has implications of greater 
effect than one individuals account. Implicit in Fr. D. 1 and made explicit in Fr. D. 2 
and Fr. D. 17 is that people ignore the evidence of experience and what is shared and 
common to all (xynos) and pursue instead their own private reasoning like soporific 
zombies: Fr. D. 2 Although the account is shared, most men live as though their 
thinking were a private possession, and then in Fr. D. 17 Most men do not think 
things in the way they encounter them, nor do they recognize what they experience, 
but believe their own opinions.
118
  
The other important theme that is further repeated in the fragments and 
introduced at the outset is the connection and interchanges between sleep and 
knowledge and wakefulness and oblivion and vice-versa. I say ‘at the outset’ 
indicating an agreement with the arrangement of the fragments as they have come to 
be delivered. The arrangement which has come to be widely accepted is that of Diels 
and then further revised by Kranz, and subsequently known as the Diels-Kranz, but, 
as Kahn stated, and to which I have alluded elsewhere, this ordering has asserted its 
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own perspective over the fragments and results in a reading that has little literary 
value. Kahn opposed this ordering and has created his own, based on what he 
perceives to be the strongest thematic links with some semblance of coherency and 
continuity between each thematic group and the next. Both have however agreed on 
the placement of the fragment in question at the beginning. There comes a point 
when no amount of re-arrangement will enhance or further understanding of the 
content and this is primarily why the Diels arrangement has become standardised.  
The necessity or possibility of ascertaining the exact form or ordering or purpose of 
Heraclitus’s book must lose weight after a certain dedicated effort to procure such 
certainty has failed. More-so when so much meaning is gleaned despite the 
uncertainty. For would we then have to say that all we have learned from Heraclitus 
was false once the proper ordering was discovered? This would be the case unless 
the “proper” ordering was one that served to assure and consolidate what scholars 
have already insightfully extracted.  
There is no reason why knowledge cannot be imparted through error. Indeed 
there is many a tradition that would say it is only through error that we learn. But, 
the real magic lies in the mountain vermillion spewed forth in the jewelled palace 
across the river, for even if it is erroneous learning it takes us across the river and is 
still part of the new learning of the jewelled palace. Following Graham’s assertion of 
the “knowledge-how” aspect of the fragments, supported and endorsed by Benitez, it 
is in the reading of the fragments, the navigation of meanings, without necessarily 
having to know what they mean, that the real message of Heraclitus is imparted. 
Therefore the transmission is only made possible with a receiver, or as Kasulis puts 
it, through participation, a meeting half way. From this perspective the only correct 
reading is entirely individual, yet probably common to all! 
 
β.  Flow, flux and basho 
 
Nishida recalls Heraclitus’s logos-structure of the world in the explication of 
his conception of basho, which is Nishida’s version of world structure generated by 
and inclusive of the field of self-consciousness. Even though Nishida ultimately 
moves away from what he pejoratively calls ‘psychologism,’ the communication 
between the ideas of Heraclitus and Nishida is transmitted via the development and 
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awareness of a self-conscious entity that is purportedly at the base of all real 
experience and any itinerant grasp of reality.  
As we recall, Heraclitus’s starting point is ‘I went in search of myself,’ 
Dōgen’s indefatigable quest for realisation of the Buddha-nature leads him to ‘learn 
one’s self’ and Nishida disembarks at an ultimate field or basho of absolute 
nothingness which is the self. The interpenetration of being and time in Dōgen’s uji 
is also a form of world structure explained through a static-eternal continuous 
movement outside the receptacle of space. ‘Do not think flowing is like the wind and 
rain moving from east to west, the entire world is not unchangeable, is not 
immovable. It flows.’119  
The dynamic moment of reception that is being-time, is inherent in Nishida’s 
bi-directional forming of the world, from ‘created to creating’. This is the same 
continuous dynamic flux of causal relations and balance evidenced in the logos 
structure of Heraclitus’s cosmic order of steady change. The flow of life is actualised 
in the individual and we are each part of this cosmic order or logos. This is the bi-
directional co-creative force of the world of the absolute. Living as if asleep we do 
not observe what is right in front of us, that we are flowing with the river as we step 
and do not step into it. Dōgen beseeches us to ‘Closely examine this flowing; 
without your complete effort right now nothing would be actualised, nothing would 
flow.’120 The river (life, the universe, logos) flows through us, as we flow through it; 
neither the river nor the self is unchanging. Both affect change in the other as they 
are simultaneously effected by the changes.  
People’s misunderstanding often comes from the familiarity of the subject. 
With regards to Time, we are all quite sure we know what it does and where it goes: 
away. But this is a sleepy observance. Dōgen complains in Uji; ‘People only see 
time’s coming and going, and do not thoroughly understand that the time-being 
abides in each moment.’121  Likewise, people’s not understanding the logos even 
though it is ‘common to all,’ may be that it is so close and so common it is 
imperceptible. Or, it may be a matter, as Heidegger says, of only hearing what we 
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already understand and that if ‘to think is before all else to listen,’122 we need to open 
to the ‘primal tidings of linguistic nature’123 so as to hear more clearly and ‘release 
ourselves’ unequivocally into the Way/Tao or logos.124  
Nishida does not question the “fact” of flux that is presented by the hints of 
Heraclitus. Perhaps in heed of Heidegger’s thought on a real thinking experience, the 
question is eliminated so as to simply ‘let ourselves be told something,’125 and 
therewith begin the cogitative whirrings. So by not questioning, Nishida instead 
interacts through wonderment, and the “primal tidings” of the Heraclitean hint – the 
‘guide-word’126 – are washed up upon his open shore of thought to be integrated into 
his true basho of endlessly changing unchangeability and ‘generation and 
extinction.’ Noble Heraclitean precepts. What Nishida calls the true basho, which is 
his ultimate basho of absolute nothingness, is also a locus of absolute flux, ‘the true 
basho is not only a basho of change but also a basho of generation-and-
extinction.’127 Bundled into this cradle of supreme godliness where the universal 
source rocks from life to death in unstoppable kinetic propulsion are the comparative 
motions kindled in the ruin. Relative to the ultimate basho the ruin is also a locus of 
generation-and-extinction.  
The possibility of such transformation lies in the original concept which must 
be a ‘universal concept containing opposites’128 otherwise the perpetual mutation 
from one to the other, life to death, beginning and end, could not occur. This 
fundamental state of flux is found deep in the heart of Nishida’s basho and pays 
homage to the “unchangeability of the endlessly changing,” which Nishida identifies 
at the core of the Heraclitean logos-bearing enterprise. Like the logos of Heraclitus, 
Nishida’s basho is essentially a structure of logic through which we can understand 
the world and our place in it, how we interrelate with the world and how the world 
responds to us. This is the form of co-dynamic mutual self-determination that 
simultaneously reflects the world and is reflected in the world that Nishida elucidates 
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in his final work. In light of these two very dynamic world conceptions the ruin 
reveals itself as a universal locus of co-dynamic self-determination in which the 
endlessly changing is immortalised through the life giving renovations of decay. 
There truly is no clear beginning or end to the paradoxical formation of the ruin 
through the gentle and persistent tide of ruination. 
 
Fragment XIII 
Uji in others 
 
Calvino’s short contemplative meditation The odd slipper (from which I 
appropriated the above basket of jumbled time), illustrates an uncanny experiencing 
of uji through one of Mr Palomar’s many curious encounters with the world. In 
Dōgen’s conception of time there is no distance spatially nor distance in time 
between events, even though they are ordered and continuous, thus the time before is 
present in the time now just as the time of tomorrow is present in today; ‘Does not 
that time of climbing mountains and crossing rivers swallow up this time of the 
vermillion tower of the jewel palace? Does it not spew it forth?
129
   
Mr Palomar has bought a mismatched pair of slippers in a moment of 
distracted ambivalence. He imagines someone else, somewhere, possibly the remote 
past, in the corresponding slippers to his, also mismatched. He did not let the 
‘distance of centuries’ perturb his new found friendship, in fact the solidarity he felt 
with his limping ‘unknown companion’ was possibly only augmented by the 
unlikeliness of their connection over such unquantifiable distances in time and space. 
Does not that time in the remote past, as somebody else, swallow up this time of 
wondering in the eastern bazaar? Does it not limp it forth? Like Beckett’s ungainly 
Hackett there is also something suggestive of a Bodhisattva in Mr Palomar, who in 
this little story shares the jilted gait of Beckett’s more often than not funambulist 
totterer’s, as they confront the challenges of mobility. 
In Busshō (Buddha-nature), another fascicle from the Shōbōgenzō, Dōgen 
writes, ‘there has never yet been a time not arrived.’ What he means once again, is 
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that there is no other time apart from the time-being and that all being is ‘the 
immediate manifestation of Buddha-nature.’ 130 The relation between being and time 
is nondualistic even though it is dependent. From the standpoint of the true self 
(Buddha-nature) which is being-time, all that we see is this true self ‘set out in 
array.’ This same self in its true suchness is the whole world ‘we set the self out in 
array and make that the whole world.’ 131 One of the many consolations of such a 
liberating and encompassing experience of time as being-time is, ‘even a form [of 
understanding] that appears to be blundering is being. On a still broader plane, the 
times before and after one immediately manifests the blunder are both, along with it, 
dwelling positions of being-time.’132 You can’t go wrong. Then again, in Beckett’s 
account of the ‘double headed’ behemoth Time, dragging the milestone of yesterday, 
which is ‘irremediably part of us, within us, heavy and dangerous’ is not the 
unfettered foot-free and fancy-loose experience offered up by Dōgen’s uji. Whilst 
not entirely assimilated, being and time still carry war scars of each-other ‘we are not 
merely more weary because of yesterday, we are other, no longer what we were 
before the calamity of yesterday.’133 
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People in Ruins 
 
If Heraclitus was to find himself the protagonist of a whimsical venture into the 
metaphysical significance of his now ruined birthplace I can imagine a very 
Beckettian character responding in retreat (recalcitrant, reluctant, antipathic – or so 
the records go). But he is my figurehead whether he likes it or not. Perhaps the 
association is a little naïve and unsophisticated, borne from the same spirit of 
idealised nostalgia and superficial mythmaking that nurture the romanticised image 
of the ruin. So be it. The work of Heraclitus, like the once splendid architecture of 
Ephesus, is known to us only in its fragmentary remains which we have no way of 
envisaging in their complete form. That is if there ever was one, for this too is guided 
by presumption. The poetry of this formal coincidence need not be belittled by the 
fact that it is highly unlikely for either to have survived in any other condition. The 
question provoked is one of choice; which aspect of the ruin are we open to 
encountering? The marbled foothold to ancient history or the momentary yet eternal 
presence that we are participants in? Along with Heraclitus, Dōgen and Nishida 
present their cosmic world orders with the human subject as a central and integral 
part of the whole structural arrangement. The ruin is suggestively postulated as a 
metaphoric receptacle for these ideas of cosmic order. As a chōra of chaotic array 
shaped by the same contradictory identity central to the existential act of Nishida, 
inherent in the overall philosophy of Heraclitus and in the paradoxical logic of 
Dōgen. Through the ruin we tangibly encounter the metaphysics of Nishida’s self-
conscious and self forming absolute present which is characterised by the dynamic 
form of this contradictory identity. Meditating on all the latent dynamisms of the 
ruin, and even better, whilst in a ruin, may very well help to cultivate understanding 
of the inspiring philosophies of these respective thinkers but it is more the reverse 
that I intend. Thus it would be that by the guiding light of these world perspectives 
the ruin can be fully appreciated as a living revelation of the bi-directional, non-
determined self-determining dynamic of the creative act. Upon this expansive 
horizon the ruin joins with green mountains’ walking and the sixteen-foot golden 
Buddha-body in being-time.    
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Fragment XIV 
Heraclitus 
 
Although Diels’s now standardised arrangement for the fragments was 
deliberately assumed as a neutral structure to avoid imposing any further meaning 
coloured by personal interpretation, it has by default, in its purely philological 
approach,
134
 stripped the work of any literary structure. What’s more, as Kahn makes 
clear ‘he thus implied, after all, that the chaotic pattern of his arrangement gave a 
true picture of Heraclitus’s own composition.’135 The aphoristic style of the 
fragments led Diels to a stylistic comparison with Nietzsche’s Zarathustra which 
reflects rather more on Diels’s historical positioning than Heraclitus’ composition. 
None-the-less, I think the reference to Nietzsche, and particularly the work of 
Zarathustra, rather pertinent and certainly not misguided in its connection. Kahn 
however, believes ‘the true parallel for an understanding of Heraclitus’s style is…not 
Nietzsche but his own contemporaries, Pindar and Aeschylus.’136 It does of course 
make much more sense to locate the literary style of Heraclitus within the milieu of 
its making, and it is in recognition and honour of Heraclitus’s extraordinarily 
evocative imagery and ingenious and multileveled metaphors that Kahn allies him 
with these two great writers of antiquity. Yet, at the same time, Kahn’s reasoning can 
also be applied to the figure of Nietzsche as a more contemporary illustration of the 
import and impart of these complex and profound thinkers. Without the slightest 
ripple one could exchange the name of Heraclitus for Nietzsche in the following 
statement of Kahn’s, in qualification of his referral to Pindar and Aeschylus; 
‘Heraclitus is not merely a philosopher but a poet, and one who chose to speak in 
tones of prophecy.’137 What Kahn is in agreement with Diels on is that the real 
starting point of Heraclitus is with Fr. D. 101 I went in search of myself. It is this 
overarching concern with the place and part of the individual within the greater all-
encompassing structure of the kosmos that sets him apart from his Ionian 
compatriots, the true phusikos, or natural philosophers.  
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Heraclitus both accepts and rejects the pattern of genealogical derivation that 
is still very evident in sixth-century cosmogony, a pattern which necessitates the 
notion of a starting point or archē characterising the material monism of Ionian 
physics. In a ‘lofty acceptance-but-also-denial’ of technical cosmologies Heraclitus 
does not completely fly in the face of his contemporaries but rather redirects the 
emphasis inwards. In other words he shifts the line of pursuit away from a largely 
scientific inquiry which aims to explain external phenomena and that is supposedly a 
radical and progressive advance on mythic thought to the nebulous terrain between 
the two in which the great drama of life plays out. His focus was primarily on the 
human condition within society and within a greater cosmic structure which in effect 
ruled over all. This does not mean he didn’t look outwards to the same elemental 
phenomena that were helping to shape the new understanding of the world, but his 
observations were revealing to him the unreachable depths of his soul rather than the 
first inklings of the weight and movement of gravity. 
Following the sensitive and discerning interpretations of Kahn, the 
Heraclitean enterprise is directed by the understanding that the ‘human condition is 
inseparable from an insight into the unifying structure of the universe, the total unity 
within which all opposing principles – including mortality and immortality – are 
reconciled.’138 The logos, everliving fire, the unity of opposites, the divine One, 
these are all part of the scaffolding for understanding not only the nature of the 
cosmic structure but also the universal principles that coincide in ‘the pattern of 
human life and the pattern of cosmic order.’139  
With demonstrative consistency, the form of Heraclitus’s discourse exhibits 
its own instructive and “unifying structure.” As a unifying structure the meaning is 
determined in accord with it, and furthermore, it simultaneously acts in unison with 
the greater universal structure of the logos of which it speaks, by using logos to 
speak of it. The dynamic equilibrium between opposites along with the measured 
constancy of change that helps create the dynamism between universals and 
particulars, form the “unifying structure of the universe” that Heraclitus represents 
and participates in. This co-creative expression that at once describes and is, 
coincides with Nishida’s articulation of the structure of reality as a ‘self-
determination’ that has at its base ‘this transformative structure of the identity of 
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contradiction.’140 C.J. Emlyn-Jones is another Heraclitean scholar who attests to the 
demonstrable consistency between the thought or idea itself and the form or mode of 
its expression in Heraclitus’s writings; ‘there was no fundamental difference between 
the meaning of his doctrine and the order in the real world.’141  
The historical temporal world, propagated by Nishida as the contradictory 
identity of self and absolute in a continuous process of self-determination recalls the 
ever changing and continuously generative cosmic world order of Heraclitus. Kahn’s 
summary testament to the salient suppositions and features of the Heraclitean kosmos 
describe a self-generating force that must also have at its base the “contradictory 
self-identity” and “discontinuous continuity” that characterises Nishida’s historical 
real world.
142
 Kahn writes; ‘Insofar as the kosmos is made, it is self-made; insofar as 
it is organised, it is self-organised; insofar as it is generated, it is identical with its 
own eternal source, everliving fire.’143 
It is generally agreed that the first extant philosophical use of the term 
kosmos is with Heraclitus in Fr. D. 30 The ordering [kosmos], the same for all, no 
god nor man has made, but it ever was and will be: fire everliving, kindled in 
measures and in measures going out. Within this densely paradoxical fragment burns 
the contentious doctrines of flux, yet flux within an ordered and stable world, 
material monism (fire posited as Heraclitus’s archē in continuance with his Milesian 
predecessors) and issues of cosmogony and ecpyrosis – world conflagration. It also 
has further implications and resonance with the logos as it occurs in other fragments; 
as logos is also a kind of world-order for Heraclitus – indeed perhaps the ultimate. 
Without becoming embroiled in the heated debate surrounding fire as a primordial 
and originative substance, nor in the same flames of controversy engulfing the 
supposed doctrine of ecpyrosis I will remain instead with the initial spark of this 
preamble, the “cosmic fire” above.144 It should be safe to surmise that there is a clear 
identity between fire and kosmos, even if it is not exactly clear what it is. 
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Kirk presents what he considers one of the most persuasive arguments for the 
fragment supported by Zeller, Burnet and Cherniss, and to which I would like to add 
my tentative voice, in which ‘the ever-living fire is simply a symbol for the 
κόσμος.’145 The word kosmos in early literature can have the sense of “adornment” 
or “ornament,” derived from the fuller meaning of “good order,” or “arrangement.” 
These have a primarily military or political sense as in a ‘disciplined array’ or 
‘behaviour showing obedience to command’146 none of which conjure the 
otherworldly dimensions of unexpected constellations that the modern epithet 
“cosmic” has come to intimate. Though incidentally, it is reflected in the naming of a 
Belgian electronic computer logistic system used at the SA container terminals, 
“COSMOS.” 
But the new philosophical rendering of the word kosmos which conjoins the 
technical idea of a world-order with the symbolic associations of the world described 
as fire, (or a fire, as Kirk scrupulously specifies ‘the indefinite article is, I think, 
required in a correct translation’147)   gives very particular insight into how 
Heraclitus perceives the nature of order in the world. It is an order governed by 
unceasing cyclic change meted out in balanced measures that ensures a stable and 
eternally unified structure whilst undergoing continual transformation. This may 
seem contradictory if fathomed from an either/or perspective – a perspective that 
gathered momentum with Aristotelian logic and consequently greatly influenced 
many historical interpretations of Heraclitus via Theophrastus, leading to, for 
example the theory of ecpyrosis and dubious cosmogonical assertions.
148
  
The alternative perspective is a logic of both/and. To be rightly appreciated 
or understood, the hidden meanings, double entendre and paradoxical riddling nature 
of the fragments need to be read through the lens of this both/and logic. If not, then 
in defiance of Heraclitus’s own generously provided guidance to understanding the 
logos,
149
 his entire discourse may very well end up sounding like the ‘symptom of 
some mental derangement.’150 As a force of both creation and destruction, fire is the 
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perfect medium through which to express this logic, fire is indeed ‘the very element 
of paradox.’151  
The smoky tendrils of his extinguished yet everlasting flame creep across the 
Ephesian city walls that must be defended like divine law,
152
 and out even beyond 
the “land beyond” of Hyperborea, and drift their way into the Far East.153 It is 
relatively recently recognised that philosophical speculation did not independently 
arise in isolation in all the separate regions of the world, but that a surprisingly 
significant amount of information was disseminated through various means 
throughout otherwise distinct and seemingly remote cultures and lands. Peter 
Kingsley is one such prominent voice, re-writing the annals (or annuls) of history 
apropos Apollo and the Orient,
154
 both of which happen to be of relevance to 
Heraclitus (the Orient and Apollo). I do not mean to imply that either the smoke nor 
idea of Heraclitus’s cosmic fire reached the Orient to be interpreted by ‘some 
obliging multilingual Magus’ who also spoke “flame” but rather, as Kahn proposes 
‘we have an example of thinkers very remote from one another in time and place 
who are sufficiently akin in turn of mind or speculative temperament to give 
expression to similar thoughts in similar language.’155 Both on stylistic grounds and 
philosophical standpoints
156
 Heraclitus and the Orient do display a somewhat 
startling kinship.  
In a description of the poetic language of the fragments, Emlyn-Jones reveals 
the features of a style not too remote from the kōan and literature of what has come 
to be known as Zen and closer to the time of Heraclitus, the mystical Taoist writings 
of Chuang Tzu.
157
He enumerates the qualities that distinguish him from the 
‘”normal” prose style’ of the Presocratics as ‘an elliptical mode of utterance, a 
deliberate and careful use of rhythmic and phonetic patterns and a preference for 
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concrete images rather than logical explanations,’ and draws particular attention to 
the ‘paradoxical form of words.’ 158 
This form of paradoxical logic has a striking resemblance to the dialectical 
method of Nāgārjuna (c. 150-250) and the subsequent Madhyamaka school of 
thought which espouses a middle-way between emptiness and illusion. Could 
Heraclitus be the torch bearer for this very path, that if we could but understand the 
logos of which he speaks we would follow to the far shore of nirvāna or to the 
eternal void of śūnyatā and home-ground of absolute nothingness? But before we 
embark on such a journey with our new found guide, archaic poet extraordinaire, let 
us loiter a little longer, like frogs around a pond, on the fringes of the Mediterranean.  
The mythopoeic antecedents of the Presocratics were not immediately overthrown by 
the scientific revolution of Miletus and the Olympians were still very much part of 
the psychology and belief systems of the sixth-century. Where answers were not 
forthcoming in the burgeoning philosophies of the phusikos there was still Zeus and 
Apollo to attend to doubts and blame for confounding anomaly. Just as ‘how strange, 
almost unintelligible, would be the dogmatic rejection of cosmo-genesis by an 
archaic thinker’159 so too would it be quite peculiar for the same thinker to ignore the 
associated mythologies. Here, betwixt the entry into a rational scientific revolution 
and the exit from mythopoeic cosmologies, Heraclitus inserts his “riddling dictums.” 
It is the predecessor of Heraclitus, Thales - the earliest Greek physicist - who 
is generally recognised as the emblematic bridging figure between these radical 
shifts in enquiry, but I think Heraclitus not only maintains the bridge but he extends 
it into hitherto unknown territories. Fr. D. 32 provides some insight into the 
shimmering dominions of Heraclitus’s elusive projections and through its 
construction hints at the type of bridge he provides - rather more of a floating 
pontoon than a direct fly-over.  
 
Fr. D. 32 The wise is one alone, unwilling and willing to be spoken of by the name 
of Zeus.  
 
Kahn considers this ‘unusually dense and puzzling’ which is quite an 
indictment considering the usual puzzling density ascribed to the fragments. Here we 
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seem to have Zeus the divine ruler of the universe being named as the One, the wise 
and the only, yet uncommitted to where he stands with that. The richness and 
diversity of potential readings cannot really be appreciation without grasping what 
Kahn terms the ‘linguistic density’ and ‘resonance’ of the fragments. By ‘resonance’ 
he means the inter-relationship of the fragments connected through the ‘echo’ of 
words and images as they appear throughout. ‘Linguistic density’ is the wealth of 
sense or meaning invested in a single word or phrase. These two devices formally 
complement and support each-other in the very same way they are operative in 
reading the texts themselves, a didactic consistency Heraclitus would no doubt 
approve of. 
160
 On a second approach to Fr. D. 32 with these linguistic devices in 
mind the explicit antimony of the statement can be further understood as a complex 
part of the mysterious and conflicting whole that the overall project of Heraclitus 
endeavours to articulate.  
Starting with the naming of ‘Zeus,’ which most basically, at least 
superficially, invites and maintains passage to the foundational cosmologies 
supporting the new gang plank to a rationalist regime. However, it is not in 
acquiescent compliance to the Hesiodic Theogony that Heraclitus presents the 
thunderous and life giving God. He has used the older and more poetic genitive form 
Zēnos rather than the more standard nomitave form of Dios, with an ambiguous 
placement of ‘only’ or ‘alone’ (mounon), inverting the meaning substantially 
depending on which clause it is attached to: hence it could either be ‘the only thing 
to be called by the name of Zeus’ or ‘to be called only by the name of Zeus’ / ‘by the 
name “Zeus” alone.’161 Whilst the genitive form may evoke the traditional 
conception of a supreme god the use of the impersonal neuter article ‘one’ (hen) 
contests to a radical de-anthropomorphism quite unparalleled at the time. This is 
even further emphasised by the negation of the wise one being willingly identified 
with Zeus.
162
  
Similarly the first phrase, following Kirk, can ‘conceivably mean any of five 
different things: (i) “one thing, the only wise”; (ii) “one thing alone, the wise”; (iii) 
“the one wise thing alone”; (iv) “the wise is one thing only”…; (v) “the only wise 
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thing is one.”’163 Ultimately Kirk and Kahn concur that wisdom must here be 
understood in an absolute sense in its connection with a divine source, that there 
really is only one wise thing, or rather wise one, whether or not it is Zeus, the Logos, 
or some other incomprehensible and unnameable force that “steers all.” It is 
suggested in fact that Heraclitus’s created the precedent for the One of Plotinus. In 
his two-volume history of philosophy Karl Jaspers (1883-1969) groups Heraclitus 
and Plotinus together, amongst others,
164
 for their communality of vision and it is 
conceivable (though not probable) that the Plotinian system would not have reached 
the beatific unity with the One, had Plotinus not been heir to the paradoxical logic of 
Heraclitean philosophy that is inclusive and expansive in its ability to inhabit both 
sides of the bridge; ‘Thus the world is a place of transition, situated at once in light 
and darkness. It is beautiful and divine, because it originates in the One.’165   
 
Fr. D. 50 It is wise, listening not to me but to the report, to agree that all things are 
one. 
 
Fragment XV 
The scattered array: a convergence in Dōgen and Heraclitus 
 
The scattered residuum, disordered and incoherent, that makes up the 
landscape of a ruin, inverts the cosmogonic teleology of Chaos in a de-generative 
return to origins. The composite shambling tabulation of rock and clod, weed and the 
odd utterly magnificent cornice, that forms the peculiar dynamic life of a ruin is the 
historical world ‘set out in array.’ In Dōgen’s uji the true self or the self in its real 
“suchness” is none other than being-time. This self in turn, is inseparable from the 
world and thus as we apprehend the world from the standpoint of this self we are in 
effect seeing ourselves set out in array; ‘We set the self out in array and make that 
the whole world.’166 The image of the self “set out in array” as the world, and the 
world set out in array as an image of the self finds playful form in the ruin. There is 
also a compelling coincidence between the first philosophical rendering of the 
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ancient Greek kosmos by Heraclitus and Dōgen’s seeing of the world as our “self out 
in array.” 
Used in a philosophical sense with Heraclitus in Fr. D. 30, kosmos extends its 
earlier literary usage as “arrangement,” which alone has obvious connotations with 
“array” (keeping in mind these are both translations) into a technical sense of world-
order. The world, like Dōgen’s, is out in array. But even more compelling in the 
context of its resonance with uji is the implication in Heraclitus’s text that the order 
is ‘self-made or self-grown,’167 as is stated ‘no god nor man has made [the kosmos], 
but it ever was and is and will be’ and that the order is inseparable from the passage 
of time which is marked by the symbolic life of (a) fire ‘kindled in measures and in 
measures going out.’  Dōgen describes a simultaneous arising of the mind and the 
time of that mind, which is to say that the mind cannot be separate from time and 
because the whole world resides in each being-time, the whole world arises with the 
mind of one being-time. There is an order within the simultaneous arousal of world 
and self which means ‘these things do not get in each other’s way’ and there is no 
overlapping of times. Displayed in the seeming dis-array of the ruin there is a similar 
arrangement of simultaneous arousals of being and time. However anarchic the dis-
assemblage of foliate, dentils and colonnades may be, there presides over the chaos 
an uncanny sense of order, repose and creative synergy. 
 
Fragment XVI 
Nishida  
 
Nishida’s search for a logical system that could express all knowledge and 
experience of reality culminated in the logic of basho, a logic with an ultimate 
standpoint of absolute nothingness. His own process of refining and distilling 
demonstrates the internal principles that determine the same workings within the 
logic of basho. In his first published work, An Inquiry into the Good
168
 each thought 
generates the next, which is a perfectly natural procedure, even expected. Nishida 
however, seemed to do so with such veracity and fluidity that often the sentences 
appear disconnected and even unfinished, before the next thought begins. Reflecting 
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Third Episode 
218 
 
on Nishida’s lecture strategy Nishitani recalls, ‘It was as if all sorts of ideas inside 
him were jostling against one another and rushing to the exit at the same time. One 
sentence might not even be completed before another began.’169 It is not a lineal 
progression as we might take a system of logic to be - especially one that references 
an Aristotelian system based on subjects and predicates which Nishida’s does - and 
this is part of what Nishida’s own process articulates.  
His entire philosophy can be seen to build on the original idea of ‘pure 
experience’ that is developed in An inquiry into the Good, which is directly 
influenced by the thinking of  James.
170
 As Nishida himself says of this first work ‘I 
wanted to explain all things on the basis of pure experience as the sole reality.’171 
The enduring enquiry was not into “pure experience” as such, although it was a 
grounding root stem for an ever expanding inflorescence of ideas, but more the soul, 
so to speak, of reality. No small task. A task that necessarily involved actual concrete 
individual experience or ‘knowledge by direct acquaintance’ to be more than a mere 
abstract and sterile conceptualization.
 172
 This he obtained through the dedicated 
practice of zazen and on the authority of Robert Wargo ‘He did achieve 
enlightenment and he did philosophize.’173 Even his final standpoint of absolute 
nothingness articulated through the logic of basho is ‘a complex system always in 
flux and under revision.’174 The constant revision and consequent developments of 
his ideas accounted for both the aliveness and integrity of Nishida’s philosophy. 
Nishida was intent on creating a system that encompassed itself, so that all 
tendencies of objectification were sublimated, ‘to neutralize the observer,’175 and to 
avoid the delusional ‘dogmatism of the reified objective self.’176  
The philosophical problems he confronts are akin to those Wittgenstein most 
precisely delineates in his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, namely that we are 
some-how logically, that is thinkingly, confined to the world of our thinking, the 
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parameters set up by the system of our thinking, and that whatever lies outside that 
cannot logically or even illogically be spoken of. But Nishida is determined to break 
through the apophatic code of mystical ineffability and in his own ‘leap into 
“dazzling obscurity”’177 is able to concede the point of his predecessors, to whom he 
is much obliged, and then “implace” the point of his predecessors, into the 
circumference-less “loop” of his ultimate basho. Most philosophical systems are 
unable to demonstrate their own consistency without contradicting themselves. This 
was Gödels discovery in the gnarly (or as many would contend: the divine) world of 
mathematical logic, and this “incompleteness” is precisely what Nishida’s logic of 
basho attempts to resolve. According to Wargo, Nishida is able to avoid the 
shortcomings and “defects” of systems that ‘purport to be all-encompassing’ by 
‘rejecting the ultimacy of the subject-object dichotomy.’178  
Cameron Freeman positions Nishida’s logic within a post-metaphysics 
framework that is founded on a paradoxical formula which he calls a “structure of 
the Real,” a structure of ‘bi-polar reversals.’179 The paradoxical form of reality, 
Freeman’s “structure of the Real” is conspicuously represented through the 
hypostatic union in the person of Jesus.
180
 The experience of this paradoxical 
structure and any attempt to explain it is notoriously plagued with such semantic 
inadequacies that most efforts are thwarted, rendered illogical and generally 
abandoned. Or, alternatively, and this is a popular preference, the route is detoured. 
New constructions of reality are erected that saturate and block out the perturbing 
opalescence of illogical mystery and ambiguity, and instead we ‘invent secondary 
conceptions in order to neutralize their suggestions and to make our actual 
experience again seem rationally possible.’181 This is precisely what Freeman 
                                                 
177
 Wargo, The Logic of Nothingness. Also Nishida Kitarō, ‘Basho’ in Place and Dialectic: Two 
Essays by Nishida Kitarō trans. John W.M. Krummel and Shigenori Nagatomo (Oxford Scholarship 
Online: Oxford University Press, 2012), nt. 96. Here Nishida refers to Dionysius the Areopagite, an 
ancient Christian mystical theologian, most likely from the fifth century, who spoke of ‘the simple, 
absolute and unchangeable mysteries of heavenly Truth [that] lie hidden in the dazzling obscurity of 
the secret Silence, outshining all brilliance with the intensity of their darkness.’ De Mystica Theologia 
997b or Mystical Theology, chap. 1, in Dionysius the Areopagite on the Divine Names and the 
Mystical Theology, trans. E. Rolt, (New York: Macmillan, 1940 [1920]), 76.  
178
 Wargo, The Logic of Nothingness; A Study of Nishida Kitarō, 113. It should also be noted that 
these problems only accompany processes and theories of knowing, not for example in ‘a theory that 
deals with all material bodies, all of space-time, and so on.’ Ibid., 111.  
179
 Cameron Freeman, Post-Metaphysics and the Paradoxical Teachings of Jesus: The Structure of 
the Real (New York: Peter Lang Publishing Inc., 2010), 8. 
180
 Ibid., 78. 
181
 William James, Essays in Radical Empiricism (New York, London and Toronto: Longmans, Green 
and Co, 1947), 48-9. 
Third Episode 
220 
 
suggests has occurred in the early development of church doctrine, and the 
‘revolutionary language’ of paradox articulated through the parables of Jesus has 
been ‘buried and forgotten beneath the ossified theological dogma that was erected 
in the historical unfolding of the Christian Church.’182  
Accordingly, the nigh impossible task of explaining the experience of the 
paradoxical “structure of the Real” may on the other hand, be demonstrated or 
alluded to, for example, through parable. Freeman’s precise mission in Post-
Metaphysics and the Paradoxical Teachings of Jesus: The Structure of the Real is to 
dis-inter the “revolutionary language” of Jesus’s parables from “the ossified 
theological dogma” that has been constructed like a tomb around it. What Freeman 
acknowledges in Nishida’s logic of contradictory identity is a method by which to do 
this, ‘Nishida’s great insight is that there is nevertheless a system of philosophic 
understanding that can be truer than another because it points beyond itself to its 
ground or origin, which is experienced immediately or directly, and can be 
articulated conceptually in ways which are more faithful to the immediacy of the 
pure experience itself.’183 Or, as Uehara Mayuko puts it, ‘He hoped to disprove the 
impossibility of reconciling Zen’s immediate grasp of reality in the truest sense with 
a philosophy of self-reflection by way of objectification.’184 He does this through ‘a 
logic of unobjectifiable reality’ that inverts Aristotle’s ‘the subject that cannot 
become predicate’ into ‘the predicate that cannot become subject.’185  
In his final essay The Logic of the Place of Nothingness and the Religious 
Worldview Nishida confronts our ‘bottomlessly deluded depths’186 as self-conscious 
entities, and formulates a doctrine of “contradictory identity” that encompasses both 
subject and predicate in a unified non-objectifiable ‘simultaneous presence and 
absence of the self and the absolute.’187 This takes place on the field of absolute 
nothingness (to appropriate Nishitani’s idiom, itself an extension of Nishida’s 
concept of the ultimate “locus” or “place” of nothingness) where all dualities are 
overcome in a dynamic co-expressive form of creative expression.  
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He explains the world as a self-transforming matrix structured on a dynamic 
of contradictory identity. Where there is contradiction there is life. These are the life 
forces made explicit in the bi-directional transformation of the ruin. The rise and fall, 
the immediate now of past and future, or as Heraclitus puts it Fr. D. 60 The way up 
and down is one and the same. In the words of Nishida, so perfectly suited for the 
crumbling growth of the ruin, ‘it is this dynamic world, having the form of self-
affirmation through self-negation, that transforms itself by expressing itself within 
itself.’188 
 
α.  Basho: ruins as a receptacle of basho 
 
Nishida acknowledges Plato’s notion from the Timaeus of the “receptacle 
place” or “chōra” as the container of ideas, but is careful to distinguish basho from 
what he sees as the fundamental limitations of the notion conditioned by an 
overriding objectification. By appropriating the term ‘receptacle’ he is able to give 
an immediate philosophical grounding and perhaps an historical context that is an 
unusual reference point in Japan at the time of Nishida. He takes the concept further 
by extending the contained to the container within the Idea as well, ‘We cannot 
determine basho by means of so-called logical form. Instead it is basho that 
establishes logical form.’189 His basho is about concrete experience. It is the basis of 
his explanation of reality that accounts for the one and many. Basho is a field or 
“platz” (as he apparently referred to it in his notes190) where the dynamic 
interpenetration of the epistemological subject and the object of cognition mutually 
and interdependently co-exist. This arrangement takes direction from the Buddhist 
conception of śūnyatā which is represented as ‘a field ten thousand miles wide, 
where there is not an inch of grass growing.’191  
Nishida’s multidimensional matrix of basho starts with the physical world 
and builds through the biological to arrive ultimately in its final ontological looping 
to the human-historical-existential world. For Nishida, the ultimate basho, the “place 
of nothingness” is only made possible through the ‘biconditional structure of mutual 
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negation and affirmation’192 evident in the self-conscious act at the level of the 
human-historical. This ultimate basho, a ‘universal that envelops and determines all 
individuals,’ 193  is not to be thought of as just a place or “receptacle” but is also self-
determining within itself. It is in this way that basho overcomes the objectification 
latent within Plato’s chōra. Another very important aspect that Nishida critiques as a 
failing in the chōra is the lack of ‘positivity operative in its formlessness.’194 
In his essay Logic and Life, written some ten years after his first articulations of the 
logic of basho, Nishida applies the logical structure of basho to the outer world of 
historical reality. The basic structure of basho is a dialectical unfolding of a self-
determining world. He applies this structure to the outer world where the interaction 
between humans and nature working ‘upon one another and upon things’195 is more 
readily evident. Nishida attempts to overcome the objectification of logic by making 
the basho structuring self-inclusive: 
 
Historical reality is not something that we can just conceive by means of the 
logic of objectification. The active self is unable to enter into the world of 
objects postulated by the logic of objectification. Therefore the world of 
historical reality must be inclusive of the self at work.
196
  
 
Nishida’s aim with the logic of basho is to ‘explain the structure of 
experience’ and explain nothingness in context with more “ordinary concepts.”197 As 
we have said the notion of basho owes something to Plato’s “receptacle,” and it is 
also an engagement with Aristotle’s enquiries into originative substance. He moves 
away from the influence of German Idealism prominent in Japan at the time and 
more towards a kind of realism which started with his interest in the ‘pure 
experience’ of James and Wundt.  
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Fragment XVII 
Simmel, Hetzler and ruin time 
 
The existence of the ruin is predicated on non-existence. The ruin is a 
poignant reminder and image of the interconnectedness of the ‘going and coming’ of 
time’s passage and of the cycle of justice measured out ‘in accordance with some 
fated necessity,’198 and it’s undeniable and ‘immediately perceived presence’199 
bespeaks of far more than just a cycle of decay and renewal.    
When the ruin is viewed askance from the usual framework of history and 
archaeology, it lends itself most overtly to philosophical ruminations on 
impermanence, flux and cyclic change. But perhaps in equal measure, to 
metaphysical notions of becoming. These ideas are evident in the sociologist Georg 
Simmel’s (1858-1918) short essay “The Ruin” from which it seems Florence Hetzler 
heavily drew to form her own concept of ruin-time. Undoubtedly the idea of the ruin 
attracts a certain quixotic nostalgia and has a special flair for inspiring the prosaic 
orator to verse. Although I don’t intend to take up rhyme, I confess I am not immune 
to the poetic persuasions that the conticent ruin somewhat ironically evokes. Simmel, 
Hetzler, and most notably, Robert Ginsberg in The Aesthetics of Ruins, all display 
advanced symptoms of the nostalgia distinctive to the ruin, a kind of utopic 
mourning.
200
  
Aesthetically Simmel reads the ruin as a ‘unity of external image and internal 
effect’ where antagonistic and contradictory forces are resolved in ‘a profound 
peace, which, like a holy charmed circle, surrounds the ruin.’201 He would not 
experience with Wiles the same profound proximity to the past in the muted visage 
of Bernadette. For Simmel ‘A painting from which particles of paint have fallen off, 
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[or] a statue with mutilated limbs’202 does not constitute the artistic unity embodied 
in the ruin through the growth and life of nature amidst the dying form of the 
constructed edifice.  
Normally we are privy to a one directional flow, that from life to death, from 
beginning to end, but the simultaneous arousal of being and time in ruin-time gives 
us an image, in the ruin, of life-sive-death and death-sive-life. Nishitani describes the 
emergence of the ‘true suchness’ of a form as ‘the point at which the orientation to 
life and the orientation to death intersect. Everything can be seen as a kind of 
“double exposure” of life and death, of being and nihility.’203 The “double exposure” 
or “emergence” in the form of the ruin of life and death makes it an outstanding form 
of “true suchness.” By outstanding I mean it is visible, and stands out in its true 
form. Both life and death become simultaneously visible thus a mode of being 
‘termed life-sive-death, death-sive-life.’204 
There is a romantic candour with the blush of naivety in Hetzler’s 
enthusiastic veneration of the ruin. She heralds the ruin as ‘a new category of 
being.’205 Her exalting appreciations of this newly declared state are not in 
themselves complicated by the probing of existential pontifications, but yet contain 
within them the seeds of whose flowers reveal their more exquisite and subtle 
renderings further afield. Indeed the coalescence of time with being in Hetzler’s 
ruin-time immediately summons the unique perspective of Dōgen and his concept of 
uji.  
Ruin-time, as Hetzler explains it, is a unifying natural force acting in 
opposing directions that is in fact immanent in the ruin. In Taoist and Confucian 
thought there is a principle of effortless or natural action called wu-wei. Wu-wei 
denotes ‘action that . . . accords in every particular with the normative order of the 
cosmos’ and is also suggested as a ‘phenomenological state’ that is an embodiment 
of the Way (Tao) rather than observable action.
206
 It is in this way that the great sage 
rules, as it states in the Tao-Te Ching:  
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Being and non-being produce each other;  
Difficult and easy complete each other;  
Long and short contrast each other;  
High and low distinguish each other;  
Sound and voice harmonise with each other;  
Front and back follow each other.  
Therefore the sage manages affairs without action (wu-wei)  
And spreads doctrines without words.  
All things arise, and he does not turn away from them.
207
 
 
Sometimes wu-wei is thought of as non-action, but this does not mean doing 
nothing, it means non premeditated action in accordance with a natural flow or order 
of things. This natural action of wu-wei definitively resonates with the ruin-time of 
Hetzler. Both evolve from a ‘spontaneous accord with the patterns of nature’208 and 
in the graceful flow of times unfolding without forceful interference the ruin and the 
rule is acted out. Indeed if the process of ruination is forced in any way it becomes 
one of destruction and the sight of ruins becomes one of dereliction and death, with 
no equilibrium between generation and extinction. The unforced flow of action in 
time is utterly essential to the life of the ruin.   
The contradictory forces of ruin-time create a paradoxical movement of 
simultaneous ruination and unification. If the ‘maturation process’209 of the ruin is 
affected through precipitant events outside the uninfluenced causality of nature in the 
uninterrupted flow of time then it is not the creation of ruin-time and the ruin as such 
is simply a site of destruction. It is ruin time that gives the ruin its being.  
Hetzler writes, ‘each being has its own time,’210 however she does not mean 
this at all in the sense that Dōgen says being is time, but rather more standardly that 
each little packet of star dust has a shelf life, a pending expiration date: that there is 
an allotted stretch of time given to each being as it marks its path across the skies, or 
maybe that each being beats to their own time-ing perhaps. Or, gleaning our own 
meaning from what might be superficially evident in the statement, it could be that 
each individual expression of being is a self-determining co-expression of a 
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universal absolute, of which each is accorded their own time and unique positioning. 
As with Heraclitus, in the measuring out of this own time, cosmic order is 
maintained. Only through this strife is justice maintained. Either way there is a 
grasping of the “skin, flesh, bones or marrow” of a much larger existential awareness 
embedded in the cracks and fallen temples of history. 
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Third Stasimon 
 
Enter Chorus. They set off across stage. What a gait. Stiffness of the lower limbs, as 
if nature had denied them knees, extraordinary splaying of the feet to right and left 
of the line of march. The trunk, on the contrary, as if by the effect of a compensatory 
mechanism, as flabby as an old ragbag, tossing wildly to the unpredictable jolts of 
the pelvis.
1
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Exodos 
 
 
[Interlocuters] 
 
THRIB 
THREAP 
A PIECE OF ROCK IN ALLEGORY 
RECEPTIONIST 
CHORUS 
 
[Scene] 
Amongst drifting cloud wisps Thrib and Threap perch on a craggy precipice near the 
summit of a magnificent floating peak, somewhere near-by is a secluded alpine 
retreat, as of yet undiscovered or undisclosed. 
The voice of Receptionist emerges from the abyss below, often distorted with echo. 
The chorus loiter mid-way up the mountain on a very small, unexpected and welcome 
alpine-steppe. 
 
THRIB: Oh yes. (Pause). I should have want to go over there (waves non-committedly 
in a generalised far off direction). 
THREAP: Yes. (Assured, knowing, inordinately calm). 
THRIB: (Pause) Yes. (Mimics the assurance of Threap) Probably (pause) mmm (less 
sure). 
 
Silence 
  
RECEPTIONIST: (shouting out, slightly distracted) What? 
 
Thrib: (with a start) Oh! (Looks around, down, around, at Threap, takes a small 
mirror out of his top pocket and looks at himself, with particular attention to the 
nose). Well! (Puts the mirror back, looks straight out again-not down). Is it…? Shall 
we? (Looks again at Threap. Threap leans forward and peers down into the abyss. 
After an indeterminate time of contemplation Threap leaps off the crag, without 
ceremony).  
 
CHORUS: Mountains respond to the temple bell in the moonlight

 
 
A PIECE OF ROCK IN ALLEGORY: …and that. 
                                                 

 Zenkei Shibayama, Zen Comments on the Mumonkan, trans. Sumiko Kudo (New York: Harper and 
Row Publishers, 1974), 95. 
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Addendum 
 
 
In conclusively, unknowing is evoked as a state,and this state is then posed as 
a method. Out of this expressive state of method of unknowing,it is intimated thatthe 
creative act transpires. It is participatory and relational, a conversation, a bi-
directional mutual exchange between it is and it is not. A parry with paradox, a 
collaboration with the coincidence of opposites, a fugitive penetration into memories 
oblivion. A state of method is the being of doing. 
As to the characteristics, customs and habitat of this state of method, a 
definitive field guide has not been provided. This entire document is a guide to rather 
than on. Certain routes are suggested, and certain signs are offered. A risky word to 
bring in at the tail end of the trail, but nevertheless it may be said that instinct, 
unqualified and unreasonable, is the true guide. Outrageous. Problematic? Risky. 
This is an individual guide which must be met with on one’s own terms. Those terms 
may respond to a shared logos and therefore be comprehendible in some way 
(although Heraclitus did not witness such harmony within the all) and form part of a 
“human universal” like that which Kahn identifies in the philosophical resonances 
between disparate cultures, geographies and histories.  
Unknowing is a creative method, a state out of which the creative act is made 
possible. It doesn’t have any specs, it doesn’t have anything, it is because it is not. 
There can be no about (ah the apocryphal about) of a state of unknowing, it can only 
be (the epiphanic is), and that is what this has attempted to demonstrate, attempted to 
be, or perhaps better said, daimonstrate.  
The question remains. Does the creative gesture start where knowing ends? 
What is the creative gesture? There are no direct routes, not to this question, but in 
answer to it, there are no direct routes because pointed determined routes are not 
creative, they block. That does not mean there is no destination, or indeed that there 
must not be some form of destination in mind to head towards, or else departure 
would be futile, unimaginable, un thought of (ansking – departure is the question, 
destination the answer) BUT, there are all those unexpected stop overs. 
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Fr. D. 18 He who does not expect will not find out the unexpected, for it is trackless 
and unexplored.

  
 
Is it a form of thoughtless thinking? Not ill considered thoughtlessness, but 
like a form of formlessness, an act which comes from the void where body and mind 
have been thrown off and the “true suchness” of a thing, a moment, an act, a being, 
is encountered. Perhaps the ultimate creative gesture is being, and as being is nothing 
without time then we must do. The product of being is incessant doing, the 
ineluctable activities that being compels, even, as Nishitani states, if that doing is 
doing nothing at all. Doing nothing is still a creative gesture. To be in time is to do 
something, even if that something is nothing. How does unknowing govern the act of 
being-time and ineluctable doing? With free reign, in fact, the bridle is quite 
forgotten. 
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